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           Thesis Summary 
The aim of this study was to investigate the feasibility of identifying latent system failures in a 
paediatric National Health Service hospital in the England (NHS). Medicine related errors 
affect up to 9% of all patients in NHS hospitals. 
The theoretical basis included error causation theory, the functioning of short-term memory 
and how the brain manages multiple stimuli. The literature review covered error causation 
and prevention research, undertaken in healthcare settings and other high-risk industries. 
The study environment was the dispensary of Birmingham Children’s Hospital (BCH) and a 
busy ward. The study instrument was non-participant, direct observation of routine 
dispensing and medicines administration tasks. 
The first phase identified latent risks in a specific readily observable task set in a specialist 
paediatric hospital pharmacy department. Having identified a major latent risk, interruption, 
the investigation then established the significance that interruptions had on operatives. The 
second phase investigated the efficiency and effectiveness of the current Incident and error 
reporting system (IR1s) in supporting learning from incidents and changing practice.  
The first phase identified “interruptions” as a latent error and demonstrated, for what appears 
to have been the first time in healthcare research, the impact these have on operatives. The 
second phase confirmed that a gap existed in healthcare error reduction strategies. From the 
outcomes of the first two phases a completely new strategy, to predict latent system errors 
and then to reduce them was devised. The strategy was then implemented in another area of 
the hospital, with different staff, on a high-risk task, IV medicine administration and was 
shown to reduce medicine errors.  
Key Words and Phrases:  Medicine Incidents; Checklists; Error Causation; Efficiency, 
Incident Reporting, Interruptions, Learning Organization, Latent System Failures, Quality 
Management Systems, Memory, Multitasking, Non-professionalism, Patient Safety, 
Paediatric Pharmacy, Professionalism, Risk Management. 
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Chapter 1 Background and Introduction 
Background 
Adverse drug events have accounted for 16% of Hospital admissions in the UK according to 
the World Health Organization 1 who go on to say that some countries spend up to 15-20% of 
their hospital budget dealing with drug complications and in the National Health Service in 
England and Wales the costs have been estimated to be £530 million pounds a year2. The 
National Patient Safety Agency’s (NPSA) National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) 
data, a database of voluntary reported incidents, shows that the proportion of reported 
medication incidents that involve 0-4 years olds is higher than that for the population as a 
whole and it is recognized that children are a particularly vulnerable group when it comes to 
medication errors.  Reasons for this have been attributed to a number of causes that include: 
medicines used for children are often used outside of their license or are simply just not 
licensed for children, dose calculations are complicated and medicines are used in ad hoc 
formulations and presentations.  
These reasons, alone may not be adequate to account for the frequency of medicine errors 
that occur in paediatric pharmacy other factors may need to be considered? This study will 
investigate the feasibility of  identifying errors in paediatric pharmacy prospectively and then 
go on to demonstrate that it is possible to reduce the frequency of their occurrence.  
This study will look in detail at a single phase in the dispensing process of paediatric 
medicine, the accuracy-checking phase, and by applying error causation theory look for 
indicators of the existence of latent errors within the system.  It will then attempt to determine 
whether these latent errors are inherent within the dispensing processes, workplace design 
or are of some other identifiable source.  Finally, it will propose solutions to mitigate these 
latent errors.  
Introduction 
1 WHO Organisation  (2002). Safety of Medicines - A Guide to Detecting and Reporting Adverse Drug Reactions - 
Why Health   Professionals Need to Take Action. 
2 NICE (2015). Costing statement: Medicines optimisation Implementing the NICE guideline on medicines 
optimisation (NG5). 
14	
A study 3Pirmohamed, James et al. (2004) conducted from November 2001 to April 2002 in
two NHS hospitals in Merseyside assessed 18,820 patients aged over 16 years of age 
admitted for cause of admission. It found that there were 1225 admissions related to an 
adverse drug event (ADR), giving a prevalence of 6.5%, with the ADR directly leading to the 
admission in 80% of cases. The median bed stay was eight days, accounting for 4% of the 
hospital bed capacity. In another study of ADRs in hospital inpatients it was thought that 
ADRs may be occurring in 9% of hospital inpatients , Davies 4(Davies, Green et al. 2009) . 
The National Learning and Reporting System (NLRS) was created in 2003  as one of the 
outcomes of the report “An Organisations with as memory”5, published by the department of 
Health  following review chaired by the Chief Medical Officer for England, Professor Sir Liam 
Donaldson, DoH (2000)  After the recent reorganization of the NHS, in 2014, the 
responsibility for patient safety passed  from the National Patient Safety Organisation (NPSA) 
to NHS England (NHSE). Each NHS organisation and others providing healthcare such as 
General Practitioner Surgeries (GPs) and Community Pharmacies collect details of incidents, 
reporting each occurrence through completing an incident form, known as an IR1. This is 
achieved using IR1 reporting software such as Datix6, although other systems also exist, 
which is passed onto the NLRS gateway and the data aggregated and analysed. The NLRS 
holds data on over 4 million incident reports submitted since its inception in 2003, with over 
600,000 of these having been reported between October 2014 and March 2015 alone7 
The National Reporting and Learning System data showed that in a 12-month period 
between October 2007 and September 2008 there were 910,089 incidents and, of these, 2% 
were found to relate to the care of neonates and 5% to the care of children. Medication 
incidents were the most commonly reported incident type for children accounting for 17% of 
all incidents NPSA (NLRS 2009)8 .  In another NPSA report, children aged up to four years 
were involved in 10.1 per cent (2,081) of all medication incident reported where age was 
3 Pirmohamed, M., et al. (2004). "Adverse drug reactions as cause of admission to hospital: 
prospective analysis of 18 820 patients." BMJ 329(7456): 15-19. 
4 Davies, E.C., Green, C.F., Mottram, D.R., Pirmohamed, M.; Adverse drug reactions in hospital in-
patients: a pilot Study Journal of Clinical Pharmacy and Therapeutics (2006) 31, 335-341 
5 Donaldson,L (Chair). An organisation with a memory; Department of Health (2000) 
<https://www.aagbi.org/sites/default/files/An%20organisation%20with%20a%20memory.pdf 
6 http://www.datix.co.uk/en/products/datixweb/incident-reporting <accessed August 2017> 
7 Organisation Patient Safety Incident Reports - data workbooks September 2015; < 
http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/?entryid45=135465> accessed February 2016 
8 NLRS, NPSA.-. (2009). Review of Patient Safety for Children and younf people. 
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stated, NPSA 9(NHS 2007). One study found that the rate of potential adverse drug events or 
near misses (ADEs) was about 3 times higher in children than for adults Kaushal (2001) 10.  
 
Types of errors that lead to adverse drug events are well documented. Error reduction 
strategies within the NHS are led by the NPSA and its seven steps for all healthcare settings 
approach NPSA 11 , which consists of a number of elements that include building a safety 
culture, risk management, incident reporting, communication, learning from errors and 
changing systems. Learning from errors is an outcome of the recommended investigation 
methodology, Root Cause Analysis (RCA). RCA and changing systems form a useful and 
effective error reducing strategy but are not without their limitations. RCA is dependent upon 
reconstructing the past in an attempt to understand error causation and thereby eliminate this 
error from occurring in the future. However, this approach is particularly susceptible to 
hindsight bias and counterfactual thought. Counterfactual thoughts express a past that is 
possible but untrue. Counterfactual theory helps to explain how inquiries may be subject to 
biases and errors of judgment that can manifest themselves in incorrect perceptions and the 
misallocation of blame, Reiss 12(Reiss 2001)   . Hindsight bias is the tendency for people with 
outcome knowledge to believe falsely that they would have predicted the reported outcome of 
an event. Research suggests that it is impossible to reconstruct the past accurately, 
Fischhoff13 Given knowledge of outcome, reviewers will tend to simplify the problem-solving 
situation that was actually faced by the practitioner. “The dilemmas, the uncertainties, the 
tradeoffs, the attentional demands, and double binds (two or more conflicting messages) 
faced by practitioners may be missed or under-emphasized when an incident is viewed in 
Hindsight. Possessing knowledge of the outcome, because of the hindsight bias, trivializes 
the situation confronting the practitioners and makes the correct choice seem crystal clear.” 
Woods (Woods, Johannesen et al. 1994)14. 																																																								
9 NHS, NPSA. (2007). Safety in doses: medication safety incidents in the NHS: P6; The fourth report 
from the Patient Safety Observatory. 
10 Kaushal, R., et al. (2001). "Medication errors and adverse drug events in pediatric inpatients." JAMA 
285(16): 2114-2120. 
11 NPSA; 2004; Seven steps to patient safety;  file:///Users/anthonysinclair/Downloads/NRLS-0034-
seven-steps-pat-reference-2004-07-v1.pdf  <accessed July 2009> 
12 Reiss, D. (2001). "Counterfactuals and inquiries after homicide." The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 
12(1): 169-181. 
13 Fischhoff B. For those condemned to study the past: heuristics and biases in hindsight. In: 
Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tversky A. Judgments under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982: 335–51 
 
14 Woods DD, Johannesen LJ, Cook RI, et al. Behind human error: cognitive systems, computers, and 
hindsight. Pp7-8;  (CSERIAC SOAR 94-01) Wright-Patterson, AFB, OH: Crew Systems Ergonomics 
Information Analysis Center, 1991. 
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Two areas that merit research and the outcomes of which could potentially impact on the 
numbers of adverse drug events are an understanding of error causation in the paediatric 
pharmacy setting and an appreciation of associated processes. This study set out to identify 
latent errors and look for weaknesses, latent errors, in the existing system.  
 
Error theory & causation 
 
The two most commonly reported errors associated with dispensing of medicines, as 
reported to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), are the wrong medicine or 
drug being supplied and the correct medicine being supplied but with an incorrect strength or 
dose or frequency, Warner 15 (Warner 2008).  Dispensing the wrong medicine or the right 
medicine but with an incorrect strength or dose is the visible outcome of a particular error 
process. In other words, it was the error outcome not the error cause.  Error outcomes, such 
as incorrect picking errors, that is selecting the wrong medicine or right medicine but incorrect 
strength, have been reduced successfully by a variety of simple but clever techniques that 
include not storing similarly named medicines next to each other. Also, changing packaging 
and using colour to good effect.  The error cause can be repeated even though the error 
outcome will now be different. Atenolol 100mg tablets may no longer be picked incorrectly for 
a prescription requiring Allopurinol 100mg Tablets but another picking error might well occur.  
The questions that need to be addressed are what factor or factors caused the error to occur 
and so an unwanted outcome and end, more significantly, could these factors have been 
predicted and so prevented.  
 
It is relevant to consider the definition of an error.  The following description is largely based 
upon James Reason’s book Human Error (1990) 16, chapter 3. “Errors are planned actions 
that fail to achieve their desired consequences without the intervention of some chance or 
unforeseen agency. Error types include slips and lapses, where the actions do not go 
according to plan and mistakes where the plan itself is inadequate to achieve its objectives”.  
In addition to error types, which are performance related, there are error forms, which are 
evident at all levels of human performance and are a product of the cognitive processes of 
long-term memory. Reason’s Generic error modeling system or GEMS, itself derived from 
																																																								
15 Warner,B  Reducing dispensing errors; (2008) ; 
< http://www.thepharmacist.co.uk/clinical services/reducing-dispensing-errors> accessed July 2009. 
 
16 Reason,J. Human Error ;Cambridge University press;1990; P64 
 
17	
Rasmussen’s skill-rule-knowledge classification of human performance, 17Rasmussen (1983) 
presents an integrated picture of error mechanisms operating at the three levels of 
performance:-  
1. Skill based performance is sensory-motor in nature, the ability to correlate visual
stimuli, motor coordination with space and depth perception to carry out pre-
determined tasks, that take place “without conscious control as smooth, automated
and highly integrated patterns of behaviour” Rasmussen 18(Rasmussen 1986) . An
example of this activity would be stacking shelves with medicine packs or the reverse
activity of selecting a pack from a shelf in the dispensary. These are automated
routine actions requiring little conscious attention,19 Embrey (1990).
2. Rule based activities in the context of the dispensary would include accuracy
checking dispensed medicines. The medicine has been assembled and labeled and
finally requires an operative to check that the correct medicine has been dispensed
for the selected patient. Appropriate labels and instructions have been selected. Rule
based activities require some conscious cognitive activity and some automated
behavior. It takes the form of, if this happens then take this action. If this medicine
requires being stored below 8 degrees centigrade then attach a store in the fridge
label.
3. Knowledge based activities have no routines or rules available for their solution and
require active conscious thought to derive a solution. In the dispensary, this type of
activity is typified by the Clinical pharmacy screening process.
A diagrammatic representation follows taken from Reason (2002)
17 "Skills, Rules and Knowledge;Signals,Signs ans Symbols and other distinctions in HUman 
performance Models." IEEE TRansaction Systems, Man and Cybernetics 13(3): 257- 266. 
18 Rasmussen, J. (1986). Information Processing and Human-Machine Interaction: An Approach to 
Cognitive Engineering, Elsevier Science Inc. 
19 Embrey, D. (1990). Understanding Human Error and Behaviour. Internet, Human Reliability 
Associates Ltd  
18	
Figure 1 Outlining the dynamics of the generic error modelling system (Gems). Reason 
(1990)  
Groeneweg’s Groeneweg (2002)  summary of the Generic error-modeling system (GEMS), 
three stages are traversed in order to bring about intentional actions. These are  
1. Planning the action,
2. Mental storage of the action in the memory and
3. Execution of the action.
19	
Errors can occur at each of these stages generating planning mistakes, storage lapses or 
execution slips. Groeneweg 20 Groeneweg (2002) goes on to explain that slips and lapses 
may occur as a result of a lack of attention, for example owing to an internal or external 
distraction, or because of over attention (too many or prolonged checks), which often occurs 
after a period of reduced attention and Double Capture slips, where the control of an action is 
captured by a stronger habitual sequence.  Perceptual confusion errors often cause slips 
resulting in the correct action being carried out on the wrong but similar-looking object. Two 
other error types also have relevance and these are reduced intentionality, where there is a 
delay between formulation of an action and execution of the action as a result of a failure in 
prospective memory. Environmental capture refers to a situation where something in the 
surroundings distracts an operator from their intended task, for example a telephone ringing, 
resulting in the failure to carry out the intended action. 
Errors at the skill-based level are mainly due to monitoring failures as a result of inattention to 
the task in hand. Rule based activities are solved by applying rules, that is an if…..then 
problem solving approach and errors arise from the application of bad rules or the 
misapplication of good rules. Knowledge based mistakes arise from the concept of bounded 
rationality, a term coined by Herbert Simon, Simon (1978)21, that is the rationality of 
individuals is limited to the information they have at their disposal, the cognitive limitations of 
their minds and the time they have available to solve the problem. In particular, where 
knowledge available for the required cognitive processing is inadequate or missing it is 
known as cognitive under specification.  
In addition to the three Error types, described above, Error forms occur at all performance 
levels and originate in all cognitive processes and are explained later in this paragraph, 
Reason (1990). Reason (1990) argued that the area in which cognitive functions are carried 
out in the brain is an area called the working memory. In order to function, the working 
memory draws knowledge from our long-term memory or knowledge base. To retrieve 
information appropriate to a particular problem-solving situation, two heuristics are employed. 
These are similarity-matching, using the degree of likeness between events or objects, and 
the second is known as frequency gambling, that is selecting events or objects that have 
occurred before; these are known as cognitive primitives and are thought to process 
information automatically without conscious effort. When cognitive operations are 
20 Groeneweg, J. (2002). Controlling the Controllable: Preventing Business Upsets, DSWO Press. 
21 http://innovbfa.viabloga.com/files/Herbert Simon theories of bounded rationality 1972.pdf <accessed 
August 8th, 2016)  
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underspecified, that is insufficient information is available to carry out a task, memory 
defaults to the most appropriate response that has occurred most often previously.  A lack of 
attention to the task in hand, inadequate processes or failure to comply with existing 
processes, insufficient, incomplete or inadequate knowledge or information all contribute to 
error causation.  
Error types and error forms are only part of the error causation picture.  In the example of a 
pharmacy dispensary in which medicines are dispensed, an operator carrying out a skill 
based task, for example preparing a label for a tablet container, may momentarily lose 
concentration and generate an incorrect label. A mistake or substandard act has occurred. In 
the accident causation model known as the Swiss Cheese model developed by Reason 
(1990), and used widely in the NHS, there is a chance that a barrier or defense in the 
dispensing process will identify the error before the medicine reaches the patient that it is 
intended for. There is also a chance that the substandard act won’t be detected by the barrier 
and will pass through to cause an accident. The barrier in this context is the pharmacy 
operative tasked with accuracy checking dispensed items.  
										Figure	2			Swiss	cheese	model	of	accident	causation	(Reason	1990) 
Each slice of cheese represents a barrier or defense put in place to prevent an accident from 
occurring. The holes represent weaknesses in each barrier. 
An error type or error form have occurred that has led to a substandard act which in turn, if 
not prevented from doing so by a barrier, will reach a patient potentially causing unfortunate 
consequences; an error would have occurred. What causes the error types and error forms to 
occur? In Figure 3 the anatomy of an error causation pathway, adapted from Reason (1989), 
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latent failures in the system gives rise to substandard acts occurring. 
Figure 3   Anatomy of an error causation pathway Groeneweg (2002) 
One Error type can give rise to multiple substandard acts that may not be repeated in the 
same way or same order again. However, controlling the effects of Basic Risk Factors 
(BRFs) would prevent substandard acts from occurring. There are 11 BRFs , Van der Meeren 
22 Meeran Van der (1990) .These are outlined in table 1 Basic Risk Factors.   
Figure 4 Basic risk factors (BRFs) - Groeneweg (2002) 
22 Meeran Van der, R. (1990). "Generalised accident scenarios. Towards a better understanding of the 
dynamics of accident causation." 
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The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA)23 NHS (2007) in their booklet Design for patient 
safety, says this “Human beings usually make mistakes because the systems, tasks and 
processes they work within are poorly designed. Effective design can deliver products, 
services, processes and environments that are intuitive, simple to understand, simple to use, 
convenient and comfortable, and consequently less likely to lead to errors”. The BRFs 
associated with this statement arguably are design, Error enforcing conditions, Procedures. 
The booklet outlines concepts for good dispensary design, see figure 4 – Dispensary 
workflow design, and goes on to describe ways in which giving thought to design, particularly 
workflow and the impact of the environment on those working  
Figure 5 Dispensary workflow design from the NPSA booklet: Design for patient safety. 
Step 1 is where a prescription enters the system; Steps 2-5 are elements of the dispensing 
process; Step 6 is where the patient is counselled and step 7 the patient leaves with their 
medication. (a detailed description can be found below in the section “Strategic Approach- 
Study 1). 
23 NHS, NPSA (2007). "Design for patient safety- a guide to developing the dispensing environment " 
(edition 1). 
23	
within it, can help to reduce errors from occurring in the dispensing process. Examples of the 
latter would be Noise and Interruptions. An additional BRF is defenses; the mechanisms put 
in place to capture sub-standard acts from resulting in errors, and ought to be incorporated 
into good Procedures. Linear workflow is widely accepted to be the most efficient and 
practical system to adopt to promote efficiency and reduce error rates within a dispensary. 
What happens, however, when two BRFs are apparently at odds, when for example design 
that suggests linear workflow means that Noise and interruptions increase by the 
juxtaposition of workstations?  
Interruptions 
Noise or disruption and interruptions merit attention; they are part and parcel of the 
functioning of a large dispensary in which multiple tasks are being carried out simultaneously. 
Boehm-Davis 24 (Boehm-Davis and Remington 2009) define an interruption as the 
suspension of one stream of work prior to completion, with the intent of returning to and 
completing the original stream of work and disruption being a momentary lapse of attention 
on the primary task without a requirement to engage in the distracting task. 
Research has shown that Interruptions consume about 28 percent of the knowledge worker's 
day, Speier (1999)25 . It was found that interrupted work environments in which complex 
intellective tasks are performed leads to lower quality decisions and decreased efficiency. 
Furthermore, even helpful interruptions that are, those that facilitated the completion of 
simple tasks, were perceived negatively by decision makers. Interruptions are disruptive, just 
how disruptive depends upon several factors that Trafton (2008) 26 summarises as 
interruption complexity; see figure 6 the anatomy of an interruption, similarity of the 
interrupting task to the primary task, how closely the interrupting and primary tasks are 
related, control over interruption engagement, and the availability of retrieval cues in the 
24 Boehm-Davis, D. A. and R. Remington (2009). "Reducing the disruptive effects of interruption: A 
cognitive framework for analysing the costs and benefits of intervention strategies." Accident Analysis 
& Prevention 41(5): 1124-1129. 
25 Speier, C, Valacich, J S, Vessey, I . Influence of task interruption on individual decision making: An 
information overload perspective, The Decision Sciences, Spring 1999 
26 Trafton.J.G. & Monk, C.M. (2008)  Task Interruptions. In D.A. Boehm-Davis, (Ed), 
Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics, Volume 3, Chapter 4 p111-126.2008  
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primary task. 
Figure	6			Anatomy	of	an	Interruption	Trafton	(2008) 
To recover well from an interruption requires pre-planning and preparation. Boehm et al 
(2009) outline two such approaches. The first is aimed at decreasing the amount of 
information that needs to be remembered upon resumption of the task. This, it is suggested 
can be brought about by breaking from the task in hand at a suitable boundary or stage in the 
task enabling the operative to resume work at the next stage or step in their task process. 
They may complete producing a medicine label for example, so when they resume they take 
up the task at packing the completed item into a bag. The second strategy is to increase the 
probability of recalling the origin task (prospective memory), for example by using 
approaches to increase internal memory (such as rehearsal) or through the creation of 
external memory, such as leaving notes. 
Distractions (i.e. in hospitals) are commonplace and have been identified as a major 
contributor to medication errors (and medical errors in general). The Medmarx report 	(2008)27 lists distractions as the number one contributing factor in error causation in each of its data 
reports published between 2002 and 2006. There have not been many studies that have 
looked at methods to reduce distractions in hospitals, Clifton-Koeppel (2008) (2008)28.	This is 
27 Hicks RW, Becker SC, Cousins DD, eds. (2008). MEDMARX data report. A report on the 
relationship of drug names and medication errors in response to the Institute of Medicine’s call for 
action. Rockville, MD:  Center for the Advancement of Patient Safety, US Pharmacopeia; 
http://www.usp.org/pdf/EN/medmarx/2008MEDMARXReport.pdf  <accessed February 2009> 
28 Clifton-Koeppel,R. ; What Nurses Can Do Right Now to Reduce Medication Errors in the Neonatal 
Intensive Care Unit; Newborn and Infant Nursing Reviews, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 72-82, 2008. 
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not the case in the aerospace industry however, where accident investigation of a number of 
airline accidents by the National Transportation Safety Board, USA, such as the Eastern 
Airlines flight 212, concluded that distractions were a significant error causation factor. The 
Federal Aviation authority wrote the Sterile cockpit rule, thus in 1981. Flight crewmember 
duties, rule FAR 121.542 / FAR 135.100—Flight.29  Section (b) of which states that “no flight 
crewmember may engage in, nor may any pilot in command permit, any activity during a 
critical phase of flight which could distract any flight crewmember from the performance of his 
or her duties or which could interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties. 
Activities such as eating meals, engaging in nonessential conversations within the cockpit 
and nonessential communications between the cabin and cockpit crews, and reading 
publications not related to the proper conduct of the flight are not required for the safe 
operation of the aircraft”. This proscribes both direct distraction, i.e. conversations, or indirect 
distraction i.e. a colleague eating food, from being made during critical flight activities. In 
addition to leading to increased error rates, distractions also have been found to increase 
anxiety and in situations of high workload situations, decrease performance, Speier (1999) op 
cit.  
A number of theories and mechanisms have been put forward to explain why distractions are 
so disruptive and to suggest strategies  to mitigate the effects of such disruptions. Research 
carried out by  Oulasvirta and Saariluoma (2006)30 suggests that interruptions are disruptive 
not because short-term memory becomes overloaded, but rather because information stored 
in the long-term working memory is poorly encoded. Trafton & Monk31 (Trafton 2008)  outline 
factors that influence recovery from interruptions. The length of the interruption, similarity 
between the primary and secondary task, that is the task the operator has been called away 
to perform, the opportunity to rehearse prior to resuming the primary or main task and the 
existence of environmental cues, for example a clear marker being left as to where to 
resume, all affect task resumption performance.  Significantly, training in the primary task 
itself is not by itself sufficient to reduce the impact of task disruption. In addition, training in 
how to resume has been found to be beneficial. Cades, Trafton & Boehm-Davies Cades 
29 http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=51e6ec25df70113f148981a89ed2d944&mc=true&node=se14.3.135_1100&rgn=div8 
<accessed August 2009 > 
30 Oulasvirta,A. Saarilouma,P. Long-term working memory and interrupting messages in human-
computer interaction. Behaviour and Information Technology, 64,941-961.(2004). 
31 Trafton.J.G. & Monk, C.M. (2008). Task Interruptions. In D.A. Boehm-Davis, (Ed), 
Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics, Volume 3, Chapter 4 p111-126.2008  
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(2006) 32 . 
Multiple task management 
Another issue to consider is how the brain manages input presented to it simultaneously 
Pashler (1994) 33 outlines three possible models which are, capacity Sharing, bottleneck or 
task-switching and cross-talk models. The first model suggests that people have a finite 
processing capacity which is shared out between tasks and people carry out multiple tasks 
quite ably until one task becomes more difficult than the others. When this happens, capacity 
is switched to the more difficult task at the expense of the less difficult tasks. The Bottleneck 
or Task-Switching model suggests that parallel processing may be possible until two or more 
tasks require access to the same processing mechanism or mental operation at the same 
time then a bottleneck results and one or more of the tasks will become delayed. The third 
model is that interference may arise when multiple tasks require the same sensory inputs in 
order to be processed, it could be easier to perform more than one task if they both require 
the same sensory inputs or harder if they require the same sensory inputs. A further 
complication is that it is thought to be more difficult to perform multiple tasks if they require 
the same sensory inputs.  
Speier (1999)34 Outlines two types of interference, Capacity interference is when the number 
of incoming cues are too numerous for a decision maker to process and structural 
interference occurs when a decision maker must attend to two inputs that require the same 
physiological mechanisms, such as two different visual signals. Rubinstein et al (Rubinstein, 
Meyer et al. 2001)35 indicate that multi-tasking may be less efficient if a person is switching 
from a familiar task to an unfamiliar task. 
Memory 
This leads on to a consideration of memory overload and memory capacity. Baddeley and 
32 Cades,D.M., Trafton,J., & Boehm-Davies,D. (2006). Mitigating disruptions: Can resuming an 
interrupted task be trained?. Proceedings of the Human factors and Ergonomics society 50th annual 
meeting (pp368-371). Santa Monica CA: Human Factors & Ergonomics Society. 
33 Pashler, H. (1994). "Dual-task interference in simple tasks: data and theory." Psychol Bull 116(2): 
220-244.
34 Speier, C. S., Cheri; Vessey,Iris (1999/3). " The influence of task interruption on individual decision 
making." http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0038930657&partnerID=8YFLogxK 30. 
35 Rubinstein, J. S., et al. (2001). "Executive control of cognitive processes in task switching." Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 27(4): 763-797. 
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Hitch Baddeley (1974)36  proposed a three part model consisting of a central executive that is 
thought to control access to the subsidiary elements of the working memory system. The 
other two parts of the theory were, a Phonological loop that stores speech based sounds for 
a limited period and is itself thought to be made up of two parts the phonological store can 
store sound coded items and an articulatory control process that allows sub vocal repetition 
of the items stored in the phonological store37. The second subsidiary part is called the 
Visuospatial sketch pad that stores visual spatial information, that is thought to set up and 
manipulate mental images. The Visuospatial sketch pad also controls attention and 
processing and organizing information. Baddeley added a third component in 2000 
38(Baddeley) , called the Episodic buffer, responsible for integrating and manipulating 
material, again has limited capacity and depends heavily on executive processing. 
The relevance to this discussion is that working memory also known as short term memory 
has a limited capacity and is affected by a number of factors such as intelligence, age, lack of 
sleep, physical fitness, anxiety, emotions and stress and by an appreciation of how 
individuals are made up and react to external stimuli will inform error avoidance or prediction 
heuristics. It is worth referencing personality types, although not part of the studies described 
in this thesis, since an appreciation of how people perceive and process information from 
their environment will add to any error prediction strategy. Whilst hospital recruitment 
systems seldom employ personality testing as part of their recruitment process for junior staff 
at least, an understanding at a rudimentary level of the existence of personality types would 
help inform responsible officers, senior managers, section leads and supervisors just why 
individuals react in the way that they do under particular circumstances and in addition would 
be helpful in the way any learning from error strategy is constructed and implemented.  
One such systematic approach to personality typing has its origins in the work of C.G.Jung 
and is known as the Myers Briggs personality type system that consists of 16 distinct 
personality type indicators39 here referenced from the Myers Briggs foundation web site. 
Each of the sixteen personality type indicators give a different combination of an individual’s 
36 Baddeley, A.D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G.H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of 
learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol. 8, pp. 47–89). New York: Academic 
Press. 
37 http://aspsychologyblackpoolsixth.weebly.com/working-memory-model.html <accessed August 8th, 
2016> 
38 Baddeley, A.D. (2000). "The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?". Trends in 
Cognitive Science. 4: 417–423. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01538-2.PMID 11058819 
39 http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/mbti-basics/the-16-mbti-types.htm  <accessed 
August 9th, 2016>. 
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preferences for perception and judgment, that is how they prefer to process the world around 
them in information terms. This in turn determines how individuals may differ in their interest, 
reactions, values, motivations and skills. In terms of work it helps an individual understand 
how for example how best to manage their time, approaches to decision making and 
addressing stress. And it would assist an individual’s supervisor in how best to develop that 
individual and how they are likely to react to different situations. 
Professionalism and non-professionalism 
Professionalism and Non-professionalism is another layer that may impact on an individual’s 
approach to their work and sense of responsibility and how they discharge their duties. A 
professional is someone who has trained for and is committed to a profession or a vocation 
and that profession is governed by a set of beliefs or code of conduct. There are other uses 
of the term and understanding of the concept for example he or she is a professional not an 
amateur meaning they do that work or use that skill to earn a living by; The Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary40. The use of the term to which it is employed in this thesis is the former, 
an individual governed by a code of conduct and ethics a sense of duty or responsibility to, in 
this case, patients of the hospital and to colleagues. One basis difference between 
professional and non-professional is that the former may down tools promptly at the end of 
their shift whereas a professional would ensure that patients come first and would work 
longer to complete a task for the benefit of a patient. Clearly this is a simplistic example but 
other examples were apparent in sections of the observational work in this thesis quite 
unexpectedly. 
Quality management systems (QMS) and Visual prompts 
“A quality management system (QMS) is a formalized system that documents processes, 
procedures, and responsibilities for achieving quality policies and objectives. A QMS helps 
coordinate and direct an organization’s activities to meet customer, or service user, and 
regulatory requirements and improve its effectiveness and efficiency on a continuous basis” 
AQM.org (2016)  41.  
40 The shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2003) The shorter Oxford English Dictionary Oxford 
University Press. Vol 2: P 2358. 
41 http://asq.org/learn-about-quality/quality-management-system/  <accessed August 9th, 2016> 
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Quality management systems are commonplace in industry but less so in healthcare, 
although this is changing as health services come to terms with the economy and the need to 
provide high quality services by means of productive and efficient organisations. (Coles 
2016)42 Lord Carter of Coles published an independent review into operational productivity in 
the National Health Service (NHS). The findings were many and included the observation 
that there was unwarranted variation in the cost of delivery of services across the NHS and 
efficiency, effectiveness and productivity could be improved and an estimated £5 billion 
saved as a result. One of the strategies that Industry have deployed to achieve greater 
productivity have been the implementation of QMS and the use of tools such as lean 
management, an improvement approach to improve flow and eliminate waste that was 
developed by Toyota43. Visual prompts have a long history in safety strategies in situations 
where operatives are required to manage complex systems that require multitasking in 
stressful situations.  
The classic example being in the aviation industry where the first checklist was created and 
introduced in 1935 on October 30th at Wright field, Dayton Ohio, USA,  where the United 
States army were conducting an evaluation of aircraft. One of the contenders was a Boeing 
299 which took off, began a smooth climb and then stalled and crashed, both pilots later 
tragically died of their injuries. The pilots were unfamiliar with the aircraft and the aircraft was 
too complex for one person to remember everything that had to be done. Later it was 
determined that pilots needed some way of ensuring that they didn’t overlook anything and 
the checklist was born. 44 Checklists were introduced on a global scale by the work of Dr Atul 
Gwande and his team on behalf of the World Health Organisation (WHO), Gwande. 45 in his 
book, “The Checklist Manifesto”, Gwande, wrote that “failure in the modern world is really 
about errors of ineptitude, that is mistakes made because we don’t make proper use of what 
we know. The routine tasks of surgeons, for example, have now become so incredibly 
complicated that mistakes of one kind or another are virtually inevitable” Gwande (2011). As 
for pilots, a checklist is one approach to managing complexity and interruption. Quality 
management and visual prompts such as a checklist and a calculation flow aid play a part in 
one section of the observational studies. 
42https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/499229/Operational_p
roductivity_A.pdf <accessed February 2016> 
43 http://www.institute.nhs.uk/building_capability/general/lean_thinking.html <accessed August 9th 
,2016> 
44 Schamel, J.(2012 updated); http://www.atchistory.org/History/checklst.htm <accessed August 6th, 
2016> 
45 Gwande, A. (2011). The CheckLIst Manifesto, Profile. 
30	
The elements that have been incorporated into this study therefore are an appreciation of 
error causation, more specifically relevant basic risk factors (BRFs) that will give insight into 
the impact of the environment and processes on individuals. An understanding of the way in 
which individuals process information needs to be considered. Memory and memory capacity 
together with multi external stimuli capabilities of the brain form another element to this work. 
The impact of professionalism and non-professionalism is a factor and finally the benefit of 
quality management systems, lean management and the use of visual prompts complete the 
research strategy for this thesis and ought to show that it is feasible to identify latent errors in 
a particular working environment. The environment in this incidence being a paediatric NHS 
foundation trust hospital pharmacy and ward in a tertiary referral paediatric hospital in 
England. 
Aims and Objectives of the project 
Aim To investigate the feasibility of predicting, identifying and mitigating latent system failures 
in a UK National Health Service paediatric hospital 
. 
Objectives 
a) To identify latent risks associated within a specific task set in an NHS paediatric
hospital pharmacy department. Then to establish the extent to which these latent risks
may be predicted. One specific area of paediatric pharmacy practice, the final
accuracy checking process, will be the focus for this study.
b) To investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of the current Incident reporting system
(IR1s) in supporting learning from incidents and changing practice.
c) To determine the impact of introducing a Quality Management Approach to process
design into one process on a busy Oncology ward in the same paediatric hospital and
determine the benefits of this approach including in terms of risk reduction
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Research Paradigm 
The research paradigm46 used was predominantly Constructivism, that is the recognition that 
reality is a product of human intelligence interacting with experience in the real world, Elkind 
(2004)47. There is a problem generated by groups of individuals working in a real world 
situation (Ontology). In order to understand this problem, the situation in which it occurs 
needs to be understood that is the underlying events  and activities (Epistemology). The 
theoretical perspective could be said to be interpretivism  and the methodology largely action 
research. Action research starts with a research question and then follows a cycle in which a 
plan is devised to answer the research question. The plan is followed by an act or action that 
will allow the question to be investigated. Observations are made and the resulting data 
analysed and reflected upon. This in turn may lead to further questions and the cycle (Plan, 
Act, Observe, Reflect) begins again. Methods deployed included Observation (non participant 
), interviews with theme identification and qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
Strategic approach 
The aim of this study was to determine if it would be feasible to identify latent risks within a 
specific set of tasks set in an English National Health Service paediatric hospital 
environment, then to go on to determine if these identified latent risks could be predicted in a 
given set of circumstances and a defined set of conditions.  In other words, taking an 
ideographic approach, that is studying individual cases and specific events and interpretive 
phenomenological type analysis could be carried out. An interpretive phenomenological 
analysis sets out to give insight into how an individual in a given set of circumstances might 
react to or make sense of a particular set of phenomena. 
A literature review was carried out, described in full in Chapter 2, that looked for papers that 
had investigated relevant error causation factors such as stress and interruptions or those 
that discussed error reduction strategies particularly in the setting of a paediatric healthcare 
system such as a National Health Service Hospital. In addition, papers reviewing the 
efficiency of incident and error reporting systems in a similar setting were also searched for. 
46	Patel,S 2015. The research paradigm – methodology, epistemology and ontology – explained in simple
language.<	http://salmapatel.co.uk/academia/the-research-paradigm-methodology-epistemology-and-ontology-
explained-in-simple-language. Accessed September 2017 47	Elkind,D. 2005. Response to Objectivism and Education: The Educational Forum 69(4) 328-334 
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Four studies were designed following an Action Research cycle, the first cycle developed 
from the initial research question, a plan was devised around a defined act that is described 
below. Observations were carried out and the outcome reflected upon. This in turn led to a 
second action research cycle to investigate a question that arose from the first cycle, namely 
investigating the impact of interruptions on operatives in a defined environment also 
described in detail below. The second objective was pursued through a third cycle and the 
outcomes from this and the first two cycles were reflected upon, a hypothesis developed and 
tested through the fourth action research cycle. Descriptions of the four studies or cycles 
follow.  
Study 1. Latent risks in Paediatric Pharmacy identified in the dispensing process 
It was determined that the first investigation would be carried out in the closely controlled 
environment of the outpatient and inpatient hospital dispensary at Birmingham Children’s 
Hospital National Health Service Foundation Trust, examining one step in the dispensing 
process known as accuracy checking. The dispensing process consists of a series of defined 
reproducible processes some of which comprise of observable multi step tasks. The 
dispensing process can be considered, in its simplest form, to begin when a request for a 
medicine is received in the dispensary. The dispensary itself is a clearly defined geographical 
area within the pharmacy department. The request, in paper form, will be formally received 
by being recorded into a log, it then is passed to a pharmacist to be screened. The 
pharmacist will ensure that the right drug, in the right dose has been requested for the right 
patient to be given at the right time(s) of day by the right route. This is known as the “five” 
patient rights of medicine administration. 
In addition, the correct quantity of medicine is ensured and particularly for paediatric patients, 
the most suitable presentation of medicine supplied, whether a liquid or solid dosage form 
such as a tablet. Once satisfied the request will be passed onto the next step in the 
dispensing process, which entails creating a label to be attached to the final container or 
pack of medicine and selecting the medicine itself. The correct medicine, container, label 
together with any ancillaries such as a medicine spoon or oral syringe are then assembled as 
appropriate.  
The final step in the process is known as the accuracy checking step, where an appropriately 
trained operative ensures that the correct medicine has been correctly labelled for the 
specified patient according to the request taking into account any amendments the 
pharmacist may have requested. The operative carrying out this step of the process could be 
a pharmacy technician or a pharmacist.  This final step, unlike other steps in the dispensing 
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process is self-contained in that everything required is presented to the operative. Any issues 
that may have existed have been resolved by the screening pharmacist at the outset of the 
dispensing process and all the elements, the medicine itself plus labels and ancillaries have 
been assembled prior to reaching the accuracy checking step. 
By selecting a relatively simple task within the dispensing process the focus would remain on 
error causation brought about through the existence of error forcing conditions within the 
system rather than a particularly complex task and one arguably atypical of the system as a 
whole. The approach adopted for this study was a non-participant direct observation of one 
task in the routine dispensing process. Eighteen pharmacy staff comprising nine pharmacy 
technicians and nine clinical pharmacists were approached and asked if they would be willing 
to volunteer to be enrolled in the study, specifically to be observed carrying out the final step 
in the dispensing process, the final accuracy check. They were advised that the observation 
was not looking at them and their work so much as the impact, if any that the environment 
may or may not have on them. Each observation lasted no longer than 30 minutes during 
which time 2 or 3 medicine requests were accuracy checked. The observer recorded 
observable actions that each operative made whilst checking the assembled components 
before them and in addition direct and indirect interruptions were recorded, using a simple 
notation devised for this investigation, for example if the operative was observed calculating a 
dose then “CAL” was written. “L” stood for logs item out; “PEW” stood for person enters 
accuracy checkers workspace and so on. 
The key elements for this study were that the task was uniformly consistent and reproducible. 
The environment comprising of various elements, heat, light, temperature, noise, space was 
constant. The Hawthorne effect, a process whereby subjects being observed change their 
behaviour because they are being observed, was mitigated against by virtue of the fact that 
the observations were explicit and carried out on multiple occasions over a significant period 
of time, between February and December 2008. Operatives became used to an observer 
sitting unobtrusively making notes.  
Workload acted as a proxy measure for stress, the higher the workload it would be 
reasonable to assume that stress levels would also increase. This was recorded in terms of 
number of individual medicine requests processed through the dispensary by the hour, at the 
time that each observation took place. An operatives’ emotional state was gauged using a 
questionnaire that they could choose to complete on each occasion that they undertook this 
particular task. The development of the questionnaire is described in Chapter 4. They were 
asked to do this during a four-month (October 2007-January 2008) period prior to the 
observations commencing. [APPENDIX].  
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This part of the study was closed by holding two round-table discussions, one with the nine 
pharmacy technicians and the other with the nine pharmacists; both facilitated by the 
investigator who had undertaken the observations. Both groups were asked the same 
question which was how many steps did they think that it took to accuracy check a medicine. 
Both groups responded with an answer in the range of 6-8 steps, essentially those listed 
above as the five rights together with form, quantity and prescriber signature. However, the 
observed number of steps were 27.9 +/- 16.8 CI 95%(pharmacy technician group average) 
and 29.6 +/-4.63 CI 95% (pharmacist group average) far exceeded the estimate of either 
group. The operatives had been clearly distracted during carrying out the accuracy checking 
process and the most likely cause of distraction were interruptions. 
Study 2 Impact of Interruptions 
Interruptions again are discussed in detail in chapter 1 and can be defined as ““an externally-
generated, randomly occurring, discrete event that breaks continuity of cognitive focus on a 
primary task”,(Coraggio 1990).  
Interruptions occur commonly in the busy work spaces of an acute healthcare environment 
such as a hospital. Whilst they are accepted as being detrimental to safety and efficiency, 
there are no investigations that I could identify that specifically determine the impact  that 
interruptions have on healthcare operatives, particularly in a paediatric hospital environment. 
Determining the significance of interruptions in a paediatric hospital environment and the 
impact on the efficiency of an operative would give an appreciation of the part they play in 
error causation and therefore the degree of importance that would need to be attributed to 
them in error causation.  This in turn would impact on any error prevention strategies that 
might be deployed either to reduce the level of interruptions or introduce interruption recovery 
strategies such as visual aids for example, or a combination of both approaches. 
The next phase of this investigation, chapter 5, was to therefore investigate the impact of 
interruptions on individuals carrying out the accuracy-checking step of the dispensing 
process that formed the core task of the first investigation outlined above. Details of the 
investigation are described in chapter 4. In essence the operatives who participated in the 
first investigation referred to above were asked to repeat the final task of the dispensing 
process. They were told that the test prescription and assembled medicines contained no 
errors that there was nothing included to catch them out. They were asked to accuracy check 
the medicines presented to them on one occasion in the dispensary as before complete with 
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direct and indirect interruptions, in other words the normal working environment. Then again, 
on another occasion in the controlled environment of an office, without any direct or indirect 
interruptions. Finally, they were asked to undertake the task once more in the office but with 
a controlled interruption. The results showed that the task took 22% longer to carry out in the 
dispensary with direct and indirect interruptions than in the office where there were no 
interruptions of any kind. From the data obtained from the first two arms of the investigation, 
it was observed that under workload pressure operatives change how they work, either 
speeding up as workload increases (pharmacy technicians) or slowing down due to concerns 
for safety (pharmacists).  
Study 3 Efficiency of the incident reporting and learning system 
Having identified factors that clearly were shown to affect performance and efficiency the 
question was asked as to what else might be a factor that needs to be taken into 
consideration? What other sources of information, in addition to the literature review, could 
be drawn upon in a secondary care paediatric hospital that might add to the understanding of 
error causation? Then having identified additional sources of incident and error data what 
could be learnt from this data and how relevant might it be to this research?  
One answer was to refer to the National Health Service’s National Reporting and Learning 
System (NLRS). In each hospital error and incident data are collected by means of electronic 
incident reports (IR1) and these feed into the NLRS system. However, what isn’t so clear is 
how reliable the data collection is, and more significantly how efficiently are the lessons learnt 
from the IR1 data collection model disseminated? These questions need to be answered in 
order to determine how useful this data might be to this investigation. In Chapter 6 The 
incident reporting system and associated processes that existed at the time of this study in 
Birmingham Children’s Hospital was investigated. It was determined to calculate the cost of 
reporting errors and incidents as a proxy measure from which the efficiency of the system 
could be assessed and in addition to gain the views of clinicians who had participated in the 
error and incident collection process as to the effectiveness of the process, in their opinion, 
used to populate the system. 
The detail of this aspect of the research is detailed in chapter 6, in summary, an entire 12 
months’ data set detailing medicine related incidents and errors was collected and, a sub set 
was then extracted for detailed analysis. A costing algorithm devised and the total costs 
relating to the error and incident collection process calculated. To my knowledge this was the 
first such study carried out to derive such data.  In addition, a questionnaire was sent by 
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email to a sub set of all those healthcare professionals listed as having participated in the 
completion of the IR1 forms in the extracted data sub-set. 
As discussed in chapter 6, the absolute costs derived from the time spent by hospital staff in 
completing IR1 on-line electronic forms were relatively modest. However, this belies the fact 
that on average there were 19.61 staff episodes associated with each completed incident 
form. In other words, multiple inputs were required from several staff. The questionnaires 
included a free text comment section and from this anecdotal feedback the overwhelming 
view of those completing the error- incident forms was of report processing fatigue. That is 
although the process may be low cost those that participate expend their energies on 
completing the forms rather than disseminating lessons that could be learnt from them and as 
such the process is arguably bureaucratic and inefficient. In addition, the data contained in 
the forms was of variable quality and therefore usefulness to this research.  
Study 4 The place of Checklists, Standard Operating procedures (SoPs) and multi-
disciplinary skill mix in error prevention on an acute ward in a children’s hospital 
In Chapter 7, the final phase of this research is discussed. Data gained from the first three 
elements of this research were considered as a whole. Latent risks had been identified in the 
system and it was demonstrated that these impacted on the efficiency of pharmacy staff and 
arguably therefore had patient safety implications.  A strategy was devised to identify and 
mitigate against these latent errors  and tested in a related but different hospital environment, 
but still involving Pharmacy personnel.   
Examples of approaches that had been deployed in other high risk industries, particularly the 
airline industry, for managing stress and distractions and the lessons learnt from these 
examples were adopted and adapted for use in a healthcare setting. From this techniques 
and approaches were adapted to be deployed on the ward and used by both pharmacy 
technicians and ward nurses.  
To this end a high-risk medicine related process was identified, one that was known to have 
incidents and errors regularly associated with it, in this case the preparation and 
administration of intra venous (IV) medicines on an acute oncology ward in the children’s 
hospital. Pharmacy technicians were sought for this project. Nursing staff were engaged and 
a two senior nurses, one of whom was employed by the pharmacy department and the other 
was a senior nurse on the ward in question, agreed to mentor the pharmacy technicians. An 
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educational needs assessment was carried out and additional training given to the pharmacy 
technicians.  
This project showed that by introducing a protocol driven approach incorporating visual aids, 
in this case a check list and introducing standardization, a calculation flow chart and by 
controlling the environment and reducing direct and indirect interruptions and finally by 
adopting a new approach to when complex calculations ought to be carried out. The number 
of reported incident forms (IR1) completed during the period of this project was seen to 
reduce; although the reduction was purely anecdotal nevertheless a strong connection was 
seen. 
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
In a report prepared for the department of health the costs to the National Health Service in 
the UK of unsafe acts could be as much as £1 billion a year and quite probably over twice 
that with drug related events alone costing £770 million a year. Frontier economics (2014) 48 
The National Learning and Reporting System (NLRS) receives approximately 1.2 million 
incidents reports a year from National Health Service Hospitals and it has been estimated 
that less than 15% of incidents are actually reported Dalton (2014)49 . In order to be able to 
identify latent system failures and then establish to what extent these latent risks may be 
predicted and mitigated against, the literature was searched for research that has been 
conducted in paediatric pharmacy within the National Health Service in the England. 
Aim 
The aim of the literature review was to search for studies that had examined the impact of 
introducing risk and error reducing systems that were particularly mindful of known error 
causation factors such as stress and interruptions. In addition papers discussing the 
efficiency of the incident and error reporting systems themselves were also looked for to 
validate the underpinning error data and to investigate how robust learning from reported 
errors were deemed to be. The literature review also took into account papers that examined 
or referenced medicines management policies from paediatric hospitals that considered 
approaches to safety including error reduction strategies including utilizing teamwork and 
considering human factors, deploying visual aids and error reducing protocols, all within the 
given context of paediatric hospital pharmacy within the National Health Service in England.  
In other words research that demonstrated learning from either their own errors or those that 
occurred within a similar environment and or other high-risk industries and have as a 
consequence implemented quality management systems to reduce risk learning from the 
errors that were made. 
48 Exploring the costs of unsafe care in the NHS; Frontier Economics Ltd, London (2014) 
<https://www.frontier-economics.com/documents/2014/10/exploring-the-costs-of-unsafe-care-in-the-
nhs-frontier-report-2-2-2-2.pdf< accessed 28.11.2016 
49 Building a culture of candour; Dalton,D; Williams,N (2014); Royal College of Surgeons. < 
file:///Users/anthonysinclair/Downloads/CandourreviewFinal.pdf> accessed 28.11.2016 
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Search strategy 
The literature search strategy deployed including keywords, search terms and databases 
searched was as follows. The following electronic databases were used with the numbers in 
parentheses following the name of the database indicating the volume searched. Science 
Direct (1823), Scopus (1823), Allied and Complementary Medicine (AMED) (1985),British 
Nursing Index (BNI) (1992), Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature 
(CINAHL) (1981), EMBASE (1974), Health Business Elite (HMIC) (1922), Health 
Management Information Consortium (1979),Medline (1946) and PsycINFO (1806. 
Exclusion-Inclusion criteria 
Articles and publications were then excluded or included based on the following criteria. 
Inclusion criteria included Peer-reviewed journal articles and systematic reviews on Safety 
and error prevention; health and non-healthcare’ in adults; no-defined age range and also in 
children and exclusion criteria were non-peer reviewed articles and also magazine reports, 
conference abstracts and commentaries 
The strategy adopted for the literature review for each of these three sections is now 
described in detail.  
Section 1. The impact of introducing risk and error reducing systems that were particularly 
mindful of known error causation factors such as stress and interruptions 
a) Safety systems, error, risk reduction systems in place in paediatrics.
The search terms used to look for articles and publications related to safety systems, error, 
and risk reduction systems in place in a paediatric setting were as follows; Using Science 
Direct: - Organisation AND (Strategy OR Management) AND safety AND error AND 
intervention AND major. Using Scopus, the following words were used, Organisation AND 
(Strategy OR Management) AND safety AND intervention. Finally, for these databases 
AMED, BNI, CINAHL, EMBASE, Health Business Elite, HMIC, Medline, PsycINFO the words 
used were, Organisation AND (strategy OR management) AND (safety OR error OR 
intervention OR major OR learning). The above search terms were then repeated using 
paediatric specific search terms. 
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The search initially found 15,072 citations that were reduced to 11,446 after removal of 
duplicates. Further refinement based upon the exclusion/inclusion criteria reduced the 
citations to 746 potentially relevant articles that were healthcare safety systems interventions 
of which 16 articles matched both the topic and a paediatric setting. The articles fell loosely 
into four topic categories discussing communication and the use of checklists, improving 
reporting of adverse events with some also including the impact of introducing blame free 
cultures; Standardising intra venous infusion bags and finally the importance of identifying the 
sources of errors and introducing and assessing a safety culture 
b) Using Workload as a proxy measure for stress.This	literature	search	looked	for	articles	that	discussed	stress	in	the	context	of	Paediatric	Hospital	Pharmacy	and	the	impact,	if	any,	that	this	may	have	had	on	efficiency,	safety	and	professionalism. Key words used were, Paediatric, Pharmacy, 
NHS, Accuracy checking, Efficiency, safety, safety steps, Impact of the environment. The 
search strategy selected child  OR children OR paediatric OR adolescent OR infant AND 
hospital OR secondary care OR tertiary care AND Pharmacy AND medicine OR 
medication AND  accuracy check OR medicine OR medication AND final dispensing check 
AND pharmacy technician OR pharmacist AND stress AND efficiency OR efficient OR 
stress reduction OR safety measure OR errors OR adverse event OR safety steps 
The keyword search resulted in zero results and so the following approach was adopted 
pharmacy AND accuracy check OR final dispensing check OR final check OR medication 
check 
This produced 69 results of which four were considered to have some relevance. 
c) Interruptions to the dispensing process
The aim of this section of the literature search was to look at the impact on the efficiency 
of operatives of direct and indirect interruptions whilst carry out a task in the dispensing 
process. The context for this search was paediatric hospital pharmacy, dispensing, 
accuracy checking, interruptions, safety and efficiency. Key words used were, 
interruptions indirect; interruptions direct; safety; efficiency; paediatric; pharmacy; 
accuracy checking. 
The search strategy was to use the following key words as follows 
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Child OR children OR pediatric OR paediatric OR adolescent OR infant AND Hospital 
OR secondary care OR tertiary care AND pharmacy AND interruption OR distraction OR 
Interrupt OR distract OR Multitasking AND safety measure OR dispensing errors OR 
medication error OR supply error OR adverse events OR safety steps OR efficiency OR 
accuracy OR accuracy checking OR near miss OR safety.  
This produced 53 articles of which 2 articles were considered to be relevant and 1 was of 
interest to review. 
Section 2. Economics of the NHS Incident reporting system 
In this section the efficiency of the National Health Service (NHS) Incident reporting system 
as observed at a local level was assessed in terms of effectiveness of achieving its primary 
goal as set out in the report an organisation with a memory 50, produced by the Department 
of Health in which was set out the importance of learning from incidents in order to change 
systems and practice and thereby reduce incident rates. 
The context was the incident reporting system effectiveness in English hospitals, in particular 
as observed in a tertiary paediatric NHS Hospital, and the key word search strategy deployed 
was as follows. Hospital OR NHS hospital OR hospital trust OR Acute care OR secondary 
care OR tertiary care AND Error reporting OR Medication error reporting OR Incident 
reporting OR patient safety OR safety mechanism OR safety report OR pharmaco-vigilance 
OR pharmacy safety OR medication safety OR root cause analysis AND  cost effectiveness 
OR economic OR value OR efficiency OR safety OR risk reduction OR risk management OR 
organisational memory OR organisational memory OR audit OR intervention OR 
effectiveness. This search yielded 193 results of which 4 articles were considered to be 
relevant. 
Section 3. Medicines management policies from paediatric hospitals 
(That considered approaches to safety including error reduction strategies including utilizing 
teamwork and considering human factors, deploying visual aids and error reducing 
protocols.)	
50 Department of Health (2000). "An organisation with a memory." 
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This section reviewed NHS hospital medicines management policies with particular attention 
to paediatric hospitals searching for error reduction strategies that included human factors 
and or quality management underpinning. The context was NHS hospital medicine 
management strategies and human factor strategies in relation to error reduction. 
Key words used were, medicines management; medicines administration; safety; error 
reduction; human factors; team work; flattened hierarchies; visual aids; checklist and 
protocol. The search strategy deployed was as follows. National Health Service OR NHS 
AND Hospital AND Medicines management OR Medication management OR 
Administering medicines OR medication administration OR medicines administration 
AND safety OR error reduction OR human factor OR team work  OR flattened hierarchies 
OR visual aid OR checklist OR protocol. 
This search yielded 52 citations of which 3 were deemed to be relevant, although none of the 
resulting articles referred to terminology or principles of human factors, teamwork or flattened 
hierarchies. 
Section 4 Quality Systems and Checklists 
The aim of this section was to consider the impact on safety and efficiency of introducing a 
quality systems approach into one process on a ward area and this was the preparation and 
administration if I.V. injections. The context was a paediatric Oncology ward in a tertiary 
referral paediatric hospital in England and in particular the preparation and administration of 
Intra Venous (IV) injections using a systems approach consisting of protocols, calculation 
aides and visual prompts (checklists) by a pharmacy technician and nurse working as a 
team.  
Key words deployed in this literature search were Paediatric Hospital, Oncology Ward, IV 
injections; medicines administration; Checklists; errors associated with IV injections; Quality 
Systems and hospital wards; medicines administration protocols; medicines administration 
and checklists and Protocol driven medicines administration process. The key word search 
strategy was as follows, intravenous medication administration OR intravenous 
administration OR intravenous injection administration OR intravenous infusion 
administration OR medication administration AND pharmacy technician OR nurse OR 
pharmacist AND quality system OR checklist OR operational list OR checklist OR protocol 
OR guideline OR standard operational procedure OR SoP. This gave a result of 83 papers of 
which 5 were considered to be relevant. 
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I will now go on to discuss the findings from the relevant papers in each of the categories 
outlined above in detail and in particular their relevance to the research questions stated at 
the outset of this thesis. 	
Section	1	The impact of introducing risk and error reducing systems that were particularly 
mindful of known error causation factors such as stress and interruptions.		
a) Safety systems, error, risk reduction systems in place in paediatrics- Standardising
procedures, protocols and medicines
Johnson et al (2004) conducted a literature search in order to review articles that would yield 
data to give an understanding of which technologies had the greatest potential to improve 
patient safety. Key words used included, safety management, risk management, office 
management, medication errors and adverse events. They repeated the searches including 
the terms infant, adolescent, childhood, paediatric and paediatric. Subsequently they 
reviewed sources of journals and articles that listed evidenced- based practice material such 
as the Cochrane library. The search yielded five types of technology that could improve 
patient safety in a paediatric context, these were electronic prescribing, electronic guidelines 
and protocols, internet based disease management resources	tele-consultation	and 
electronic patient healthcare records. The authors go on to cite the evidence of the positive 
impact of using these technologies. The use of electronic prescribing has been shown to 
reduce medication errors by over 80% in some circumstances. Using National guidelines and 
treatment protocols has been shown to improve compliance with evidenced based 
approaches to therapy, yielding better patient outcomes. Tele-consultation, the ability to 
consult with expert colleagues has been shown in a number of studies, cited by the authors 
to improve diagnosis and treatment outcomes.51 
Bullock (2006) 52set out to determine the impact of implementing standardised intra venous 
infusions, on the PICU in Mattel Children’s Hospital California, on medication errors. The 
authors observed variability in medication administration practices on their Paediatric 
intensive care unit (PICU) and a variety of concentrations of IV medication were used, clearly 
51	Johnson, K. B. and C. L. Davison (2004). "Information Technology: Its Importance to Child Safety." 
Ambulatory Pediatrics 4(1): 64-72	52	Bullock, J., D. Jordan, et al. (2006). "Standardizing IV Infusion Medication Concentrations to 
Reduce Variability in Medication Errors." Critical Care Nursing Clinics of North America 18(4): 515-521	
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a safety risk as this could result in an IV medication being prepared of a different 
concentration to the one previously administered to a patient and administered at an incorrect 
flow rate resulting in an incorrect dose being given. A retrospective audit of the error reporting 
system showed that over a 12-month period 26 of 50 (52%) of medication errors were dose 
related. The aim of this project was to determine the impact of introducing standardised IV 
infusions on dose administration error rates. The research team undertook three 
interventions, the first being the introduction of a standardised IV medication list. The second 
was an education campaign to support the changes and the third intervention was to support 
implementation of the standardised IV infusions through a system of one to one coaching and 
mentoring. The project began with data being audited retrospectively between April 2003 and 
April 2004 (12 months) then the new system introduced and errors were again analysed 
between June 2004 and December 2004. It was found that errors due to incorrect doses fell 
from 52% to 21% as a result. Recording errors, analysing the data and understanding the 
possible causes for errors can lead change in systems that result in significant improvement 
in patient safety. 
Sullivan et al (2004)53 investigated the benefits of applying lean technology to a pharmacy 
aseptic unit’s compounding workflow in New Haven Hospital’s Smilow Cancer Hospital, 
Connecticut, USA. This was necessary due to a rapid expansion in workload and patient 
expectations. Baseline workflow data was collected and analysed and it was found that 
turnaround time was at about 91 minutes for IV chemotherapy compounding. Current 
processes were subjected to lean methodology review. The review resulted in a reduction to 
turnaround compounding and delivery times of 20 minutes. 
Verschoor (2007)54 and colleagues describe various medicine administration chart audits, 
carried out in the United States, Britain, Australia and Canada suggest that between 2.9% 
and 16.6% of hospital patients experience one or more adverse events. A group of women 
and children’s healthcare facilities in British Columbia, Canada have successfully introduced 
a safety culture across their hospitals. Integral to their safety culture is the importance of a 
non punitive error reporting culture. This group have also borrowed from the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI), based in Cambridge, Massachusetts and instituted safety 
briefings and patient safety walkabouts. The later are conducted by senior staff and 
demonstrate both the hospitals commitment to safety and show a willingness to introduce 
53 Sullivan, J. E. and J. J. Buchino (2004). "Medication errors in pediatrics - The octopus evading 
defeat." Journal of Surgical Oncology 88(3): 182-188. 
54 Verschoor, K. N., A. Taylor, et al. (2007). "Creating a Safety Culture at the Children's and Women's 
Health Centre of British Columbia." Journal of Pediatric Nursing 22(1): 81-86. 
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improvements. Reporting and learning from adverse events are a cornerstone, as discussed 
previously of any safety culture. 
Alessandrini et al (2001)	55  set out to create an organised and comprehensive method for 
assessing paediatric emergency care(PEC), the setting for this work was the emergency 
department of Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Centre, University of Cincinnati College 
of Medicine, Cincinnati, USA. By devising a measurement framework to they can then assess 
the quality of care in the paediatric emergency department. The team hypothesise that to 
adequately measure quality, a range of representative, of all tasks, performance measures 
would be required. The authors discuss the Donabedian model (Donabedian 2005)56 that 
assesses healthcare in terms of a tripartite framework consisting of Structure this element 
considers facilities, plant and staffing. Also, process, and all the elements of healthcare, 
including prevention and /or diagnosis together with therapy and finally outcome, the effects 
of healthcare on patients or a population. The Institute of Medicine (IOM), now the National 
Academy of Medicine based in Washington DC, USA has a framework of performance 
consisting of a number of domains by which performance can be assessed. These include, 
Timeliness, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Safety, Patient centeredness and Equity. Alessandrini 
and colleagues developed a model based on the IOM domains but adapted for use in a 
paediatric emergency department. Quite simply measuring the quality of care in a 
reproducible manner will give a reliable indication of whether care has improved or not! 
b) Using Workload as a proxy measure for stress
The aim of this section was to consider stress, using workload as a proxy, in the context of a 
Paediatric Hospital Pharmacy dispensing final checking step and the impact, if any, that this 
may have had on the efficiency, safety and professionalism of dispensary operatives that is 
both pharmacists and pharmacy technicians, in the context of a paediatric hospital pharmacy 
in England. Jee, Schafheutle et al. (2016)57  explored the process of professional 
socialization in pharmacy trainees during their pre-registration training. This is a training year 
that occurs after graduation but before professional registration onto the General 
Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) registers. Trainees have to demonstrate a set of 
55 Alessandrini, E. A. and J. Knapp (2011). "Measuring Quality in Pediatric Emergency Care." Clinical 
pediatric Emergency Medicine 12(2): 102-112. 
56 Donabedian, A. (2005). "Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care." The Milbank Quarterly 83(4): 691-
729. 
57 Jee, S. D., et al. (2016). "Exploring the process of professional socialisation and development during 
pharmacy pre-registration training in England." International Journal of Pharmacy Practice 24(4): 283-
293.
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competencies and pass a set of professional examinations in order to successful complete 
the year and qualify as a pharmacist. The researchers implemented a prospective, 
longitudinal design study following 20 trainee community pharmacists. The study showed the 
experiences encountered by trainees that affect their professional socialisation.  This study 
was conducted in an environment at variance with the context of this thesis however the 
principle is pertinent in that professionalism is inculcated deliberately rather than absorbed by 
happenchance and affects an individuals approach to their work and perceived 
responsibilities. 
Family (2013)58   set out to investigate the effect of perceived time pressure on pharmacy 
students’ ability to accurately detect dispensing errors. The study comprised a simulated 
dispensing task set up for 52 final year pharmacy undergraduates who were set dispensing 
tasks to complete within a fixed time.  Each participant then completed the NASA task load 
index to assess his or her perceived time pressure and mental workload. The NASA task 
load index was developed by Hart and Staveland (1988)59 and consists of a set of questions 
each of which is evaluated using a Likert scale, to evaluate perception of workload. The 
questions include an assessment of, Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, 
Performance, Effort and Frustration. The researcher found that time pressure does indeed 
impact on work accuracy in the context of dispensing. This piece of work whilst of interest 
has several limitations, it does connect workload pressure and impact on the quality of work 
output, however, it was a simulated situation in a university with undergraduates as 
participants and as such is of limited use for this thesis. 
Lynskey (2007)60 set out to establish the nature of medication errors occurring within 
community pharmacy and analyse common error patterns. The setting for this study was 
fifteen community pharmacies within Brighton and Hove City Primary care trust, Sussex. The 
researchers used an anonymous self-reporting incident form intended for use by the 
pharmacists when an incident (error) occurred. On completion the data extracted from the 
forms was analysed using statistical descriptive methods in IBM’s SPSS v 11. 145 forms 
were collected at the end of the study and included 32 errors and 113 near misses (errors 
58 Family, H. E., M. Weiss (2013). "Perceived time pressure and its effect on final dispensing check 
accuracy." International Journal of Pharmacy Practice 21(supplement 2): 1-8. 
59 Hart, S. S., L (1988). "Development of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index): Results of Empirical and 
Theoretical Research." nasa_techdocs. 
< http://humansystems.arc.nasa.gov/groups/tlx/downloads/NASA-TLXChapter.pdf> accessed 
August 3rd, 2016. 
60 Lynskey, D., et al. (2007). "Medication errors in community pharmacy: an investigation into the types 
and potential causes." International Journal of Pharmacy Practice 15(2): 105-112. 
47	
trapped within the pharmacy itself). The results showed that by far the predominate 
attributable cause for making an error (66 or 58%) or near miss (20 or 63%) was business. 
Again this study connects workload pressure with error causation, it could be said that the 
link is circumstantial, not enough details has been observed to actually attribute error to 
cause and the context is community pharmacy rather than hospital paediatric pharmacy. 
None the less this study is useful for this thesis. 
 Bond (2008)61 prepared a monograph consisting of an analysis of a data set from the 
evaluation of the community pharmacy contractual framework. The researchers were 
commissioned to evaluate the impact on community pharmacy of the new framework. A 
survey was posted out to all community pharmacies (n=1080) in a stratified random sample 
of 10%, across all primary care organisations in England and Wales (n=31). The response 
rate was particularly high, 71% (n=762). The survey included questions on Pharmacy and 
Pharmacy demography; Job satisfaction; Workload stress and pressure; Satisfaction with 
incentives and rewards; changed in staffing and roles since the new contract; Training; inter-
professional relationships; Included within the results was a statistic related to the fact that 
the new contractual framework had led to an increased workload for community pharmacies 
and 57% (237 where n=425) of respondents indicated that they felt stressed at work, the 
impact of which hasn’t been investigated in this study, although there is comment on this fact 
in the discussion, it does call into question a pharmacists ability to work effectively when 
clearly stressed and potentially fatigued. 
Although the context is once again community pharmacy and not paediatric hospital 
pharmacy a link is again drawn between stress and workload and conjecture made as to the 
possible impact that this may have on individuals and the quality of their work and as such 
supports the work in this thesis but doesn’t add to it. 
c) Interruptions to the dispensing process
The only paper that  had even oblique reference to this section was a study by Van der Velde 
(2010) 62 into chemotherapy prescribing errors and to compare electronic prescribing with pre 
61 Bond, C. B., A;Inch,J; Celino,G; Gray,N (2008). "The effect of the new community pharmacy 
contract on the community pharmacy workforce." Retrieved 29.4.2016 
62 Velde van der, B., V ; (2010) "Chemotherapy medication error rate in a pediatric hemato-oncology 
department." European Journal of Oncology Nursing 14(1): 81. 
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pre-printed prescribing approaches. In order to do this the team reviewed chemotherapy 
orders generated though the electronic prescribing system (n=373) and pre-printed created 
chemotherapy orders (n=538) and analysed them for errors. The errors were then 
categorized using the NCC-MERP index. This is an index created by the American National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and preventing that classifies incidents 
according to the severity of outcome. Included in the analysis of errors the researchers 
identified six that had a causation classified as being due to human related due to high 
workload 63/distraction.  
Although the context is a paediatric hospital, but located in Ghent, Belgium. The researchers 
were investigating prescribing not dispensing processes, nevertheless a causative link was 
made between a cohort of errors and workload or distraction, in a small number of errors 
(n=6 or 0.66%). This paper is of little substantive relevance apart from confirming a link 
between distraction and error causation       
Section 2 Economics of the NHS Incident reporting system	
Armitage et al (2007)64 set out with the aim of their study being to assess the utility of the 
incident reporting system at Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust, England. The 
methodology that they employed was to collect a 50% random sample of medicine related 
incident reports that were created between 1993 and 2003 where n= 1253. Free text 
elements of the incident reports were analysed using a technique known as content analysis, 
Holsti 65(1969) and described by Stemler (2001) as, “any technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”66 . The 
authors found that over the five-year period that was analysed, 276 incident reports (27.8%) 
were incomplete. They also observed that generation of incident reports varied between 
specialties within the Trust and the reporting rate reduced over the five-year period.  This 
study was carried out across a large NHS hospital trust on multiple sites. It is provides useful 
confirmation that there is an issue with incident reporting but doesn’t investigate the causes 
63 http://www.datix.co.uk/products-services/modules/uk-and-europe/incident-reporting/   <accessed 
August 4th, 2016) 
64 Armitage, G., et al. (2007). "Reporting drug errors in a British acute hospital trust." Clinical 
Governance: An International Journal 12(2): 102-114. 
65 Holsti, R;(1969) Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities; Published by Addison-
Wesley & Co publishers 
66 Stemler, S; (2001); Yale University; Copyright PAREonline.net; 
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17 <accessed August 4th 2016> 
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for this and as such doesn’t impact on the section in this thesis that investigates the efficiency 
of the incident reporting system in NHS Trusts. 
FUNG (2012)	67 set out to synthesise the best available evidence on factors that influence 
incident reporting by nurses. This was a literature review of primary research studies. Fifty-
five papers were identified from the searches based on their titles and abstracts. Nine studies 
were included in this review. Cultural and demographic factors were the most significant 
factors in affecting nurses' attitudes towards incident reporting. Major perceived barriers 
included fear, administrative issues, and the reporting process. Also, nurses were more likely 
to re Fung, Koh et al. (2012) 68port incidents that caused direct harm, and if reporting was 
kept anonymous. This literature review carried out by Fung et al collated data with regard to 
the attitude and barriers of nurses to completing an incident form rather than look at systems, 
processes and attitudes that impact on processing completed incident forms and learning 
from the lessons learnt from completed incident forms and as such does not add to this 
thesis. 
Ginsburg, Chuang et al. (2010) in their paper “the Relationship between organisational 
Leadership for Safety and Learning from Patient Safety Events”, set out with the aim to 
examine the relationship between organizational leadership for patient safety and five types 
of learning from patient safety events. The context for their study was forty-nine general 
acute care hospitals in Ontario, Canada. The approach that they used was to consuct two 
cross sectional surveys, one of the senior officer in each trust responsible for safety and the 
other of patient care managers in each organisation. The response rate were as follows, 54 
of the 68 (79%) senior managers responded and 282 of the 621(46%) safety managers 
responded. The authors go on to explain that the data was analysed using multivariate 
regression analysis was used to test the unique effect of the hospital size; informal leadership 
for patient safety and then formal organizational leadership for patient safety, and also the 
interaction between hospital size and leadership variables, defined in the text, on learning 
from patient safety episodes. The results, in this very well designed study, suggest that firstly 
smaller hospitals, defined as those with less than one hundred beds are able to engage more 
with learning from errors than larger hospitals and secondly safety cultures need to be driven 
from the most senior management in a Trust.  
67 Fung, w. m. k., serena siew Lin; chow, yeow Leng. (2012). "attitudes and perceived barriers 
influencing incident reporting by nurses and their correlation with reported incidents: a systematic 
review." bi library of systematic reviews, [s.l.] v. 10(n. 1): p. 1 - 65. 
68 Fung, W. M., et al. (2012). "Attitudes and perceived barriers influencing incident reporting by nurses 
and their correlation with reported incidents: A systematic review." JBI Database of Systematic 
Reviews and Implementation Reports 10(1): 1-65. 
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The context for this study was forty-nine hospitals in Ontario Canada and the study assessed 
implementation of a safety culture and correlated the size of an institution with effectiveness 
of learning from errors. In this thesis the efficiency of the reporting system itself is 
investigated in a single site English Hospital and therefore this study although interesting 
doesn’t impact on the research in this thesis. 
Waring (2004)	69 In his study “a qualitative study of the intra-hospital variations in incident 
reporting”, set out with the purpose of determining the relationship between variations in 
hospital incident reporting and the corresponding attitudes and participation of medical 
professionals. The setting for the study was a single district general National Health Service 
hospital trust in the Midlands in England. The study was conducted between 2001 and 
20013, initially with a six-month observational study of the management structures within the 
Hospital and then going on to conduct forty-two face to face interviews with managers and 
clinicians within the Trust. A further set of interviews was conducted with 25 clinicians from 
various medical specialties. Waring found that that physicians are inclined to report when 
there is confidence in the processes and purpose of reporting, where reporting has a 
meaningful contribution to service development, and typically where these are satisfied 
through collegial forms of incident reporting. 
This study was carried out in a district general hospital in the NHS and a s such has 
similarities with the studies carried out in and outlined in this thesis. The subject matter 
overlaps but brings out reasons for possible lack of ownership and engagement in the 
incident reporting process that add to the knowledge on this topic.	
Current thinking underpinning improvement in safety has the underlying concept of learning 
from errors and in order to do this staff need to be encouraged to report adverse events and 
in order for this to happen a fair blame culture needs to be introduced into the organisation. 
This will lead to an increase in the number of incidents occurring, or so it is postulated and 
learning from these incidents will impact on practice. The outcome of which would be a high 
reporting culture but lower actual harm to patients. 
Bianchi (2009) at the hospital, the Bambino Gesu Children’s hospital and Research Centre, 
Rome, Italy has implemented a system of continuous improvement of Quality. The aim of 
which was to develop a culture of safety and the adoption of safer practices, integral to which 
was the introduction of procedures to improve safety and reporting od adverse advents. The 
project began in February 2007 with a survey of nurses to ascertain their knowledge and 
69 Waring, J. J. (2004). "A qualitative study of the intra-hospital variations in incident reporting." Int J 
Qual Health Care 16(5): 347-352. 
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awareness of errors in healthcare. The survey was distributed to 25% of the workforce and 
consisted of 20 questions. The data does not give a response rate only the results in terms of 
percentages for each answer and as such is of limited usefulness, however one conclusion 
drawn is that there needs to be a change in culture from one of blame when an accident 
occurs to that of no blame in order to encourage incident reporting70. 
The environment for this next study was a paediatric cardiac surgery operating room in at St 
Louis Children’s Hospital, St Louis, USA. The study started with a single surgeon recording 
all failure events, during the month of April 2008, then extending this to all surgeons until the 
study ceased in December 2010. Procedural errors were identified and discussed during the 
post operation briefing session. Error reporting increased from recording incidents in 20% of 
all procedures to 50% of all procedures. The study showed that recurrent patterns of failure in 
the operating room might only come to light with this in depth focused systematic review of all 
failures within the operating room microenvironment. This in turn led to a greater appreciation 
of system failure with sufficient data to affect system changes in order to reduce incident 
rates, Bowermaster (2015)71. 
The Neonatal intensive care unit  (NICU) at the Boston Paediatric Hospital, Massachusetts, 
USA, describes the impact of introducing an online system, Safety Event Reporting System 
(SERS) to record adverse events together with a no blame culture to encourage adverse 
events reporting and learning from these incidents to improve clinical practice positively, 
Bradley (2011)72. The neonatal intensive care unit created a safety committee with the remit 
of reviewing incident or error reports collected through the Event reporting system, and then 
using this information to change practice. An example was, during 2007 an increase in 
mislabelled laboratory specimens. The Safety group upon reviewing this information 
introduced a clinician double check with the resulting outcome of that this type of incident has 
decreased by 55% from 2007 to 2009. This review of and subsequent change in practice and 
process including the introduction of technology has noticeably reduced error rates. 
A project also at Boston Children’s Hospital, situated in Boston, Massachusetts, USA, 
encouraged adverse event reporting by nursing staff, through the Magnet recognition 
70 Bianchi, N., G. Carta, et al. (2009). "Clinical risk management at the Bambino Gesù Children's 
Hospital." Paediatrics and Child Health 19, Supplement 2(0): S176-S181. 
71 Bowermaster, R., M. Miller, et al. (2015). "Application of the Aviation Black Box Principle in Pediatric 
Cardiac Surgery: Tracking All Failures in the Pediatric Cardiac Operating Room." Journal of the 
American College of Surgeons 220(2): 149-155.e143 
72 Bradley, C., E. C. Dewitt, et al. (2011). "Implementing Change in Pediatric Care Practices Based on 
a Safety Event Reporting System." Newborn and Infant Nursing Reviews 11(1): 10-16. 
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program, a program that recognises excellence in nursing and was founded in 1990 by the 
American Nurses Credentialing Centre (ANCC). The rationale being that 59% of adverse 
events are preventable and so it was determined to focus nursing efforts to reducing errors, 
as part of the Magnet program. In 2005, the hospital implemented a web-based error 
reporting system, known as the Safety Event Reporting System (SERS), an on-line 
anonymous self-reporting system. The hospital also employed a system improvement model 
that has three elements that include an aim, a review and an outcome action. Then a survey 
was used to illicit nurses understanding of error reporting, followed by an educational 
campaign inspired by the results of the survey. The following year, 2010 a follow up survey 
was launched and sent to 560 nurses and had a 46% response rate. Outcomes indicated that 
education about the benefits of error reporting wasn’t in itself sufficient. In addition the 
perception of the time it took to complete an incident report discouraged reporting. However, 
the additional data with regard to incidents was seen as a positive contribution to developing 
error prevention strategies, and the results showed a 35% increase in adverse events 
reporting over a two year period, Hession-Laband (2001).73 
Kurth (2014) describe the significant benefits of collating adverse event reports on a national 
scale in the USA, analysing this data using Safety Analytics and Quality improvement and 
using the outputs to introduce quality improvements in the context of paediatric 
anaesthesia.74 This is a national project developed by the American Society of Anesthesia 
who created a project called Wake Up Safe (WUS) which has been certified by the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) as  a patient safety organisation in its own right 
in America. Quality improvement can be described as “a set of values and tools for setting 
goals and planning, implementing and measuring change”75 and safety analytics is an 
examination of the data to identify underlying causes of errors. WUS is made up of 19 
institutions and the serious adverse events rate was found to be 1.4 per 1000 anaesthetics. 
WUS has found that Quality Improvement and Safety Analytics are key strategies to 
improving patient safety. 
A joint Anglo-American research team set out to identify patient safety factors of critically ill 
children dying in a paediatric intensive care unit (PICU). The setting was a single tertiary 
73 Hession-Laband, E. and P. Mantell (2011). "Lessons Learned: Use of Event Reporting by Nurses to 
Improve Patient Safety and Quality." Journal of Pediatric Nursing 26(2): 149-155. 
74 Kurth, C. D., D. Tyler, et al. (2014). "National pediatric anesthesia safety quality improvement 
program in the United States." Anesthesia and Analgesia 119(1): 112-121. 
75 Dawda, P;  Jenkins, R; Varnam, R; (2010);Quality Improvement in General Practice  ; The King’s 
Fund; http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_document/quality-improvement-gp-inquiry-
discussion-paper-mar11.pdf  <accessed August 2nd, 2016. 
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regional PICU in a London Hospital.  The investigators examined patients’ medical notes, of 
47 (7%) patients who had died between January 2007 and December 2008. 22 adverse 
events contributing to death (AEds) in 17 of the 47 cases (36%). Two AEDs occurred in 
primary care, 20 in pre-PICU hospital care and none in PICU. As for Critical Incidents (CIs), 
37 occurred in 28 of the 47 (60%) cases. After statistical analysis and a careful case notes 
review a number of deficiencies in care were able to be identified and the researchers call for 
interventional studies to be undertaken to identify appropriate strategies by which patient 
safety could be improved. .76 	
Section 3 Medicines management and administration policies    	
Medicines management and administration policies in paediatric hospital settings in relation 
to safety, error reduction, human factors, teamwork, flattened hierarchies, visual aids, 
checklists and protocols	
Communication failures are adverse events in their own right that have an adverse impact on 
patient safety, a negative effect on patients and often require costly additional treatment. 
Bagnasco  (2013) conducted a study in an emergency department of a teaching hospital in 
Northern Italy. The researchers used two types of analysis, a failure mode analysis (FMEA) 
and a Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Failure modes and effects 
analysis (FMEA) is a step-by-step approach for identifying all possible failures in a design, a 
manufacturing or assembly process, or a product or service77  and Failure mode, effects and 
criticality analysis extends FMEA by including a criticality analysis, which is used to chart 
the probability of failure modes against the severity of their consequences78. 
The resulting error modes that were identified were then categorised using a model 
suggested by Vincent79 (Vincent, Taylor-Adams et al. 1998) that organised factors that 
influenced clinical practice into seven categories; Institutional context, Organizational and 
management context, Work environment, team factors, individual (staff) factors, task factors 
and patient characteristics. 
																																																								
76 Monroe, K., D. Wang, et al. (2011). "Patient safety factors in children dying in a paediatric intensive 
care unit (PICU): a case notes review study." BMJ Quality and Safety 20(10): 863-868. 
77 http://asq.org/learn-about-quality/process-analysis-tools/overview/fmea.html <accessed August 1st, 
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78 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode,_effects,_and_criticality_analysis <accessed August 1st, 
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79 Vincent, C., et al. (1998). "Framework for analysing risk and safety in clinical medicine." BMJ 
316(7138): 1154-1157 
	 54	
 It was found that poor communication was the main factor that led to patient safety issues 
and using a structured reporting tool such as the SBAR (Situation, Background, Assessment 
and Recommendation(s)) as a proposed solution80.  
This research does indeed have some relevance and although of interest only obliquely 
connects with the research conducted in this thesis. Vincent’s81 taxonomy relates to clinical 
situations, the background to this thesis draws upon the work of Hudson, Wagenaar and 
Reason as outlined by Groeneweg (2002) referenced elsewhere in this document, and who 
sets out the significance of Basic Risk Factors (BRFs) in error causation theory. 
Gordon (2014) and his team undertook research into the impact of introducing a specially 
designed checklist into the context of a paediatric cardiac catheter laboratory situated in the 
Loma Linda paediatric university hospital California, America. The team retrospectively 
reviewed the medical notes of patients treated throughout the study period January 2010 to 
February 2012. Half way through this period patients were allocated to one of two cohorts, 
those where a checklist was utilised and one where a checklist wasn’t used. A survey was 
conducted amongst staff at the beginning and at the end of the study period. They were 
asked questions in relation to team communication and attitudes towards team and safety 
within the department. A five point Likert scale was used in this process and the results 
analysed statistically using SSPSÓ software. The authors found that staff that used the 
checklist thought that it improved pre-operative communication82. The main outcome was to 
do with perception than impact on process or safety and as such has little relevance for this 
thesis.  
Sharma (2013) investigated the benefits of introducing ward round safety checklists in the 
context of a National Health Service (NHS) tertiary referral paediatric intensive care unit at 
Great Ormond Street Hospital, London.83  The aim of this study was to improve ward round 
communication on the paediatric intensive care unit (PICU). The researchers carried out a 
prospective, non-blinded observational study between July 2009 and December 2011, on a 
12 bed section of PICU. A checklist was designed appropriate to the needs of a PICU unit. 
The results indicated that there was benefit from having a simply designed spoken checklist 																																																								
80 Bagnasco, A., B. Tubino, et al. (2013). "Identifying and correcting communication failures among 
health professionals working in the Emergency Department." International Emergency Nursing 21(3): 
168-172. 
 
82 Gordon, B. M., T. S. Lam, et al. (2014). "Utility of Pre-procedure Checklists in the Congenital 
Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory." Congenital Heart Disease 9(2): 131-137. 
83 Sharma, S., M. J. Peters, et al. (2013). "'Safety by DEFAULT': Introduction and impact of a 
paediatric ward round checklist." Critical Care 17(5). 
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that appeared to improve team communication and impacted positively on patient safety. The 
setting of this research was similar enough to be of relevance and the design of the checklist 
used during this particular research was of interest but the area investigated was sufficiently 
different not to impact directly on the research in this thesis. 
 Section	4	Quality	Systems	and	Checklists	
Maaskant, Vermeulen et al. (2014) 84 and colleagues conducted a systematic literature 
review to identify evidence-based interventions to reduce medication errors in hospitalised 
children. The search strategy that they employed was primary research studies found within 
the Cochrane Library, the Economic Evaluation Database (EED) and the Health Technology 
Assessments (HTA) database; MEDLINE, EMBASE, the Cumulative Index to Nursing and  
Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), PsycINFO, ProquestDissertations &Theses,Web of 
Science (citation indexes and conference proceedings) and the EPOC Register of Studies.  
The searches were conducted in November 2013 and November 2014. Neither language nor 
date limits were applied. What the authors found were seven studies describing five different 
interventions, these were; participation of a clinical pharmacist in a clinical team (n = 2), 
introduction of a computerised physician order entry system (n = 2), implementation of a 
barcode medication administration system (n = 1), use of a structured prescribing form (n = 
1) and implementation of a check and control checklist in combination with feedback (n = 1). 
The results from this paper yielded one relevent article, that by Lepee, Klaber et al. (2012)85 
who describes the impact of introducing a checklist to improve the prescribing of medication 
orders by clinicians.Their aim was to assess the impact of introducing such a prescribing 
checklist on the quality and safety of inpatient prescribing in two paediatric wards in a London 
teaching hospital. The authors found that whilst there was a reduction in technical errors, 
there was no discernible improvement in clinical errors.  
The introduction of a quality management system, including the use of visual prompts such 
as checklists does form a part of the content of this thesis and as such that makes this 
particular article by Leppee (2012) of interest. However, the context, that of prescribing rather 
than medicines preparation and administration and the fact that it was the intervention as 
																																																								
84 Maaskant, J., et al. (2014). "PS-126 Interventions For Reducing Medication Errors In Children In 
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opposed to merely an element of an intervention, that is a complete quality management 
system,  preclude it from being useful in the context of this thesis.  
Manias, Aitken et al. (2005) 86 conducted a study to determine how graduate nurses use 
protocols in their medication management activities. In particular, to examine the extent of 
adherence to various protocols in relation to medication activities and determine how the 
ward environment impacts on graduate nurses' use of protocols to manage patients' 
medication. This research team used a descriptive prospective qualitative design for their 
study. Twelve graduate nurses involved in direct patient care in medical, surgical and 
specialty wards of a metropolitan teaching hospital in Australia participated in the study. 
There were six areas of particular interest, availability and use of protocols, scrutinizing 
patients' identity before medication administration, double-checking certain medications 
before administration, writing incident reports, following specific policies and timing the 
administration of medications. Manias and the team carried out participant observations with 
the graduate nurses during a two-hour period when medications were being administered to 
patients, followed by In-depth interviews with each nurse immediately afterwards. Protocols 
associated with medication management activities for the clinical settings were also 
transcribed. What was found was that graduate nurses adhered to protocols if they were 
perceived not to impede with other nursing activities. Participants were also more likely to 
follow protocols if they felt encouraged to make their own decisions and if there was a 
decreased likelihood that disciplinary action would be involved. Nursing attitude and 
behaviour does impact on one of the projects in this thesis, however the project in this thesis 
introduces an approach to improve protocol compliance rather than observe it prior to the 
intervention. This article has relevance in that it gives background knowledge to nursing 
culture and behaviour but it doesn’t impact directly.  
Pape (2013) 87 In her paper entitled, The effect of a five-part intervention to decrease 
omitted medications, investigated the impact of introducing the MedSafe protocol on the 
number of admitted doses and nurses being distracted during medicine administration 
rounds. The setting was a 600-bed hospital situated in the middle of America. The MedSafe 
protocol consists of a number of steps to prevent nurses engaged in medicines preparation 
and administration from being interrupted. Signs were placed in the medication preparation 
area that stated, “STOP, Quiet Zone, do not Interrupt Nurses During Medication 																																																								
86 Manias, E., et al. (2005). "How graduate nurses use protocols to manage patients' medications." J 
Clin Nurs 14(8): 935-944. 
87 Pape, T. M. (2013). "The effect of a five-part intervention to decrease omitted medications." Nurs 
Forum 48(3): 211-222. 
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Administration, Avoid Conversation in this Area.” In addition, yellow duct tape was used to 
mark off the medication area as a quiet zone. “Do Not Interrupt signs” were placed on the on 
the wall in the area; a prepared medication protocol checklist as a reminder of the correct 
method to administer medications was used; Other personnel working in the same area were 
requested  not interrupt the nurse, but using teamwork to “field” phone calls and other 
distractions and interruptions during the medication administration cycle; and nurses wore a 
fluorescent sash when they began to retrieve and administer medications to all assigned 
patients during the scheduled time. The results demonstrated an 84% decrease (from 142 to 
23) in the number of distractions and interruptions that nurses experienced using the five-part 
intervention compared with the control group that used standard processes. This study was 
conducted in a 600 bed American hospital. The study introduced a number of measures to 
prevent nurses administering medicines from being distracted including a check list visual 
prompt and a s such has superficial similarities with one of the projects in this thesis, but with 
sufficient variance to make it of interest but not useful. 
Raja Lope, Boo et al. (2009)88 set out to determine the rates of non-adherence to standard 
steps of medication administration and medication administration errors committed by 
registered nurses in a neonatal intensive care unit before and after intervention. The setting 
for the study was the Neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) in the Hospital University 
Kebangsaan, Malaysia. The method used was an observational study carried out during two, 
two week phases in 2005 and repeated after introducing remedial interventions in 2006. The 
baseline assessment, carried out on 2005, showed that the nurses did not carry out at least 
one of the ten standard administrative steps during the administration of 188 medication 
doses. Following implementation of remedial action mainly comprising of re-education some 
improvement was shown. This study was set on a NICU unit in a Malaysian hospital; the 
approach used as outlined in the paper does not have relevance to the work in this thesis. It 
does show that re-education alone doesn’t generate significant improvement in protocol 
compliance. 
Samaan, Dahlke et al. (2011)	89 describes the safety precautions for the use of U-500 insulin 
at St. Vincent Indianapolis Hospital, America, a 500-bed community hospital.  U-500 insulin is 
a high strength insulin product range and as such presents a potential safety risk. The 
hospital has introduced a series of protocols that include specifically designed prescribing 																																																								
88 Raja Lope, R. J., et al. (2009). "A quality assurance study on the administration of medication by 
nurses in a neonatal intensive care unit." Singapore Med J 50(1): 68-72. 
89 Samaan, K. H., et al. (2011). "Addressing safety concerns about U-500 insulin in a hospital setting." 
Am J Health Syst Pharm 68(1): 63-68. 
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forms, administration dose guides and picking sheets in order to mitigate the risk. This is set 
in an American hospital with a product not used in paediatric hospitals in England. The paper 
describes precautions taken but isn’t a study and doesn’t contain data but does include the 
use of checklists as a visual prompt. As such it merits inclusion but isn’t of direct relevance to 
this thesis. 
Cottney (2014) set out to assess whether the introduction of automated dispensing cabinets 
(ADCs) on an inpatient ward in a UK mental health hospital, East London NHS Foundation 
Trust would replicate the benefits realised in Hospitals in America that have implemented 
ADCs. The method used was direct observation of nursing staff accessing medicines before 
the ADCs were implemented and then again after their implementation. The results were as 
follows, the ADC led to a reduction in the medication administration error rate from 8.9% to 
7.2%; however, this reduction was solely accounted for by a reduction in errors of negligible 
clinical severity. The types of administration errors noted after implementation of the ADC 
remained largely unchanged from beforehand. The ADC was found to reduce the 
amount of time that nurses spent administering medication from 2.94 min per dose to 2.37 
min per dose. It is estimated that this reduction could generate around 66 min of additional 
free nursing time per ward per day. The setting was an NHS mental healthcare trust and the 
intervention was technology based rather than system based. The results are interesting but 
not directly relevant to this study. 
McLeod, Barber et al. (2015)	90 Set out to identify system factors that facilitate and/or hinder 
successful medication administration focused on three inter-related areas: nurse practices 
and workarounds, workflow, and interruptions and distractions. The researchers used a 
mixed-methods ethnographic approach involving observational fieldwork, field notes, 
participant narratives, photographs, and spaghetti diagrams to identify system factors that 
facilitate and/or hinder successful medication administration in three inpatient wards, each 
from a different English NHS trust. Over a period of 85 hours, 43 different nurses were 
observed on 56 drug rounds (26 qualitative and 30 quantitative) across the three study 
wards. This study was very well thought through and designed and the data collected 
comprehensive and gives possibly for the first time gives insight into nursing behaviour and 
practice during medicine administration rounds. The authors conclude that to reduce 
medication administration errors that there ought to be work done to optimise the ward-based 
medication systems; Reduce interruptions and distractions, and actively encouraging 																																																								
90 McLeod, M., et al. (2015). "Facilitators and Barriers to Safe Medication Administration to Hospital 
Inpatients: A Mixed Methods Study of Nurses’ Medication Administration Processes and Systems (the 
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inpatient involvement with their medications where appropriate. This study gives a wealth of 
data on nurse behaviour and practice during medicine administration rounds. This thesis, 
arguably, looks at interventions that may go some way to address aspects of the 
recommendations made in their paper. 
 
Scott, Williams et al. (2010) 91 undertook an audit of medication interruptions and 
effectiveness of drug round tabards in Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, NHS Grampian, Scotland. 
The aim of the project was to evaluate the impact of introducing drug round tabards to three 
wards in Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, in order to evaluate the impact that this may have on 
reducing interruptions experienced by nurses administering medicines. The project was 
carried out over a 5 week period from January to March 2008. During weeks 1 and 2 data 
were collected on the number of interruptions received by nursing staff while conducting drug 
rounds. In week 3 drug round tabards were introduced which staff wore during the drug 
rounds. During weeks 4 and 5 the number of interruptions was again recorded. Views from 
staff and patients were obtained using questionnaires. The average number of patients per 
drug round was nine (pre and post tabard) and 95% of drugs rounds analyzed were 
interrupted (pre and post tabard). It was found that The median number of interruptions was 
significantly reduced from six interruptions to five interruptions per drug round following the 
introduction of drug tabards. This project yielded positive results in that interruptions were 
reduced and medication incidents fell from 19 to 16 over the five-week period of the project, 
as compared to the same period during the previous year. The data and detail is too little to 
draw conclusions as to the usefulness of this approach and consequently the relevance to 
this thesis is adjudged to be small. 
 
Gaps in the Literature 	Error	reducing	systems	included	technology	and	the	introduction	of		the	standardisation	of	intra	venous	bags.	Other	systems	described	in	the	literature	cover	the	benefits	of	safety	cultures	and	encouraging	error	reporting	and	lean	management	systems.	All	of	which	are	beneficial	in	improving	patient	safety	but	none	explicitly	identify	error	causation	at	a	root	cause	level,	many	are	arguably	reactive	rather	than	proactive.	Working	leaner	improves	efficiency	but	doesn’t	necessarily	improve	safety.																																																									
91 Scott, J., et al. (2010). "The effectiveness of drug round tabards in reducing incidence of medication 
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Of the articles describing stress related research, two were student or trainee related and 
two, community pharmacy related and as such not directly relevant to the research questions 
that this thesis set out to investigate. Business was identified as a causative factor in stress 
causation but not how to mitigate this. 
The only article in the interruptions category described the impact of distraction on the 
prescribing not the dispensing process. Incident reporting was examined by various authors 
who looked at the volume of completed incident reports, the connection between 
organisational culture and reporting of incidents and attitudes to incident form completion by 
nursing staff. Two further studies examined incident reporting in a theatre unit in the USA and 
on a Neonatal intensive care unit also at the same hospital in Boston, USA. 
Medicines management policy research yielded articles that identified the importance of 
communication in reducing errors and in particular seven error modes outlined above that 
reflect, in part at least, the basic risk factors of error causation theory outlined in the 
introduction in chapter one of this thesis. Adherence to standard operating procedures 
(SoPs) by nurses was also examined, but interestingly the quality, relevance and usefulness 
of the SoPs were not. Another team looked at the benefit of introducing quiet zones 
supported by visual aids such as signs and instructions. The introduction of do not disturb red 
tabards were also investigated by a team from Aberdeen, Scotland In other words 
interruptions were accepted as playing a factor in error causation and current practice was 
adjusted rather than being re thought. 
Finally two other teams, on examined the introduction of robotic dispensing units and the 
other undertake an extremely thorough examination of nursing systems and the impact that 
they may have on error causation.  
The full search strategy for the literature search was outlined above. In total 11896 citations 
were found and after further review and refinement this number was reduced to thirty-four 
citations for discussion. 
The rationale for this approach was initially to gain a perspective on research carried out in 
the context of a paediatric NHS hospital in England and Wales, beginning with organizational 
approaches to safety, risk reduction and interventions. In other words, what was the “big” 
picture or overview, the strategic approach to learning from errors and therefore going one 
step further, taking a proactive rather than reactive approach and attempting to reduce the 
likely hood of the same type of error from reoccurring, that is predicting errors before they 
took place. Included in this initial literature search were sub topics, for example 
communication failures as a particular incident grouping; Work on incident reporting itself; the 
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benefit of standardizing procedures, protocols and medicine strengths and Introducing and 
assessing a safety culture.  
In approaching the literature review in this way it would become clear as to whether or not 
research to date had identified ways in which to answer the research questions stated as the 
aims of this thesis that is to identify latent risks associated with in a specific task set in an 
NHS paediatric hospital pharmacy department. Then to establish the extent to which these 
latent risks may be predicted. Also to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
current Incident reporting system (IR1s) in supporting learning from incidents and changing 
practice and finally, to determine the impact of introducing a Quality Management Approach 
to process design into one process on an acute Oncology ward in the same paediatric 
hospital and determine the benefits of this approach including in terms of risk reduction. 
In order to begin to fill in the detail, the next step was to investigate the impact of the 
environment on operatives working in the defined setting. Could something as simple as the 
conditions that operatives were expected to work in impacting detrimentally on the ability to 
function optimally? Were conditions to hot or too cold for example, were systems such as 
workflows inefficiently designed? Might an operatives emotional state affect their perception 
of the environment to reduce their operating capacity as much as if the conditions were 
actually suboptimal. 
How might operatives function under stress inducing conditions? Workload capacity is often 
discussed quite reasonably in many working environments and under many systems and an 
optimal workload capacity is defined. Not so in pharmacy, where workload is generally 
managed reactively rather than on the basis of capacity, safety and efficiency. The question 
to investigate therefore is what is the impact on an operative’s work strategy as workload 
increases and stress levels rise as a consequence. Following on from this it was determined 
that it was important to investigate how increasing an individual’s stress levels affected an 
individual’s approach to the way in which they worked and whether their approach changed 
and whether this in turn increased or decreased the potential for errors to occur.  
Having looked at general safety management strategies, the impact of environment and 
process design and then how stress impacts on operatives through the proxy of increasing 
workload the next step was to investigate how efficient the incident reporting process really 
was. When an error has occurred it was important to discover whether or not the existing 
error or incident reporting systems work efficiently enough and effectively enough to actually 
be able to deduce the cause of a particular error and then generate learning that can actually 
impact on preventing that particular error scenario from re occurring in the future. 
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Error causation and error prevention strategies are well developed in many high risk 
industries, the nuclear industry, the Oil industry, Shipping, Pharmaceuticals and classically 
amongst airlines, but less so within healthcare. Possibly this is due to the fact that healthcare 
is less organised, less structures less organic that these other industries being staffed in 
critical areas by independently minded professionals rather than employees and as such 
changing culture is more difficult than it might otherwise be. However, this is conjecture.  
High-risk industries have developed sophisticated Quality Management Systems (QMS), 
process are developed that are well designed, efficient and safe and continually performance 
monitored. Standard operating procedures (SoPs) are well written and training is appropriate 
together with continuous improvement embedded into their cultures. Teamwork and flattened 
hierarchies are commonplace and the use of visual prompts and other safety strategies 
ubiquitous. This next section was a proactively designed project to test the hypothesis that 
QMS could be introduced into healthcare. The literature search for this section looked for the 
existence of the implementation of QMS and elements of QMS such as visual prompts such 
as checklists. 
Finally, to compliment the QMS section a literature review of research relating to NHS 
Hospital medicines management policies in relation to safety, error reduction, inclusion of 
human factor elements, team work, the encouragement of the use of flattened hierarchies, 
the use of visual prompts such as checklists was carried out.  
Conclusion 	
The literature review indicated that there is indeed a gap in understanding in being able to 
predict error causation in the context of a paediatric National Health Service hospital 
pharmacy. That learning from errors or incidents and thereby being enabled to change 
working cultures in order to reduce system failures and resulting errors, is seldom proactive 
and when it is, changes are made wholesale so understanding as to what works and why, is 
arguably missed. Clearly a systematic and reasoned approach to an appreciation of error 
causation in a paediatric healthcare setting together with the introduction of effective quality 
management systems culture changing initiatives is required and this was the aim of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 3. Latent risks in Paediatric Pharmacy identified in the dispensing process 
 
Introduction 
 
The primary aim of this thesis was to identify latent risks associated with in a specific task set 
in an NHS paediatric hospital pharmacy department and then to go on to establish the extent 
to which these latent risks may be predicted. If a latent risk can be predicted, then it may be 
possible to mitigate the risk to reduce it or eliminate it entirely and thereby reduce the number 
of latent risks developing into actual incidents.  
In order to do this an understanding of the system, the processes that occur within it including 
investigating the impact of that system upon those required to work within it needs to be 
obtained. In addition, existing error prevention barriers put into place to prevent risks from 
developing into errors needs to be considered and gaps in these noted.  
Finally, latent risks known to be an issue from the literature review stress and interruptions to 
be investigated specifically.   
Objectives 
 
• To identify latent risks that exist within one step in the dispensing process, the 
accuracy checking step, in a paediatric hospital pharmacy 
• To observe the accuracy checking process itself in detail 
• To investigate the impact of the environment (the dispensary) on operatives working 
within it. 
• To ascertain how operatives, view their working environment 
• To establish a link, if it exists, between workload and stress 
• To determine if interruptions is a latent risk with particular significance in paediatric 
pharmacy. 
 
 
Background 
 
The dispensing process consisted of the following steps; receipt and logging of requests for 
medicines onto the computer system; a clinical check by a clinical pharmacist; labelling of the 
medicine using the Ascribe © pharmacy system; assembly; accuracy checking by a qualified 
Checker Technician and logging out.  
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The specific dispensing step selected for observation was accuracy checking, a discrete 
readily observable process. Each task is brought to the accuracy checker complete with 
everything required to complete the task in a tray and the elements that comprise this task 
are explicit and immediately observable, unlike the other two steps; Labelling is essentially 
rule-based selection tasks carried out on the dispensary software system or from a store 
shelf. Clinical screening is essentially cognitive and difficult to observe. In this process, the 
operative is required to check that the correct medicine is dispensed for the correct patient. 
Dose calculations, correct labelling of the items and attachment of all required ancillaries and 
additional instructions are also checked.   
 
Method 	
The study environment was the inpatient/outpatient dispensary of Birmingham Children’s 
Hospital (BCH), a tertiary referral specialist Children’s Hospital.  The study instrument was 
non-participant, direct observation of routine dispensing tasks.  A discrete, clearly identifiable 
step within the dispensing process was chosen for this study.  
In this study nine technicians and nine pharmacists were each observed for up to a 30-
minute period.  The observations themselves were carried out between February 2008 and 
December 2008, and during each observational period the subject accuracy-checked items 
passing through the dispensary. The observations were carried out at different times of the 
day throughout the week.  The overall activity or business of the dispensary was also 
measured in terms of the number of medicines items being processed within the whole 
dispensary during each observation period.  These data were extracted from the Pharmacy 
management system, Ascribe©.  
Details of the observations made of each study event included background noise and 
interruptions, and these factors were recorded using a set of codes (Table 1). The codes 
were derived by reducing the most commonly observed tasks, interruptions and background 
noises, to a brief description and associated abbreviation. This code set was then used to 
record each action that an accuracy checker performed, each interruption that occurred and 
each type of background noise.  There were 57 events and associated codes used, 
examples of these were, AT for air tube, CBl for check bag label, CB for a visual check of a 
bottle, IP denoted that the medicine request   was initialled and so on. 
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Table 1 a list of dispensary events, tasks, actions and interruptions together with the codes 
used to record them. 
 
 
Eighteen members of the pharmacy staff at Birmingham Children’s Hospital staff, comprising 
of nine Pharmacy technicians and nine Pharmacists were approached by the researcher and 
invited to participate in the study. This represented 36% (n=25) of the technician workforce 
and 37.5% (n=24) of the pharmacist workforce in the department. The invitation took the form 
of an informal interview in which the aim of the study was explained to them. In particular, it 
was explained that observations were not assessing their work but rather the impact of the 
environment on them. It was also explained that the study had been submitted into the 
National Health Service (NHS) ethics approval process and the advice received was that the 
study was viewed as a service improvement and as such did not require ethics approval. 
(Appendix 8) 
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Questionnaires 	
During the four-month period immediately prior to the observations being carried out, that is 
October 2007 to January 2008, accuracy checkers were invited to complete a questionnaire, 
(Appendix 1) consisting of six multiple choice questions that recorded the impressions of the 
participants on the dispensary environment at a particular moment in time. The survey was 
developed using material developed by the Health and Safety Executive, HSE (2004)92, 
Eurofound – The European foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions93, 
The NASA task load index (Hart 2006)94, and two Survey Monkey survey templates, 
Employee satisfaction survey questions and Management performance template survey.9596 
The Questionnaire itself consisted of a set of 6 areas. One area had three sub-sections. The 
respondent was invited to indicate the degree of impact each area had on them. The areas 
were Environment, Workloads, Focus, Workspace, Equipment/references and Knowledge 
base. An example of degree for the Area workspace asked the respondent to comment on 
the workspace they were in for that particular duty slot. That is, was the workspace cluttered 
or spacious or adequate? Another area was environment and respondents were asked to 
indicate on temperature, lighting and background noise levels. There was also a space for 
comments to be made. The forms were readily available for respondents to complete as 
often as they chose to do so, one form for each work session. 
The questions inquired as to an operative’s impression of the workload during that session. 
This was purely an impression and not necessarily factually based, that is workload data 
wasn’t accessed to answer this question. Also they were asked where they thought their 
focus was during the session. This was an attempt to assess whether they thought that their 
mind was on the task in hand or whether they felt distracted in some way mentally or 
emotionally. Views on the workspace, available equipment and reference books also were 
recorded. They were also asked if they felt that they had the necessary knowledge to deal 
with the work presented to them during that session. Finally, there was also opportunity to 
make written comments and those that found a particular session stressful or had made 
																																																								
92 Health and safety Executive; HSE  Management Standards indicator tool; User Manual. (2004) 
93 European foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions; Measuring Job 
Satisfaction in Surveys- Comparative analytical report.(2007)< http://www.eurofound.europa.eu> 
accessed July 2013 
94 Hart, S., G. (2006). NASA-task load index (nasa-tlx); 20 years later N.-A. R. Center. 
95 Survey Monkey; Employee Satisfaction Template Survey.pdf (2013)  
96 Survey Monkey; Management Performance Template Survey.pdf;(2013) 
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errors often elected to complete this section. In total 35 forms were completed by 8 accuracy 
checkers. 
After the observations were made each accuracy checker was interviewed using a semi-
structured interview technique. All participants were asked the same set of seven questions 
(Appendix 1) that produced a framework to elicit their views on how content they were to 
carry out accuracy checking duties and the work environment itself. Participants were asked 
to comment on: 
• Distractions that occurred  
• How they felt about these  
• Whether they had their own checking system to which they worked  
• An error that they had made and what they thought contributed to  
 making this error and how this had affected them. 
 
Focus Groups 	
Two focus groups were organised after the observations period had been completed, each 
with nine participants, one for technicians and one for pharmacists.  All of the participants 
had taken part in the observational study described in this report.  Each group was 
constituted from a single professional group in order to encourage more openness of 
response and to observe the impact, if any, that professional culture, experience or training 
would add to the discussions.  Each group was convened for a single sixty-minute 
uninterrupted period and facilitated by the same investigator and who also took notes of the 
key emerging themes.  The groups were tasked with two objectives: 
(1) Each group was asked how many steps they thought it took to accuracy check a 
prescription for a bottle paracetamol liquid.  
(2) To compile a process map for the accuracy checking process using basic systems 
analysis techniques, consisting of processes represented by boxes connected by lines to 
show the order in which tasks are performed, as used in SSADM (Structured systems 
analysis design methodology) for example. SSADM is a systems approach to the 
analysis and design of information systems. SSADM was produced for the Central 
Computer and Telecommunications Agency, a UK government office concerned with the 
use of technology in government, from 1980 onwards97. The investigator acting as 
facilitator for the group added the tasks in the sequence suggested, to the A1 paper on a 
																																																								
97 Wikipedia entry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structured_systems_analysis_and_design_method 
<accessed August 7th, 2016> 
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flip chart, creating a task flow diagram. As a result, a detailed task by task sequential 
work flow diagram was compiled by each group.   (Appendix 4) 
 
Statistics 	
The linear lines that were added to the graphs were linear regression lines, that is a model in 
which the conditional mean of y given the value of x is an affine (connected with) function of 
x. The standard error, or standard error the mean (SEM), that is the standard deviation of the 
multiple samples means was used rather than simply the mean of the samples. The SEM 
gives a measure of how well the sample represents the sample. When the sample is 
representative, the standard error will be small. The division by the square root of the sample 
size is a reflection of the speed with which an increasing sample size gives an improved 
representation of the population. An approximation of confidence intervals can be made 
using the mean + / - standard errors. The SEM can be calculated by dividing the standard 
deviation of the sample by the square root of the sample size. (Syque 2002-2009)98 
Results  
 
Observational data and data extracted from the pharmacy management system enabled a 
data set to be compiled.  Comparisons could then be made between both staff groups, 
showing the relationship between business of the dispensary against a number of 
parameters including the steps taken to process each medicine request; the number of safety 
checks and the time taken to check each medicine request. The data is recorded in tables 
presented before each corresponding graph. In Figures 1-3 data sets for the pharmacists are 
shown in green and those for technicians in blue.  Along the X axis on each of the graphs is 
an indication of the overall business of the dispensary, measured in number of items 
processed in each half hour period. 
 
																																																								
98 Syque 2002 http://changingminds.org/explanations/research/statistics/standard_error.htm (accessed 
2009) 
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     Table 2 The average time taken to check an item (pharmacist and technician groups) and 
the total work activity (number of items) for each 30-minute observation period                
      
*Time here was the average time an individual took during the observed session 
The mean for technicians group was 6.09 +/- 1.4 (SEM) and for the pharmacists group was 
3.27 +/- 0.4. (SEM) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7  (Graph 1) Shows the average time each participant took to accuracy check an item 
and how this varied as work activity increases within the dispensary.  
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The data indicated that as general workloads increased, the time that checking technicians 
spent on checking an item tended to decrease, whereas the time pharmacists spent on 
checking showed a trend to increase. The trend lines were calculated by excel, the formula 
for the technician trend line was The trend lines were calculated by excel, the formula for the 
technician trend line was y = -0.2583x + 7.3806 and for the pharmacist trend line was y = -
0.2583x + 7.3806 
 
 
 
Table 3 The average number of steps* a Technician checker and Pharmacist checker makes 
per item checked and items passing through the dispensary in a half hour period as a 
measure of work activity 
The mean for the Pharmacist group is 29.6 +/- 4.72 (SEM) and for the Technician group is 
27.9 +/- 16.1(SEM). With regard to statistical significant differences between the groups: If 
the two confidence intervals do not overlap, we can conclude that there is a statistically 
significant difference in the two population values at the given level of confidence 
• Where a ‘Step’ was a clearly observable discrete action, for example reading a label.  
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Figure 8 (Graph 2) Workload of Dispensary (number of items processed in a 30 minute 
period) versus Steps taken to process each request 
 
The graph (Figure 8) shows the variation in the number of steps that an individual carried out 
in order to accuracy check an item together with workload passing through the dispensary.  
The trend lines indicate that as workloads increased the number of steps increased for the 
pharmacist group but decreased for the technician group. The trend lines were calculated by 
excel, the formula for the technician trend line was y = 1.7617x + 19.058 and for the 
pharmacist trend line was y = -0.335x + 31.253. 
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Table 4 Safety checks carried out and items passing through the dispensary per half hour. The mean for the 
Pharmacist group is 63.7  +/- 10.5 (SEM) and for the Technician group is 45.9 +/- 17.1(SEM) 
 
(*Where SEM is the standard error of the mean) 
 
 
Figure 9 (Graph 3) the number of steps that could be said to have Safety implications* v’s 
Workload (the number of items passing through the dispensary in a 30 minute period) 
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*A Safety step for example would be to ensure that the dose was correct as compared to a 
purely functional step for example checking that a medicine spoon was present. 
Figure 9 shows that for both groups, as workloads increase the number of steps that could be 
defined as safety checks changed. The trend for the technician group was for the number of 
safety groups to increase and for the pharmacist group to decrease. The pharmacist group 
appeared to carry out more safety checks from the outset. 
Questionnaires  
 
Blank questionnaire forms were available in the dispensary during the three-month period 
prior to the observations starting. The individuals who had agreed to participate in the 
observations were invited to complete a questionnaire whenever they were assigned to a 
dispensary accuracy checking session. Individuals could therefore complete more than one 
questionnaire form should they have been assigned to more than one dispensary accuracy 
checking session. 
Of the 34 questionnaires completed, 5 (15%) contained comments indicating that the 
respondent had made an error personally. Even though they then went on to correct that 
error, they were asked to note the fact that an error (sometimes euphemistically called a 
’near miss’) had been made.  The respondents were also asked to comment on several 
potential influencing factors that included environmental observations, for example they were 
asked to indicate whether the dispensary felt hot or cold or comfortable and to rate the 
lighting and also background noise levels. Other factors examined were workloads, focus (a 
range from “on the job in hand” to “day dreaming”), work space, references available and 
adequacies or otherwise of their knowledge to perform the tasks expected of them.   
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Table 4 Summary of Questionnaire results, of how an   individual perceived the dispensary 
environment that is how it was impacting on them during a particular dispensary session 
 
* Individuals were asked to complete a questionnaire as often as they wanted, during a 16-
week period. One questionnaire was completed for an individual checking session 
The results showed that 20 out of 34 questionnaires were completed after a busy checking 
session in the dispensary, that is busy as perceived by the individual completing the form, 
and 14 questionnaires were completed after a quiet session or one with a reasonable 
workload.  Respondents were more likely to feel challenged or out of their depth in a busy 
session (81%) than in a non-busy session (19%). They were more likely to find noise levels 
distracting in a busy session (40%) than in a non-busy session (14%), similarly the 
dispensary temperature was more likely to be uncomfortably either too hot or too cold in a 
busy session (45%) than a non-busy session (36%); the lighting to be too harsh (25%) 
compared with (7%); the dispensary to appear to be cluttered (70%) to (14%) and to feel 
stressed (50%) as compared with (14%). The results correlate with feeing stressed and non-
stressed. This confirmed that business was a reasonable proxy measure for stress. 
Participants recorded that they felt stressed during 12 of the 34 occasions that a form was 
completed (35.3%) and errors were made and noted on 5 questionnaires (41.7%). No errors 
were noted on the questionnaires completed after a checking session during which the 
participants didn’t feel stressed. People felt stressed only one session in three but when they 
did they were 5 times more likely to make an error. 
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Table 5 Showing results from the Questionnaire  
 
Key: The letters indicate the parameter, for example WL = Workload, ET= Environmental 
Temperature and so on. The numbers indicate where on the “Likert”, Allen,E (2007)99 scale 
the respondents felt they were. A Likert scale is a simple linear scale used to represent 
people’s views with regard to an issue. The scale may be numerical for example with the 
numbers 1-3, or 1-5, or 1-10 and have words associated with the numbers for example 1(do 
not agree), 2 (Have no opinion), 3 (agree). A respondent is then given a statement and asked 
to indicate which of the options most closely matches their point of view with regard to the 
question asked. Some parameters, for example ET had a scale consisting of three options 
indicating that the environmental lighting was “Comfortable”, “Harsh” or “Dark”. This was 
recorded as ET1, ET2 or ET3 and so on. Some parameters, Workload (WL) for example had 
a Likert Scale consisting of 5 options.   
Of the respondents who had indicated that they had felt stressed during the session that they 
had selected to complete a questionnaire for, 53% (n-19) had also replied that the dispensary 
workload seemed busy or very busy (manic) to them as compared with 17% (n=12) who 
thought that the workload was “quiet” or “reasonable”. The inference being that there is 
																																																								99	Allen,	E;	Seaman,	C;	Likert	Scales	and	data	Analyses;	Quality	Progress;	July	2007;<	http://asq.org/quality-progress/2007/07/statistics/likert-scales-and-data-analyses.html>	
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indeed a link between workload and an individual feeling stressed, and that workload is a 
reasonable proxy measure for stress.  
 
 
Table 6 Summary of Questionnaire Results Analysis Selecting responses related to noise, 
stress and errors 
 
 
Table 5, above, shows that operatives are four times (40%, n=8) as likely to be distracted by 
a background noise when they feel busy than not (5.9%, n=2), 10 times as likely to feel 
stressed (50%,n=10), four times more likely to make an error (20%,n=4), 5 times as likely to 
be distracted by a background noise and feel stressed  (14.7&,n=5) and twice as likely to feel 
distracted, stressed and make an error (5.8%,n=2). There would appear to be evidence to 
indicate that feeling busy is stressful increases the probability of the existence of distracting 
background noise and these error generating mechanisms or sub-standard acts, Groeneweg 
(2002) leads to errors. 
 
The Interviews 
 
The interviews consisted of seven questions and the responses were analysed using a 
qualitative analysis key theme methodology.  The questions elicited views on the accuracy 
checking workstation, for example where it was positioned in the dispensary. Interviewees 
were asked about interruptions and how they managed these.  Checkers were also invited to 
talk about an error that they had made. For all participants key words themes revolved 
around Interruptions (Noise, “being the person to ask”, that is perceived as the person who 
will know the answer ; Environment; workplace design) and Errors (training and procedures; 
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emotions; work pressure and design of paperwork). Five key themes emerged from the 
interviews. Each time a theme was raised by an interviewee it was noted, the figures in 
brackets denote percentage occurrence of a theme amongst the interviewees. (n=18) 
1. Design either of the paperwork being used or the dispensary itself. (39%)  
2. Interruptions such as background noise, being asked questions and the phone being 
left to ring (100%) 
3. Emotions such as anger or feeling pressured by expectations of others whether 
colleagues or patients/carers (70%) 
4. Processes not being followed that resulted in incomplete information being available 
to the checker, for example incomplete patient drug records on the pharmacy 
computer system. Lack of training would be a subset of this theme (40%) 
5. Workloads, simply being too busy. (70%) 
 
In addition to describing an error, each interviewee was asked to mention any causal factors 
that led to the error being made. 45% of interviewees attributed the error to being busy and 
so feeling stressed or distracted. 6% attributed the error to the emotional state they were in at 
the time (angry) and 6% of interviewees attributed the error to the poor design of the 
paperwork used. 
Focus groups 	
Two focus groups were organised after the observations period had been completed. One 
group consisted of the nine pharmacy technicians and the second group of nine pharmacists. 
Each group was asked how many steps they thought it took to accuracy check a prescription 
for a bottle paracetamol liquid. Interestingly both groups suggested that it took 5-6 steps to 
check a medicine although as will be seen later the actual number of steps for both groups 
was significantly higher than this, in fact the mean number of steps taken for the Pharmacist 
group was 29.6 +/- 4.72 (SEM) and for the Technician group was 27.9 +/- 16.1(SEM). 
  
Discussion 
 
The initial phase of the present study set out to identify latent risks associated with a specific 
paediatric pharmacy process, the final accuracy check, and then to establish the extent to 
which latent risks inherent within the system may be predicted.  
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This investigation took the form of observations, interviews, questionnaires and focus groups. 
Eighteen members of the pharmacy staff at Birmingham Children’s Hospital FT participated 
in the study, which was carried out over an eight-month period. Each participant agreed to 
take part in the study and was observed whilst accuracy-checking medicine orders for a 30-
minute period. Nine of the participants were pharmacy technicians qualified to accuracy-
check medicine orders and nine were pharmacists. The questionnaires were completed 
during a four-month period prior to the observations being made. Ethics approval was 
deemed not to be required as the study was seen as a service improvement.  
The observations were reduced to three data sets. Firstly, the impact that increasing 
workload, the number of items being processed by the dispensary in a 30-minute period, had 
on the time each participant took to process items. This could be considered to be an 
indication or simple measure of the impact of increasing stress on an individual. Secondly, 
the number of steps or actions taken whilst checking an item was also recorded and how this 
changed as a function of workload in the dispensary. Thirdly, a sub set of the number of 
steps was plotted against increasing workloads. This sub set consisted only of steps that 
were considered to be safety steps as opposed to process steps. An example of a safety 
step would be checking the strength of the drug and an example of a purely process step 
might be packing items into a bag. In addition, the technicians and pharmacists were treated 
as two distinct groups. 
 
The first data set measured the average time an individual took to check items during a 
particular observational session as a function of increasing workload. The more items 
passing through the dispensary during each observational, 30-minute period, was taken as 
an indication of workload pressure each individual experienced. The results showed that for 
the pharmacy technician group, as work pressure increased the time taken to accuracy check 
an item decreased. For the pharmacist group the reverse occurred, that is as workload 
pressure increased so did the time taken accuracy checking items. The pharmacist group, in 
other words, spent more time checking items the more they felt under workload pressure. 
This indicates that each group seems to have a different approach to this task. It is also worth 
noting that the mean time for the pharmacist group was almost half that for the technician 
group notwithstanding the fact that this group slowed down as work pressure increased. 
The second data set measured the average number of steps that a participant took to check 
an item as a function of workload pressure. The results showed that as workload pressure 
increased the number of checking steps that individuals took varied. As workload pressure 
increased, the technician group reduced the number of checking steps that they made and 
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conversely the pharmacist group increased the number of checking steps as workload 
pressure increased. 
The third data set, measured safety steps which as explained above in the ‘Method’ section 
is a sub-set of the steps taken data set as a function of workload pressure and, for both 
groups, as workload pressure increased the number of safety related steps again changed. 
For the technician group the number of safety checks increased, whilst for the pharmacist 
group the number of safety checks decreased as workload pressure increased. Although the 
number of the safety checks for the pharmacist group decreased with increasing work 
pressure, this group appeared to carry out more safety checks from the outset. The number 
of safety steps decreased from a higher number of safety steps carried out than that carried 
out in the technician group and remained at a higher level in comparison to those of the 
technician group. There was a noticeable difference between the two groups in their 
approach to managing increasing workloads, the technician group appeared to be task 
focused, intent on managing the increased workload. By comparison the Pharmacists 
appeared to be more safety conscious. This raises the question as to what was the reason 
for the difference in approach between the two groups? The pharmacy technician group 
collectively had more dispensing experience than the pharmacist group. Clearly the degree of 
education was a variance between the groups, the Pharmacists all possessed master’s 
degrees whereas the pharmacy technician group had lesser educational qualifications. It 
could be argued however; that education would only be relevant if the underlying 
competencies required performing the tasks being observed was a factor. One clear 
difference between the pharmacist group and the pharmacy technician group, at the time of 
observation, was the fact that the pharmacists were regulated by a professional body that 
required adherence to a code of practice. In other words, professionalism may have been the 
determining factor to account for the difference in approach between the two groups. 
 
Questionnaire 	
The questionnaire forms were available for participants to complete on an as and when basis 
over a four-month period prior to the Observations being carried out. Individuals completed a 
form after one of their regular accuracy checking work sessions in the dispensary. The 
number of forms completed by an individual varied and a total of 34 forms were completed in 
all. An analysis of the results indicated that a definite link existed between making an error 
and an awareness of the surroundings that an operative, in this case an accuracy checker, 
was working in. Respondents only felt stressed on one session in three but when they did 
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feel stressed they were four times as likely to be distracted by a background noise when they 
felt busy than when they didn’t feel busy, 10 times more likely to feel stressed, four times 
more likely to make an error 5 times more likely to be distracted by a background noise and 
feel stressed and twice as likely to feel distracted, stressed and make an error. There would 
appear to be evidence to indicate that feeling busy is stressful increases the probability of the 
existence of distracting background noise and these errors generating mechanisms or sub-
standard acts, Groeneweg (2002) leads to errors.  
It is not surprising that when workloads are high, then it is likely that background noise and 
interruptions will increase, that work spaces will be more cluttered, an individual’s knowledge 
base will be challenged and an individual’s stress levels will rise as indicated by the results of 
the questionnaire. Clearly, both background noise and direct interruptions impact directly on 
an operative, as does to a lesser extent, the ambient environment (heating and lighting etc) 
or perhaps how the ambient temperature and lighting are perceived as in the dispensary in a 
hospital theses variables tend to be kept constant. 
Interviews 	
These findings were corroborated by a thematic qualitative analysis of the interviews. Key 
themes that emerged included Pressure to work faster, noise, Training & Procedures, 
workplace design, distracted, emotion and paperwork design. All but distracted and emotion 
can be recognised as having Basic Risk Factor (BRF) antecedents.       
The Focus Groups 	
Both groups suggested that it would require 6 or 8 steps to check an unambiguous 
prescription for a bottle of Paracetamol liquid for a child. Both groups then went on to outline 
a 40-50-step checking work stream when asked to break the process down task by task. The 
Observational study found that the actual number of steps each group took as being far 
higher. This would indicate that in practice there may currently be redundant steps in the 
checking process. Redundant in the sense of unnecessarily repeating steps most likely as a 
consequence of a direct or indirect interruption, an example of a direct interruption would be 
being asked a question and an indirect interruption could be noise generated from a 
telephone ringing. Without the use of a visual aid an operative would be uncertain as to how 
far they had reached in the process and would automatically retrace their steps to a known 
break point. In addition, the number of steps varied, either decreasing or increasing with 
increasing work pressure.   
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What explanation could account for the marked difference in observational results between 
the two groups? Arguably, the strategy and work ethos for each group investigated was a 
function of training and perceived differential responsibilities existing between the two groups, 
in other words the differences being due to either being task driven or carrying legal and 
professional responsibility for dispensing outcomes.  
Project limitations 
 
It was recognised that the sample size for this study was small in number, 18 operatives in 
total, and the results should be interpreted in this context. The investigation was itself 
substantial. The intention was to examine the prediction of errors in paediatric pharmacy 
using one task in the dispensing process. Therefore the results are valid in this setting.  
Recording and coding observations without the use of technology, arguably also has its 
limitations. These criticisms are mitigated somewhat by there being one observer undertaking 
all the observations with attendant consistency.  
It should also be noted that medicines items requiring dispensing for children can be 
inordinately complex, take significantly longer to dispense than a similar medicine for an adult 
and consequently have the potential for more errors associated with the process.  Processes 
and systems applied to the paediatric pharmacist setting that lead to the development of 
safer dispensing environments would therefore be able to be transferred to the arguably less 
demanding adult general hospital dispensary setting. 
The results were somewhat unexpected and showed that as workloads (stress) increased the 
time spent on checking an item decreased for the technician group but increased for the 
pharmacist group. This trend was repeated in the second data set that is, as workloads 
(stress) increased the number of steps taken to check an item reduced for the technician 
group but increased for the pharmacist group. Interestingly, the number of purely safety 
checks increased for the technician group and showed a decrease for the pharmacist group 
as workloads (stress) increased. Although it can be seen from the graph that whilst the 
number of safety checks is reducing for the pharmacist group, the total number of safety 
checks is higher when compared with the technician group. 
Professionalism 
 
A Profession according to The Merrisam-Webster on line dictionary  is a calling requiring 
specialized knowledge and often-intensive academic preparation; it continues a principal 
vocation or employment. The word Profess derived from profiteri to declare aloud and fateri 
to declare and derived from fabula fable (The concise Oxford dictionary of Etymology (1996) 
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editor Hoad T.F P372; to avowal of belief in a religion; an Occupation. A Professional is 
someone therefore who has trained for and is committed to a profession, a vocation and one 
with a set of beliefs or code of conduct, although it also carries multiple other meanings 
today. Usually for a professional it is mandated that they belong to a Professional body that is 
regulated and has a code of conduct by which members are expected to follow. For example, 
the Chartered society of Physiotherapy has a code of Professional values and behaviour100 
that expects its members to take responsibility for their actions, behave ethically, deliver an 
effective service and to strive to achieve excellence. As a minimum, professionals are 
required to follow the various rules and regulations that govern their practice but has so 
clearly set out in the code of professionalism by the Medical School of the university of 
Massachusetts 101an individual covered by the code is expected to take on appropriate 
responsibilities willingly. A professional doesn’t down tools when the clock strikes 17:00 or 
whatever time a shift ends, for example but ensures patient care, in the case of a healthcare 
professional is a priority.  
An unexpected result that emerged from the observations was that there was a noticeable 
variance in approach to work between the two groups of healthcare workers. Pharmacy 
technicians didn’t become a mandated registered profession until July 2011 whilst the 
observations made in this section of the thesis were initially made three years earlier in 2008, 
in other words pharmacy technicians at the time that the observations were made were not 
professionals in the sense of being governed by a code of conduct, expected to follow a set 
of ethics and regulated by professional body, in the case of Pharmacy, the General 
Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC). From 2011 this variance was no longer the case, although 
discovering professionalism quite reasonably is a journey to be travelled not an 
instantaneous event. 
 
From the results we can see that the two groups of workers, Pharmacists and Pharmacy 
technicians behaved differently through the three sets of observations. 
In the first set of observations the two groups were observed carrying out a simple final 
accuracy-checking task with the time taken to complete the task being plotted against 
workload, as proxy measure for stress. In other words, the greater the work volume the 
greater the stress an individual would experience. The interesting and very unexpected 
observation was that the two cohorts of staff acted uniformly as groups. The Pharmacy 																																																								
100 < http://www.csp.org.uk/professional-union/professionalism/csp-expectations-members/code-
professional-values-behaviour <accessed August 7th, 2016> 
101 http://www.umassmed.edu/uploadedfiles/professionalism.pdf  <accessed August 7th, 2016> 
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technicians speeded up their work rate in order to get the work completed, whereas the 
Pharmacists, under increased pressure and presumably with other imperatives, actually 
slowed down as a group. This could be interpreted in many ways but it is certainly consistent 
with taking into account responsibility towards their patients’ well being and being mindful of 
their code of ethics. 
In the second set of observations, the number of steps taken to complete a task was plotted 
against workload. As workload increased and staff felt under increasing pressure, the number 
of steps that pharmacy technicians took decreased, presumably in order to get through the 
workload as rapidly as possible, in contrast the number of steps that the Pharmacists took to 
complete the assigned tasks actually increased. Again, the presumption is that this was due 
to wanting o take extra care when they felt rushed and under pressure. 
 
In the third and final set of observations a sub set of task steps were again plotted against 
workload, but on this occasion, only steps that could be considered to be safety steps, that is 
any task that would impact on the level of safety in the process, were counted. The result is 
informative and complex but essentially this time the number of safety orientated steps 
carried out by the pharmacy technicians increased and by contrast the number of safety 
steps carried out by the pharmacist cohort decreased. This at first would seem at odds with 
the first two sets of observations. However, the pharmacists’ number of safety oriented steps 
decreased from a higher number and therefore the outcome was that although they 
decreased they were still significantly higher than the number of safety steps that the 
pharmacy technicians took. One conclusion that could be drawn from this, is the fact that 
professionals and non-professionals behave differently, guided by different sets of values and 
ethics. 
Themes that emerged from this study that impacted upon error generation included 
dispensary design from the perspective of distracting background noise generation. 
Dispensary design is driven by a number of factors that are pragmatic in nature, including, for 
example, affordable space, workflow within that available space with some consideration to 
ergonomics and some background noise, also professionalism of individual operatives and 
their ethical approach to work responsibilities.  
Two key themes that stood out above others were Stress, whatever the source impacted on 
personal performance and interruptions, which appears frequently in healthcare safety 
literature. In the next chapter the part interruptions play in error causation in paediatric 
hospital pharmacy will be investigated. 
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Chapter 4. The impact of interruptions on individuals carrying out the accuracy-checking step 
of the dispensing process 
 
Introduction 
 
Interruptions are included in the list Basic Risk Factors in error causation theory and one of 
these, Error enforcing conditions, described by Groeneweg (2002) as “influences that have a 
disadvantageous effect on the human condition and, interruptions, could be said to fall into 
this definition. Many articles refer to the impact that interruptions have on individuals and task 
performance, Speier, C (1997); Trafton, G et al (2008); Coraggio, l (1990) and in the 
aeronautics and space industry regulations have been introduced specifically to limit the 
probability of interruptions from occurring at critical times, Electronic code of federal 
regulations (2009), known as the sterile cockpit rule. In the healthcare environment, 
specifically in hospitals for example during medicine administration rounds, this has been 
addressed by requiring staff to wear visible indications, for example a nurse wearing a red 
tabard during the medicine administration round, that alert people not to interrupt the wearer 
of the tabard. However, there is little in the literature that evidences the impact of 
interruptions on operatives in a paediatric hospital pharmacy setting, nor for that matter 
evidences the detrimental effect or otherwise of interruptions on performance at all. In this 
chapter the part that interruptions play in error causation in paediatric hospital pharmacy will 
be investigated. 
 
Dispensary design concerns itself with workflow and seldom considers the impact that the 
dispensary environment has on individuals. Classically the two cognitively intense tasks 
within the dispensing process, clinical screening and accuracy checking, occur at the 
beginning and at the end of the dispensing process. Clinically screening is when a 
pharmacist reviews a prescription to identify and assess the clinical impact that the 
prescribed drugs may or may not have on an individual at the doses requested. Accuracy 
checking ensures that the dispensed medicines have been accurately dispensed. These two 
tasks are usually carried out where most interruptions and distractions are likely to occur. The 
impact that these interruptions have on the efficiency and work rate of individual operatives is 
unclear. This study is designed to investigate the impact that interruptions have on those 
individuals carrying out the accuracy-checking step in the dispensing process. 
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Background 
 
In a report,”The Cost of Not Paying Attention: How Interruptions Impact Knowledge Worker 
Productivity”, Spira (Spira 2005)102 writes that the cost of interruptions consume 28% of a 
knowledge worker’s day. Spier (Spier, Valacich et al. 1999) 103 outline several propositions 
characterizing interruptions including that decision-making performance on complex tasks 
degrades when the frequency of interruptions increases. Hohenhaus relates that in a 200-
multisite study of voluntary reporting of error in neonatal intensive care units (NICU), 27% of 
reports were associated with inattention, 22% with a communication problem, and 12% with 
distractions.104 
So, in addition to introducing inefficiency, Interruptions are clearly disruptive, and a major 
cause of error in healthcare. An interruption can be defined as ““an externally-generated, 
randomly occurring, discrete event that breaks continuity of cognitive focus on a primary 
task”,(Coraggio 1990)105 . Tafton (2008)106 outlines characteristics of interruptions that make 
them particularly disruptive and these include the following the complexity of the interruption; 
similarity of the interrupting task to the primary task; how closely the interrupting and primary 
tasks are related; control over interruption engagement, and the availability of retrieval cues 
in the primary task.  
A question arises as to how does the brain manage when more than one task presents itself 
simultaneously? Pashler 107(Pashler 1994) summarises three possible theories and these 
are, Capacity Sharing, Bottleneck or task-Switching and Cross-Talk models. The first model 
hypothesizes that people have a finite processing capacity, which is shared out between 																																																								
102 Spira, J. B. F., J.B (2005). The Cost of Not Paying Attention: How Interruptions Impact Knowledge 
Worker Productivity. 
103 Spier, C., et al. (1999). "The Influence of Task Interruption on Individual Decision Making: An 
Information Overload Perspective." Decision Sciences 30(2): 337-360. 
104 Susan M. Hohenhaus, Stephen M. Powell; Distractions and Interruptions: Development of a 
Healthcare Sterile Cockpit; Newborn and Infant Nursing Reviews - June 2008(Vol. 8, Issue 2, Pages 
108-110, DOI: 10.1053 2008 
105 Coraggio, L. (1990).P19  "Deleterious effects of intermittent interruptionson the task performance of 
knowledge workers: a laboratory investigation 
106 Trafton, J. G., & Monk, C. M. (2008). Task Interruptions. In D. A. Boehm-Davis (Ed.), Reviews of 
Human Factors and Ergonomics, Volume 3, chapter 4 p111-126. 2008 
 
107 Pashler, H. (1994). "Dual-task interference in simple tasks: data and theory." Psychol Bull 116(2): 
220-244. 
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tasks and people carry out multiple tasks quite ably until one task becomes more difficult than 
the others. When this happens, capacity is switched to the more difficult task at the expense 
of the less difficult tasks. In the Bottleneck or Task-Switching model suggests that parallel 
processing may be possible until two or more tasks require access to the same processing 
mechanism or mental operation at the same time then a bottleneck results and one or more 
of the tasks will become delayed. The third theory is that interference may arise when 
multiple tasks require the same sensory inputs in order to be processed, it could be easier to 
perform more than one task if they both require the same sensory inputs or harder if they 
require the same sensory inputs. However, most theorists opt for the view that it’s more 
difficult to perform multiple tasks if they require the same sensory inputs.  
 
Spier 108(Speier 1999/3) Explains two types of interference, Capacity interference which is 
when the number of incoming cues are too numerous for a decision maker to process and  
Structural interference occurs when a decision maker must attend to two inputs that require 
the same physiological mechanisms, such as two different visual signals.  
Allport, Antonis et al. (1972)109 Hypothesized that the brain has a multi-channel not single 
channel processing capability and demonstrated that people can indeed attend to and repeat 
back continuous speech at the same time as taking in complex, unrelated visual scenes, or 
even while sight-reading piano music. That in both cases, performance with divided attention 
was very good, and in the case of sight-reading was as good as with undivided attention. 
There was little or no effect of the dual task on the accuracy of speech shadowing.  
However, ability to process multiple sensory inputs simultaneously is not the same as being 
able to process the data efficiently or productively. Worthy of note is that aging also has an 
impact on working memory and therefore how an individual manages interruptions Clapp and 
Gazzaley (2012) 110  explain that interference is known to negatively impact the ability to 
maintain information in working memory, an effect that is exacerbated with aging, which they 
explain by excessive attentional allocation to distracting (indirect interruptions) stimuli, and a 
distinct mechanism for the impact of interruption on working memory performance. 
																																																								
108 Speier, C. S., Cheri; Vessey,Iris (1999/3). " The influence of task interruption on individual decision 
making." http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0038930657&partnerID=8YFLogxK 30. 
109 Allport, D. A., et al. (1972). "On the division of attention: a disproof of the single channel 
hypothesis." Q J Exp Psychol 24(2): 225-235. 
110 Clapp, W. C. and A. Gazzaley (2012). "Distinct mechanisms for the impact of distraction and 
interruption on working memory in aging." Neurobiology of aging 33(1): 134-148. 
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To recover well from an interruption requires pre-planning and preparation. Boehm (2009)111 
outlines two such approaches. The first is aimed at decreasing the amount of information that 
needs to be remembered upon resumption of the task. This can be achieved by breaking 
from the task in hand at a suitable boundary or stage in the task and thereby enabling the 
operative to resume work at the next stage or step in their task process. Dispensary staff may 
complete producing a medicine label for example, so when they resume they take up the task 
at the next stage in the process e.g. packing the completed item into a bag. The second 
strategy is to increase the probability of recalling the origin task (prospective memory), for 
example by using approaches to increase internal memory (such as rehearsal) or through the 
creation of external memory, such as leaving notes. 
Distractions in hospitals are commonplace and have been identified as a major contributor to 
medication errors (and medical errors in general). Medmarx112, a registry of adverse drug 
events in the U.S, with over 400 healthcare facilities, lists distractions as the number one 
contributing factor in error causation in each of its data reports published between 2002 and 
2006. There are few published studies that have looked at methods to reduce distractions in 
hospitals. Accident investigation of a number of airline accidents by the National 
Transportation Safety Board, USA, such as the Eastern Airlines flight 212, concluded that 
distractions were a significant error causation factor. The Federal Aviation authority wrote the 
sterile cockpit rule, as a result in 1981. The rule 121.542   Flight crewmember duties113 
prohibit direct, i.e. conversations, or indirect i.e. a colleague eating food, distractions from 
being made during critical flight activities. In addition to leading to increased error rates, 
distractions also have been found to increase anxiety and decrease performance, in 
situations of high workload. Speier (1999).114 Clearly direct or indirect interruptions are 
disruptive and the impact they cause needs to be mitigated. Research carried out by 
Oulasvitra (2004)115 suggested that interruptions are disruptive not because short-term 																																																								
111 ) Boehm-Davis, D.A., Remington, R., Reducing the disruptive effects of interruption: A cognitive 
framework for analysing the costs and benefits of intervention strategies. Accid. Anal. Prev. (2009), 
doi:10.1016/j.aap.2009.06.029 
112  https://www.medmarx.com/  
 
113 Electronic code of federal regulations; Title 14: Aeronautics and Space PART 121—OPERATING 
REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS  Subpart T—Flight 
Operations http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=1e08bf9191ec5ce00b88432261a1b3b7&rgn=div8&view=text&node=14:3.0.1.1.4.20.3.
8&idno=14  <accessed August 2009> 
 
114 ) Speier, C., Valacich, J. S., & Vessey, I. (1999). The influence of task interruption on individual 
decision-making: An information overload perspective. Decision Sciences, 30(2), pp. 337-360. 
115 Oulasvirta A, Saariluoma, P. long-term working memory and interrupting messages in human-
computer interaction Behaviour & Information Technology Volume 23 Issue 1, January-February 2004 
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memory becomes overloaded but rather that information stored in the long-term working 
memory is poorly encoded.   
Trafton (2008)116 outline factors that influence recovery from interruptions. The length of the 
interruption, similarity between the primary and secondary task, that is the task the operator 
has been called away to perform, the opportunity to rehearse prior to resuming the primary or 
main task and the existence of environmental cues, for example a clear marker being left as 
to where to resume, all affect task resumption performance.  Significantly, training in the 
primary task itself is not sufficient in and of itself to reduce the impact of task disruption. In 
addition, training in how to resume has found to be beneficial. Cades, Trafton & Boehm-
Davies (2006).117 
Interestingly, Prakash, Koczmara et al. (2014) 118 observed a difference in the effectiveness 
of certain kinds of interventions, for example the introduction of a quite area where no 
interruptions were permitted, the introduction of a standardised nursing workflow; speaking 
allowed when verifying a task; using timers when giving injections by a manual push method. 
The impact that these had depending upon the type of task and whether it was one of 
commission, that is verifying volumes contained in syringes and programmed in ambulatory 
pumps however, no statistically significant differences were observed however, for other 
medication verification tasks, such as verifying a patient’s identity or the name of a medicine 
or the dose of a medicine. 
A checklist, is an example of a visual prompt or environmental clue and are often proposed 
as a technique to be deployed to mitigate against interruptions and task complexity. In 1935 
on October 30th at Wright field, Dayton, Ohio, USA the United States army were conducting 
an evaluation of aircraft. One of the contenders was a Boeing 299. IT took off, began a 
smooth climb and then stalled and crashed, both pilots later tragically died of their injuries. 
The Pilots were unfamiliar with the aircraft and the aircraft was too complex for one person to 
																																																								
116 Trafton, J. G., & Monk, C. M. (2008). Task Interruptions. In D. A. Boehm-Davis (Ed.), Reviews of 
Human Factors and Ergonomics, Volume 3, chapter 4 p111-126. 2008 
 
117 Cades, D. M., Trafton, J. G., & Boehm-Davis, D. A. (2006). Mitigating Disruptions: Can Resuming 
an Interrupted Task Be Trained? Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th 
Annual Meeting 
 
118 Prakash, V., et al. (2014). "Mitigating errors caused by interruptions during medication verification 
and administration: interventions in a simulated ambulatory chemotherapy setting." BMJ Quality & 
Safety 23(11): 884-892. 
	 89	
remember everything that had to be done. Later it was determined that pilots needed some 
way of ensuring that they didn’t overlook anything and the checklist was born. 119 
 
Gwande (2011) 120 in his book, “The Checklist Manifesto”, says that failure in the modern 
world, he writes, is really about errors of ineptitude that is mistakes made because we don’t 
make proper use of what we know. The routine tasks of surgeons, for example, have now 
become so incredibly complicated that mistakes of one kind or another are virtually 
inevitable. As for pilots, a checklist is one approach to managing complexity and interruption. 
The research environment 	
One aspect of the dispensing process, accuracy checking, within a hospital pharmacy 
department was selected for observational analysis. The dispensing process at Birmingham 
Children’s hospital consists of the following steps; -  
1. Clinical screening or review of the prescription or drug request to ensure that the drug 
or drugs requested are therapeutically appropriate singularly and in combination for 
the designated patient and are safe and in addition that doses are correct and 
quantities requested reasonable. 
2. Labelling of the medicine containers with the correct patient demographic, name, 
form, strength and quantity of the drug being supplied, clear and unambiguous 
instructions, date of dispensing and other required warning labels. 
3. Assembly of the required drugs in the expected quantities along with associated 
devices to assist administration. 
4. Accuracy checking of the complete drug order to ensure that steps 2 & 3 have been 
carried out correctly.  
This study sought to answer the question, what impact if any does the dispensary 
environment have on those working within it, in particular direct (For example an operative 
being asked a direct question whilst accuracy checking) or indirect interruptions (For example 
a background noise, such as a telephone ringing)?  Pharmacy staff authorised to perform the 
final checking step in the dispensing process are Pharmacy Technicians and Pharmacists.  
UK Pharmacists are masters level educated and are required to be registered with the 
General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC). Hospital pharmacists are encouraged to have a 																																																								
119 Schamel, J.(2012 updated); http://www.atchistory.org/History/checklst.htm <accessed August 6th, 
2016> 
120 Gwande, A. (2011). The CheckLIst Manifesto, Profile. 
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post-graduate qualification at least at Clinical Diploma level. The GPhC regulates practice 
and standards of its members. Pharmacy technicians began t be regulated by the GPhC on 
June 30th 2011. The training for these two staff groups is intensive but varies significantly 
between the groups. A technician requires a NVQ level 3, usually obtained through a day 
release program over a two-year period during which time the student attends college once a 
week and compiles a portfolio of their experience during their training. Qualified pharmacy 
technicians can then go on to train to become accuracy checkers at Birmingham Children’s 
Hospital by undertaking a period of further training and assessment. This qualification is 
validated by the regional workforce group on behalf of the NHS regional chief pharmacists 
and is based on nationally recognised standards. Pharmacists are qualified in their own right 
to carry out the accuracy-checking step in the dispensing process.  
Method 
 
A medicine request requiring that two bottles of medicines, representing a typical and 
uncomplicated prescription, be dispensed was written for the purposes of the study. The 
medicines were, labelled and placed in a checking tray together with the required paperwork, 
additional spoons or oral syringes and a dispensing bag.  Each prescription asked for 
pharmaceutically routine items such as paracetamol liquid and codeine linctus to be supplied. 
The operatives volunteered to participate and were told that they would be timed during the 
accuracy checking process and that the object of the observations was to measure the 
impact of the environment on their work and not to assess their individual performance. They 
were also informed that the prescriptions that they would be checking were straightforward 
and didn’t contain errors by design. Each observation consisted of two arms as determined 
by a Latin square. A Latin square is used in experimental designs in which one wishes to 
control for two known sources of variation. A Latin square ensures that all possible variants 
were carried out.  
The observations were carried out in the dispensary during normal working hours and in an 
office; the later ensured a noise and interruption controlled environment. Finally, a designed 
interruption was introduced into certain variants. The interruption consisted of the individual 
being stopped and asked to check a dose calculation. Each observation and each 
interruption were timed and recorded on a MS Excel© spread sheet. 
Individuals were timed whilst they accuracy checked a prepared prescription consisting of 
two simple medicines under controlled conditions and in different locations. There were four 
possible combinations of conditions and locations. That is, individuals were timed whilst 
dispensing in an office or in the dispensary, with or without a controlled interruption. Each 
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variant comprised of any two of these possibilities or arms and could be carried out in any 
sequence. In summary, there were 12 variants, consisting of two arms, accounting for all 
possible variations.  Each variant was repeated three times, with different operatives, giving a 
total data set of 36 results or observational sets.   
Each participant was observed carrying out one or more variant.   See Table 1 below in 
which describes how each possible variant. The “i” denotes when a controlled, but unknown 
to the operative, interruption occurred. Variant 1 for example was where the operative was 
asked to dispense the test medicine request in the dispensary first without a controlled 
interruption and then asked to repeat the exercise but this time with a planned interruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Latin Square depicting all possible variations of Observations made. 
 
Results 	
The results were then analysed using Minitab statistical analysis software to determine 
whether or not there was a statistically significant difference between the variants. The tests 
included, a General Linear Model for time versus location, interruption, and individual. An 
Analysis of Variance for time, using Adjusted Sum of Squares for Tests and least square 
means for time. 
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 Table	8	observed	times	for	each	variant	by	individual	subject;	the	date	on	which	the	observation	took	place	and,	which	variant	was	being	observed.	Key;	Disp=	Dispensary;	Di	=	Dispensary	with	a	controlled	interruption;	Oi	=	Office	with	a	controlled	interruption;	Office=Office 
 
The time differences were calculated net of any interruption that was made.  
Statistics 	
The data was analysed in Minitab using a General linear model that analyses balanced or 
unbalanced ANOVA (analysis of variance) models with crossed or nested and fixed or 
random factors. Variance was tested against length of interruption, location, individuals and 
order in which events took place. There were 44 timed events, carried out by 12 individuals in 
	 93	
two locations. Although all the variants had an impact the two that were most significant were 
the length of the interruption (p=0.012) and the individual (p=. 001). 
 
 
Table 9 Table of an analysis of variance for time using adjusted sum of the squares for tests 
 
Seq SS is sequential sum of squares, Adj Sum is adjusted sum of squares, Adj mean is 
adjusted mean, F stands for the F statistic and P is the probability. 
An Analysis of Variance for time, using Adjusted Sum of the squares (SS) for Tests was 
carried out. Adjusted SS is used in General Linear Models without orthogonality that is where 
the factors are not completely independent of each other. The total variation was 69044.5 
and the variable that caused the greatest variation was the individual (p=0.001). The order of 
location, that is the sequence in which the tests were carried out, whether in the dispensary 
first and then the office and so on, was shown to be insignificant (p=0.140). 
A plot of least square means for time showed that it takes 22% longer (155.63-121.2) when 
interrupted in the dispensary than in the office.  
 
 
Table 9 Least Squares Means (LSM) for time 
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Figure 10 Showing graphically a main effects plot for time shows that it takes longer when 
interrupted in the dispensary than when not interrupted in the office.  
 
Discussion 
 
Twelve pharmacy technicians and nine pharmacists participated in the observations.  Thirty-
six sets of observations were carried out each consisting of two arms as determined by a 
Latin square.  As the observations were made the methodology evolved in response to 
observed outcomes. For example, the first three observational sets all included an additional 
observation in the dispensary before going on to make observations in the office and in the 
office with an interruption. It was considered that this additional step wasn’t necessary and so 
was discontinued. After the first six observational sets a standardised interruption was 
introduced. During the last 10 observational sets the two arms of each set were separated by 
a significant time delay, of at least 48 hours, and were not carried out immediately one arm 
after the other to observe whether this had any significant impact on outcomes or not.   
The most significant impact on the observations was noticed not between individuals but 
between professional groups that is between Pharmacy Technicians and Pharmacists.  All 
OfficeDisp
140.0
137.5
135.0
132.5
130.0
127.5
125.0
10
location
M
ea
n
interrupt
Main Effects Plot for time
Fitted Means
	 95	
operatives were asked to simply accuracy check the medicine request, that is to ensure that 
the correct medicines had been supplied, that the demographic data on the labels matched 
that of the prescription along with the quantity, dose and prescriber’s instructions. The 
operatives were advised that there were no deliberate errors and that they were to consider 
the prescription to be clinically correct.  In other words, the only task that was required of 
them was to accuracy check the dispensed prescription.  With two exceptions, the 
pharmacists took additional time looking for non-existent errors they thought had been set to 
catch them out, asking additional questions or in clinically checking rather than simply carry 
out the task requested, that was simply accuracy checking the medicine request.  In addition, 
some (n=3) refused the interruption during the observation even though interruptions are an 
accepted part of their day-to-day work in the dispensary.  By comparison the pharmacy 
technicians did as they were instructed and complied with the requirements of the study.  
Many of the pharmacists (n=5) were non-compliant with the study protocol and consequently 
these observations (n=11) had to be excluded from the final results, leaving 25 observations 
out of a total of 36. 
It should also be noted that the dispensary itself was seldom without inherent interruptions in 
addition to the planned interruption and a variable was created in the statistical analysis to 
take this into account.   
The results were calculated by subtracting the time the interruption took from the timing of 
that arm of the observation to give a net time. Of the 25 usable results 20 (80.0%) showed 
that when interrupted an operative took 22 % longer to accuracy check a prescription in the 
dispensary when compared to when they accuracy checked the standardised prescription in 
an office without an interruption.  
When an operative was subject to a direct planned interruption or indirect interruptions as is 
experienced working in a noisy environment then in 32.0% of the observations it took an 
additional 10-18% to carry out a standard task and in 28 % of observations it took an 
additional 29%-48% of time to carry out a standard task. 
Dispensary design is driven by a number of factors that are pragmatic in nature, including, for 
example, affordable space, workflow within that available space with some consideration to 
ergonomics and background noise.121 This is a welcome start but more consideration should 
be given to error causation and how intelligent dispensary design could contribute to reducing 
latent errors from the system. Little was found in the literature as to the impact of the 
environment upon dispensary operatives. 																																																								
121 Design for patient safety: A guide to the design of the dispensing environment; NPSA, 2007 
edition 1 
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Project limitations  
 
It is recognised that the sample size for this study was small in number, initially 17 individuals 
in total and this was reduced to 12 individuals for reasons outlined elsewhere in this article. 
The results should be interpreted in this context. The intention was to examine the impact 
that one element of the working environment, interruptions, have on the performance of 
individuals in paediatric pharmacy using one task in the dispensing process. Therefore, the 
results are valid in this setting.  
It should also be noted that medicines items requiring dispensing for children can be 
inordinately complex, take significantly longer to dispense than a similar medicine for an adult 
and consequently, in our experience, have the potential for more errors associated with the 
process.  Processes and systems applied to the paediatric pharmacy setting that lead to the 
development of safer dispensing environments would therefore be able to be transferred to 
the arguably less demanding adult general hospital dispensary setting. 
Conclusion 
 
This study set out to investigate the impact that interruptions have on those individuals 
carrying out the accuracy-checking step in the dispensing process, to assess what impact if 
any the working environment has on individuals carrying out critical tasks. The mean 
additional time taken to complete a standard task in one phase step within the dispensing 
process, accuracy checking, was observed to be 18.75%. The additional time that one third 
of individuals took was observed to be between 30% and 48%. Interruptions, an accepted 
part of dispensary routine, directly reduce an individual’s efficiency and have the potential 
consequently to therefore impact upon safety. Interruptions have been shown to be latent 
system failures in the paediatric hospital pharmacy accuracy checking, the final step in the 
dispensing process.  
Interruptions are a recognised Basic Risk Factor, Groeneweg (2002) under the category 
“error enforcing condition”, but little has been done in healthcare to investigate just what the 
impact of interruptions are on operatives working in a healthcare setting, in this case, 
paediatric hospital pharmacy. One explanation for this lack or research may possibly be 
because the National learning and Reporting System’s (NLRS) incident data has failed to 
identify interruptions as a significant theme or alternatively if it has identified interruptions as 
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a significant error causation theme then organisations have failed to learn from this error 
type.  
In the next chapter a review of the Children’s hospital own incident reporting system will be 
investigated from the perspective of efficiency both in terms of cost and of learning from 
errors reported through the system. 
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Chapter 5. Investigating the costs of incident reporting and the impact on safety in a 
specialist paediatric NHS hospital 	
 
Introduction 
It is argued that a safe culture is an informed culture and this, in turn, depends upon creating 
an effective reporting culture122. The NHS has become increasingly effective at reporting 
incidents through the National Reporting and Learning System (NLRS). The NLRS holds data 
on over 4 million incident reports submitted since its inception in 2003, with over 600,000 of 
these having been reported between October 2014 and March 2015 alone123. The goal of 
every NHS trust is to have a high reporting low harm culture, and one that learns from its 
errors. The incident reporting system is clearly good at collecting data, but the system needs 
to be good enough at a local hospital level to in addition to collecting incident data but to go 
on to learn from the data in a way that would impact on practice sufficiently to reduce the 
numbers and types of error that are taking place. This next study investigates the efficiency 
of the learning from incident system within the hospital. 
Background 	
The term Safety Culture was first used in the accident investigation report generated after the 
nuclear accident at Chernobyl (1986)124. On April 26 1986, two explosions blew off the 
1000-ton concrete cap sealing the Chernobyl-4 reactor, releasing molten core fragments into 
the immediate vicinity and fission products into the atmosphere. It was the worst accident in 
the history of commercial nuclear power generation. It has so far cost over 30 lives, 
contaminated approximately 400 square miles around the Ukrainian plant and significantly 
increased the risk of cancer deaths over a wide area of Scandinavia and Western Europe 
Reason (1990).  
In 1987 a fire broke out in the machine room under a wooden escalator at Kings Cross 
underground station tragically killing 27 people. In the investigation report, a structured safety 																																																								
122 Reason J; Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice ; Work & Stress, 1998, vol. 12, no. 3 293-
306; <http://aml-safety.com.au/AMLstores/_images/pdf-files/21may09-JReason.pdf> accessed 
December 2015. 
123 Organisation Patient Safety Incident Reports - data workbooks September 2015; < 
http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/?entryid45=135465> accessed February 2016 
124 A Synthesis of Safety Culture and Safety Climate Research; Douglas A. Wiegmann, Hui Zhang, 
Terry von Thaden, Gunjan Sharma, and Alyssa Mitchell 
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regime (Culture?) and a more open approach to the exchange of information within an 
organisation, was called for, Fennell125(1988).  "A safe environment is not one in which 
there is an absence or a low number of serious injury incidents, but rather, results from the 
active participation of management and staff in identifying hazards and then doing something 
positive about them. In other words, the absence of accidents is a negative measure largely 
dependent on luck, while the identification then prompt elimination or control of hazards is a 
positive step and is essential to the discharge of our duties under current legislation."126 	
According to Meshkati (1997)127, the turning point for safety culture in the United States was 
the tragic crash of Continental Express Flight 2574, a scheduled domestic 
passenger airline flight travelling from Laredo International Airport in Laredo, Texas, to Bush 
Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas. On September 11, 1991. The plane lost a wing 
and crashed as it was approaching the runway for landing, killing all 14 people on board. An 
analysis cited the failure of management to establish "a corporate culture which encouraged 
and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures”. 
Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by 
everyone in every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which 
individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety, act to preserve, 
enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both 
individual and organizational) behaviour based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be 
rewarded in a manner consistent with these values. Wiegmann (2002)128. A key concept 
made by Zhang (2002) is that, a Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to 
develop and learn from errors, incidents, and accidents. To be clear, a safety culture is a 
learning culture. Organizations with a healthy safety focus are constantly learning. They learn 
from their mistakes and those of others. Information regarding prior incidents and accidents is 
shared openly and not suppressed, Sumwalt (2011).129 A safety culture is one therefore in 
which individuals within an organisation   are empowered to communicate safety concerns 																																																								
125 Fennell D QC. Technical Report ARL-02-3/FAA-02-2 .June 2002 
126McKinnon R C; Safety Management: Near Miss Identification, Recognition, and Investigation; CRC 
Press; 2012 
127Meshkati, N. (1997, April). Human performance, organizational factors and safety culture. Paper 
presented on National Summit by NTSB on transportation safety. Washington, D.C.  
128 Safety Culture: a review. http://www.mtpinnacle.com/pdfs/Safety%20Culture-%20A%20Review.pdf  
accessed August 2015 
129Sumwalt R. The Role of Organizational Culture, Safety Culture, and Safety Climate in Aviation and 
Aerospace Safety. <http://app.ntsb.gov/doclib/speeches/sumwalt/Sumwalt_121007b.pdf> accessed 
April7th, 2015. 
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Weigmann (2002) and the organisation itself is willing to develop and learn from errors and 
incidents. 
Reliability is both dynamic and invisible, invisible because people don’t know how many 
mistakes they could have made but didn’t Weick (1987)130. Reliability is also invisible 
because reliable outcomes are constant, so there is nothing to pay attention to. In the 
absence of frequent bad events, the best way to induce and then sustain a state of intelligent 
and respectful wariness is to gather the right kinds of data Reason (1990). A safety culture is 
one in which data is proactively collected, not just incidents and errors but near misses and 
concerns. This information is collated and analysed and from the outcomes lessons are 
learnt and practice changed. In other words, a safety culture is also a reporting culture. 
A Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learn from errors, 
incidents, and accidents. Wiegmann (2002) 131 in a review of safety culture for the federal 
aviation administration Illinois, USA describe five components of a safety culture and these 
are as follows. Firstly, comes organizational commitment that is that the senior management 
of an organization are committed to implementing a safety culture. That it is seen one of the 
organization’s core principles and senior management are willing to support the 
implementation of safety strategy as a priority both with management support and financially. 
Secondly, management enforce the importance of complying with the organisations safety 
culture. Thirdly, that employees are empowered to make a difference that implementation of 
a safety culture is seen as emanating from the “shop-floor” as well as the board room or “top-
down”.  Fourthly, they outline the importance of having a reward system as a key component 
to the organisations safety strategy. That safe practice is reinforced and encouraged and 
unsafe practice is discouraged. Fifthly and finally, the organization is a reporting culture that 
the reporting of incidents is encouraged without fear of retribution or punishment. 
So, to be clear, a safety culture is a learning culture. Organizations with a healthy safety 
focus are constantly learning. They learn from their mistakes and those of others. Information 
regarding prior incidents and accidents is shared openly and not suppressed, Sumwalt 
																																																								
130Weick K; Organisational Cultural as a source of high reliability. California management review. Vol 
XXIX, number 2 , winter 1987. The regents of the university of California. 
131 Wiegmann, D. Z., H. Von Thaden, T.Sharma, G. Alyssa Mitchell,A. (2002). "A Synthesis of Safety 
Culture and Safety Climate Research." Aviation Research Lab, Institute of Aviation, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
1 Airport Road , Savoy, Illinois 61874  
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(2011).132 In the absence of frequent bad events, the best way to induce and then sustain a 
state of intelligent and respectful wariness is to gather the right kinds of data Reason (1990). 
A safety culture is one in which data is proactively collected, not just incidents and errors but 
near misses and concerns. This information is collated and analysed and from the outcomes 
lessons are learnt and practice changed. In other words, a safety culture is also a reporting 
culture. 
In an average NHS acute hospital 2.5 million doses of medicines are administered a year. 
There are 215,000 administration errors and 45,000 prescribing errors per year.133 In the year 
2000 a report, “An Organisations with as memory”, produced by the department of Health by 
a committee chaired by the Chief Medical Officer for England, Professor Sir Liam Donaldson 
in 2000 (Health 2000)134 .The report outlined the development of untoward incident guidance, 
building on recommendations first issued in 1955 by the then Department of Health135 , that 
stated that “a brief report should be prepared by the Secretary of the Board of Governors or 
Hospital Management Committee as soon as possible after any occurrence of the kind in 
question, giving the name of any person injured, the names of all witnesses, details of the 
injuries and the full facts of the occurrence and of the action taken at the time”. 
The report called for lessons to be learnt from incidents and errors within the NHS and as a 
result the National Learning and Reporting System (NLRS) was created two years later in 
2003.  After the recent reorganization of the NHS the responsibility for patient safety passed 
from the NPSA to NHS England in June 2012. Each NHS organisation and others providing 
healthcare such as General Practitioner Surgeries (GPs) and Community Pharmacies 
collects details of Incidents, reporting each occurrence through completing an incident form, 
known as an IR1. This is achieved using IR1 reporting software such as Datix, although other 
systems exist which is passed onto the NLRS gateway and the data aggregated and 
analysed.  
The intention, as outlined in the report “an Organisation with a Memory”, that by collecting 
this data it would be possible to identify themes and causes for the occurrence of errors and 
then learn from these incidents and adapt or change systems and processes to reduce error 
rates. To be able to achieve this at a local level there needs to be efficient local systems in 
place to encourage error or incident reporting, analyse the reports, draw out themes and 																																																								
132Sumwalt R. The Role of Organizational Culture, Safety Culture, and Safety Climate in Aviation and 
Aerospace Safety. <http://app.ntsb.gov/doclib/speeches/sumwalt/Sumwalt_121007b.pdf> accessed 
April7th, 2015. 
133Medication safety in the NHS faults and remedies. NHSE March 2015 134	Health, DoH  (2000). "An organisation with a memory."	
135http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publication
s/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/Browsable/DH_4936867 <accessed August 5th,2016> 
	 102	
lessons that can be learnt from the incident and them disseminate this learning across the 
organisation. The steps in the process therefore include, encourage reporting, understand 
what went wrong, address the causes, implement changes to systems and /or implement and 
disseminate learning arising from the analysis.  
So the theme of a reporting culture was first introduced across the NHS after the report, an 
Organisation with as memory, DoH (2000)136 was published. Four aspects of a Safety culture 
were outlined as being a Reporting Culture, one in which near misses were systematically 
reported. A Just culture, not an absence of blame but one in which an atmosphere of trust 
prevailed the term Fair Accountability has also been coined. A Flexible culture being one in 
which control is allowed to pass to experts at the frontline and a Learning culture, a 
willingness to learn from errors and change practice.  
The NHS strategy to reduce errors was to develop the concept of a safety culture, a term first 
introduced by the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG)137 and given meaning by 
Reason (1998)138, who listed the key elements of a safety culture as one that is Open, Just, 
reports, learns and adapts. The Department of Health outlined its own safety strategy in its 
paper, an organization with a memory (2000) requiring NHS organisations to report errors. 
Through the National Learning and Reporting system (NLRS). The system enables patient 
safety incident reports to be submitted to a national database. This data is then analysed to 
identify hazards, risks and opportunities to improve the safety of patient care.  
 
Since the NRLS was established, over four million incident reports have been submitted 
through the NLRS system by healthcare staff.139The NHS has become increasingly effective 
at collecting incident data, for the six months October 2014 to March 2015 in specialist and 
acute trusts there were 642,098140 incidents reported of which those categorised as severe 
amounted to 0.38%(2423). These figures would indicate that the system is effective but the 
question is could it be improved further either with regard to safety outcomes and/or from a 
cost perspective? 
 																																																								
136 DoH. (2000). An Organisation with a Memory. 
137Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident 
INSAG (1988) 
138Achieving a safety culture: theory and practice. Reason J. WORK & STRESS, 1998, VOL. 12, NO. 3 
293-306   
139http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/report-a-patient-safety-incident/about-reporting-patient-safety-incidents/  
accessed April 2015 
140Organisation Patient Safety Incident Reports - data workbooks September 
2015<http://www.nrls.nhs.uk/resources/?entryid45=135465> accessed December 2015. 
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The literature lacks data on the actual process costs of recording IR1s. To our knowledge, 
this study was the first to investigate the incident reporting process (IR1s), to calculate the 
costs of reporting incidents in this context and to gain an indication of how economic the 
process was and whether it could be improved to yield better outcomes. A literature search 
reviewed studies that had key words that included, error reporting, patient safety, risk 
management, organizational memory, intervention and safety management and also terms 
that explored economics, cost and effectiveness and set in the context of NHS hospitals in 
the United Kingdom. The search yielded 193 papers of which 4 were deemed to have some 
relevance and 14 were considered to be remotely relevant.  
Armitage (2007)141 set out with the aim of their study being to assess the utility of the incident 
reporting system at Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust, England. The methodology that 
they employed was to collect a 50% random sample of medicine related incident reports that 
were created between 1993 and 2003 where n= 1253. Free text elements of the incident 
reports were analysed using a technique known as content analysis, Holsti 142(1969) and 
described by Stemler (2001) as, “any technique for making inferences by objectively and 
systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”143 . The authors found that 
over the five-year period that was analysed, 276 incident reports (27.8%) were incomplete. 
They also observed that generation of incident reports varied between specialties within the 
Trust and the reporting rate reduced over the five-year period 
Fung144 (2010) Set out to synthesise the best available evidence on factors that influence 
incident reporting by nurses. This was a literature review of primary research studies. Fifty-
five papers were identified from the searches based on their titles and abstracts. Nine studies 
were included in this review. Cultural and demographic factors were the most significant 
factors in affecting nurses' attitudes towards incident reporting. Major perceived barriers 
included fear, administrative issues, and the reporting process. Also, nurses were more likely 
																																																								
141 Armitage, G., et al. (2007). "Reporting drug errors in a British acute hospital trust." Clinical 
Governance: An International Journal 12(2): 102-114. 
142 Holsti, R;(1969) Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities; Published by Addison-
Wesley & Co publishers 
143 Stemler, S; (2001); Yale University; Copyright PAREonline.net; 
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17 <accessed August 4th 2016> 
144 Fung, M; koh, lin, S; Leng,Y. attitudes and perceived barriers influencing incident reporting by 
nurses and their correlation with reported incidents: a systematic review; bi library of Systematic 
Reviews, [S.l.]v 10;issue 1 ;P1-65.Jan 2012. 
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to re Fung, Koh et al. (2012) 145port incidents that caused direct harm, and if reporting was 
kept anonymous. 
Ginsburg 146 (2010) in their paper “the Relationship between Organizational Leadership for 
Safety and Learning from Patient Safety Events”, set out with the aim to examine the 
relationship between organizational leadership for patient safety and five types of learning 
from patient safety events. The context for their study was forty-nine general acute care 
hospitals in Ontario, Canada. The approach that they used was to consuct two cross 
sectional surveys, one of the senior officer in each trust responsible for safety and the other 
of patient care managers in each organisation. The response rate were as follows, 54 of the 
68 (79%) senior managers responded and 282 of the 621(46%) safety managers responded. 
The authors go on to explain that the data was analysed using multivariate regression 
analysis was used to test the unique effect of the hospital size; informal leadership for patient 
safety and then formal organizational leadership for patient safety, and also the interaction 
between hospital size and leadership variables, defined in the text, on learning from patient 
safety episodes. The results, in this very well designed study, suggest that firstly smaller 
hospitals, defined as those with less than one hundred beds are able to engage more with 
learning from errors than larger hospitals and secondly safety cultures need to be driven from 
the most senior management in a Trust.  
Finally Waring (2004) 147 In his study “a qualitative study of the intra-hospital variations in 
incident reporting”, set out with the purpose of determining the relationship between 
variations in hospital incident reporting and the corresponding attitudes and participation of 
medical professionals. The setting for the study was a single district general National Health 
Service hospital trust in the Midlands in England. The study was conducted between 2001 
and 20013, initially with a six-month observational study of the management structures within 
the Hospital and then going on to conduct forty-two face to face interviews with managers 
and clinicians within the Trust. A further set of interviews was conducted with 25 clinicians 
from various medical specialties. Waring found that that physicians are inclined to report 
when there is confidence in the processes and purpose of reporting, where reporting has a 
meaningful contribution to service development, and typically where these are satisfied 
through collegial forms of incident reporting. 																																																								
145 Fung, W. M., et al. (2012). "Attitudes and perceived barriers influencing incident reporting by nurses 
and their correlation with reported incidents: A systematic review." JBI Database of Systematic 
Reviews and Implementation Reports 10(1): 1-65. 
146 Ginsburg, L. R., et al. (2010). "The relationship between organizational leadership for safety and 
learning from patient safety events." Health Serv Res 45(3): 607-632. 
147 Waring, J. J. (2004). "A qualitative study of the intra-hospital variations in incident reporting." Int J 
Qual Health Care 16(5): 347-352. 
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Objective 	
The objective of this study was to investigate the incident reporting process (IR1s), to 
calculate the costs of reporting incidents in this context and to gain an indication of how 
economic the process was and whether it could be improved to yield better outcomes. Also, 
to gain a sense of whether the system encouraged learning from the errors reported. 
Method 	
Study design and setting 
A retrospective analysis from medication incident report summaries, generated at 
Birmingham Children’s Hospital (BCH), a specialist tertiary referral pediatric center was done. 
Our hospital has 350 inpatient beds, 39,000 inpatient admissions and 150,000 outpatient 
appointments each year. In addition, questionnaires were sent to a cohort of those staff who 
had been involved with processing an IR1 incident report. 
 
Incident reporting process 	
The process for completing an IR1 is a composite process initiated by an individual who has 
identified that an error has taken place. This individual may then approach a colleague for 
additional input. Once completed the IR1 is submitted electronically and transmitted to the 
manager of the location where the incident took place for investigation, and in addition to a 
list of individuals with a related responsibility with that area or incident either managerial or 
clinically. Once resolved each individual connected no matter how remotely with that incident 
receives an email summary relaying the outcome of the investigation or a link to where the 
outcome may be found. In addition, some clinical areas have their own Safety team that 
reviews the incident in detail for example the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU).  The 
PICU safety team consists of 12 staff that is made up of Doctors, Nurses and Pharmacists. 
Finally, all members of the unit or ward where an incident took place are notified of the fact. 
The incident summaries record the following data, the time and date of the incident, which 
staff were involved, a brief outline of the incident, an assessment of the impact that the 
incident may have had on the patient and the staff who was informed of the incident after the 
form was completed.  
 
Incident reporting process analysis 
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The complete incident report summaries data set for 2014 were extracted (n=5147) and the 
medicine related errors isolated (n=1432). Of medicine, related incidents, a sub set (n=149), 
10.41% of the data was randomly selected, from across the whole period, for detailed 
analysis to calculate a costing algorithm that could be applied to the whole.  
 
Analysis 	
The analysis recorded the numbers of staff by profession and grade involved in the incident, 
the actual impact, whether additional therapy was required as a result of the incident and the 
numbers of staff informed by email of the incident. In addition, the outcomes of the incident 
report and the error type were also noted using sets of standardised responses for each. 
In addition, a questionnaire was sent by email to a sub set of staff (n=97) (33.21%) out of a 
total staff listed on the incident summaries’ circulation list, on the extract sub set, as having 
been informed of that incident. Three questions were asked of those to whom a questionnaire 
was sent; 1. When you or colleagues complete an incident form entry, how long 
approximately do you spend?   2. When you are notified of an incident (via email), how much 
time do you spend processing it?   3. If your ward has a ward safety team, how long would 
the team spend discussing a particular incident, on average? (Only two wards have safety 
teams). Free text comments were also invited. 
 
Calculating the costs 	
The professional roles of the staff listed on the incident forms were categorized into one of six 
groupings that matched as closely as possible to the groups described in the reference 
compiled by the Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU). The categories were, 
Ward Sister/manager, Deputy Ward sister/Deputy Manager, Nurse, Consultant, Pharmacist, 
Pharmacy technician. The PSSRU reference then gave the composite costs per hour for 
each category of Staff including all associate costs. (Employment, administration, Human 
Resources, Training & Education). In addition, staff categories that were not considered to be 
clinical roles for example, management or administration roles, these were costed using NHS 
agenda for change pay scales for 2014 and a standard NHS on-cost of 23% was included. 
Staffing costs were then calculated per 1 minute and 10 minute units of time.  
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Results 
Analysis of the subset of Incident report summaries (n=149) for the year reviewed, 2014, 
showed that there 2105 staff episodes in total, comprised of 148 Nursing inputs, 49 Doctor 
inputs, 21 pharmacist inputs, 9 general manager inputs and 9 other staff category inputs. 
Individual staff being involved on multiple occasions during the incident form completion 
process. Staff was involved in completing the forms either directly that is completing the 
incident form themselves or indirectly through being consulted when the incident form was 
being completed. On the subset of 149 Incident report summaries, 262 individual staff were 
listed.  
Questionnaire   	
The first thirty Incident form summaries, from January 2014 were selected and the staff 
(n=97) listed on these forms was sent a questionnaire, with 8 staff having left the Trust, 89 
staff received the questionnaire. As there was more than one incident form having been 
completed per ward area contained in this subset some individuals were involved with more 
than one incident. 
The questions asked for an estimate of the time that they thought that they spent, completing 
an IR1 incident form summary. Respondents were given the option to select from several 
time ranges in minutes, 1-5; 6-10;11-15;16-20; 21-30; 30-45 and more and a not relevant 
option.  The time that they thought they spent on reviewing and responding to associated 
emails, investigating an incident if relevant time spent reviewing the incident form summaries 
with a ward based Safety team. The Paediatric Intensive Care Unit has created a 
multidisciplinary team that meets to review Incident report summaries. The questionnaire 
received a response rate of 40.45% (36/89) and from this it was possible to calculate the 
average time spent by each respondent on the various tasks that they were involved with. 
The results of the questionnaire are tabulated in table 1 below.  
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Table 11 Results of Questionnaire to ascertain time spent on various stages of the Incident 
Summary review and investigation process. 
 
 
Then in table 12 that follows, there is a summary of the findings, also expressed in        
graphs 1-4. 
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Table 12 Summary of the number of responses by category of the Questionnaire to ascertain 
time spent on various stages of the Incident Summary review and investigation process 
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Figure 11 (Graph 4) the number of responses (Y axis) and time taken in 5-minute blocks to 
complete an Incident form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 (Graph 5) The number of responses (Y axis) and the time taken in time blocks 
(minutes) to investigate an Incident. 
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Figure 13 (Graph 6) the number of respondents (Y axis) and the time spent (again in 5 
minutes’ time blocks) processing incident summary related emails. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14  (Graph 7) Number of responses (Y axis) and 5-minutetime blocks for time spent               
discussing Incidents in the PICU safety team meetings. 
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 Calculating the costs 
 
Staffing costs were calculated per unit as outlined above, and the results tabulated in tables 
3-5 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 13 Costs for one minute of various staff categories’ time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Table 14 Calculating a proportionate rate for one minute of Doctors time 
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Table 15 The PICU safety team members and unit staffing costs 
 
From the questionnaire, the average time spent dealing with the first notification was found to 
be 5.71 minutes. The second email notification was read cursorily. There were 2942 email 
occurrences to 262 individuals. The PICU ST (Safety team) consists of 12 staff, removing 
duplication of emails to PICU ST and the individuals directly gave 1773 staff email episodes. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 Costs associated with processing initial email and in addition follow up email 
notifications. 
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     Table 17 Showing costs for each element of the IR1 process. 
 
The Total cost for processing an IR1 was £337.16. For the 149 IR1s reviewed, 262 
individuals were involved on multiple occasions (2942) giving 19.74 staff episodes per IR1. 
There were on average 12.96 staff individuals associated with the processing of each IR1 
incident form report.  
Free text comments were very few and therefore not analysed in any detail. The few 
respondents that did comments indicated that the IR1 incident process seemed to be both 
cumbersome and time consuming. 
Discussion 	
It was not the purpose of this study to review the quality of the data captured on IR1 incident 
reports or even the volume of IR1 reports completed nor was the aim to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the IR1 recording process but rather to investigate the costs associated with 
it and in particular, incidents that were classified as resulting in no patient harm and therefore 
didn’t require additional therapy at additional cost. Incidents that result in causing harm to 
patients, follow a more comprehensive investigative pathway and the costs would be higher 
to take into account additional therapy that may be required. 
What the study did show was that although costs were low, staff episodes required to 
complete the process were high and calls into question the design of the process and 
whether or not this level of staffing input would not be better allocated to learning from these 
errors rather than recording them? The few anecdotal free text comments that were made on 
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the questionnaires did allude to this. The real reason for recording errors, after all, is to be 
able to learn from them and improve patient safety, it would seem that energies went into 
processing incident 9IR1) reports rather than identifying themes in the errors reported and 
changing practice accordingly. 
 
Conclusion 
The costs associated with reporting, investigating and processing an incident report (IR1) of 
£337.16 on average did not appear to be unduly high considering the acknowledged positive 
impact for patient safety. However, the numbers of staff involved (19.74 staff episodes on 
average) in the process particularly as a result of the email distribution activity did appear to 
have room for efficiencies. Anecdotally, feedback through the free text element of the survey 
indicated a certain incident reporting processing fatigue amongst staff that hinted at 
disengagement from the process. It could be argued that an element of what many perceive 
as unproductive processing time could be diverted away from less important tasks in the 
process to supporting learning from the incidents instead?  
The second objective of this piece of research was, to investigate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the current Incident reporting system (IR1S) in supporting learning from 
incidents and changing practice. This investigation showed that the current process efficiency 
could be improved in terms of learning from incidents. It also showed that the IR1 incident 
reporting system couldn’t add substantively to this research any more than a review of the 
literature could. 
In the next chapter, chapter 7, the outcomes from the studies outlined in chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 together with lessons learnt from error causation theory outlined in chapter 1, will 
be brought together into a unique, as far as paediatric hospital pharmacy is concerned, risk 
reduction strategy and tested in a different but related healthcare environment and 
implemented with pharmacy staff. 
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Chapter 6. The place of Checklists, Standard Operating procedures (SoPs) and multi-
disciplinary skill mix in error prevention on an acute ward in a children’s hospital 		
The introduction of pharmacy technicians onto an acute ward, onto one medicine round a 
day, as part of the nursing team and partnered with a nurse, and tasking them with 
intravenous (IV) medicine preparation and patient administration duties has had a direct and 
measurable impact on reducing medicine related incidents and therefore on patient safety.  
The pharmacy technician and nurse team are supported with a specially designed protocol, 
inspired by the World Health Organization (WHO) Safer Surgery checklist, and based on the 
five rights of medicines administration that in addition has a calculation aide tool on the 
reverse. The pharmacy technicians, after a learning needs assessment was carried out, 
received additional training in IV medicine administration including administration pumps 
together with an introduction to patient assessment skills. A senior medicines management 
nurse who is based within the pharmacy department oversaw the project. The pharmacy 
technician-nurse team was a genuine multidisciplinary skill mix team. The pharmacy 
technicians brought a protocol driven proactive medicine safety approach to the partnership, 
whilst the nurse added the necessary Patient assessment, medicines administration skills 
and knowledge of the specialty. 
Initial anecdotal data collected through the month of June 2015 indicated that the addition of 
a pharmacy technician to the medicines administration process prevented 1-3 incidents 
(IR1s) a day from being reported. The pharmacy technicians proactively addressed errors or 
potential errors before proceeding with the IV preparation process, questioning ambiguity or 
actually errors on the medicines administration charts.  In paediatric hospitals, two qualified 
nurses, that is nurses who have a degree in nursing from a recognized institution and are 
registered with the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), are required to check medicines 
before they are administered to patients. Another positive outcome realized from the project 
was   in a timelier fashion. If for no other reasons than they were an additional pair of hands 
and less likely to be called away from preparing medicines than a nurse would be, which in 
itself contributes to medicines safety. Finally this was arguably a significant role development 
that pharmacy technicians have made since they became a profession that didn’t emanate 
from pharmacists.  
 	
	 117	
Introduction 	
NHS providers and commissioners ended 2015/16 with an aggregate deficit of £1.85 billion 
(unaudited), a threefold increase on the previous year. This is the largest aggregate deficit in 
NHS history [Source The King’s Fund148]. In a BBC interview on May 22nd 2016, Simon 
Stevens the chief executive of the NHS has warned that leaving the EU could damage the 
health service. Elsewhere in this thesis it has been discussed that Lord Carter of Coles 
published an independent review into operational productivity in the National Health Service 
(NHS). The findings were many and included the observation that there was unwarranted 
variation in the cost of delivery of services across the NHS and efficiency, effectiveness and 
productivity could be improved and an estimated £5 billion saved as a result. Included in the 
report was the recommendation that NHS Hospital resort less to agency staff in order to 
control expenditure (Coles 2016). Current imperatives to increase efficiency, to use 
resources more effectively, to improve patient safety set against a backdrop of reducing 
length of stay and moving healthcare to where the patient is, leads us to continually consider 
better ways of working. 
Many hospitals in England are struggling to recruit adequate numbers of nurses to staff their 
wards. Some 92% of the 225 acute hospital trusts in England did not manage to run wards 
with their planned number of nurses 149,150.  It should also be noted that paediatric trained 
nurses are fewer in number than general trained nurses151. In a paediatric hospital, nurses 
are tasked with the selection, preparation or more accurately reconstitution including if 
necessary dilution and administration of IV drugs to patients. It is mandated by the Trust 
medicines policy that tasks making up these processes are checked by a second competent 
individual, typically another nurse, so two nurses are actually involved in the preparation and 
administration process.  
Moreover, nursing staff is the professional group more than any other that actively record 
errors and incidents. Ross (2000)l152, in a study conducted in a paediatric teaching hospital in 																																																								
148http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_publication_file/Deficits_in_the_NHS_Kings_Fund_July_2016_1.pdf  <accessed August 8th, 2016> 
149 BBC News. NHS nursing levels: Nine in 10 hospitals missing targets. 2015.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-35148920 (accessed May 2016). 
150 ITV News. 'Shortage' of nurses on wards. 2013.  
http://www.itv.com/news/story/2013-09-18/shortage-of-nurses-on-nhs-wards/ (accessed May 2016). 
151 Nursing and Midwifery Council. https://www.nmc.org.uk/registration/search-the-register/ (accessed 
May 2016). 
 
152 Ross LM, Wallace J, Paton JY. Medication errors in a paediatric teaching hospital in the UK: five 
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England reported a medication error rate of about 0.15% and nurses were responsible for 
59% of these errors. The seemingly high nursing involvement in these error types should not 
be surprising when one appreciated that it’s nurses more than any other healthcare 
professional who are involved in administering IV medication.  
The use of medicines carries risks of adverse events, which are greater in the paediatric 
population because of many factors, notably the increased use of compounding inherent to 
sterile and non-sterile named patient prepared medicines (Sharek 2006) 153 in their literature 
review of adverse drug event rates in paediatric inpatients have quotes as high as 1.8 to 4.8 
times that occurring in adult studies, although, fortunately the majority of reported adverse 
drug events in paediatric patients appears to be of low severity. In another study, 154 found 
that adverse drug events in paediatrics were three times high than those for adults. 
Furthermore intravenous drug administration is a riskier route than almost any other used in a 
hospital setting, Hicks RW (2008)155 , Kaushal (2001). This project investigated the 
practicality of using pharmacy technicians to support the workload of nursing teams.  There is 
a growing body of literature that describe the expanding role of Pharmacy technicians. 
(Adams 2011) 156,Shane (2011).157 
Pharmacy technicians158 are a part of the pharmacy team, working under the supervision of a 
pharmacist. They prepare medicines and other healthcare products and supply them to 
patients. They also take an active role in providing patients with guidance on taking   Kaushal 
(2001)159 medicines. The training of Pharmacy technicians consists of two years consecutive 
work-based experience under the direction of a pharmacist to whom the trainee is directly 
accountable for not less than 14 hours per week. Qualification requires completion of both a 
GPHC-approved competency-based qualification and a knowledge-based qualification. 
Pharmacy technicians are registered with the General Pharmaceutical Council. The question 																																																																																																																																																																													
years operational experience. Arch Dis Child2000;83:492–7 
153 Sharek PJ, Classen D. The incidence of adverse events and medical error in pediatrics. Pediatr 
Clin North Am 2006;53(6):1067-77 
 
154 Kaushal, R., et al. (2001). "Medication errors and adverse drug events in pediatric inpatients." 
JAMA 285(16): 2114-2120. 
155 Hicks RW, B. S., Cousins DD (2008). MEDMARX data report. 
156 Adams, A. J., et al. (2011). ""Tech-check-tech": a review of the evidence on its safety and benefits." 
Am J Health Syst Pharm 68(19): 1824-1833. 
157 Shane, R. (2011). "Advancing technician roles: an essential step in pharmacy practice model 
reform." Am J Health Syst Pharm 68(19): 1834-1835. 
158 https://www.pharmacyregulation.org/education/pharmacy-technician  <accessed August 8th 2016> 
159 Kaushal, R., et al. (2001). "Medication errors and adverse drug events in pediatric inpatients." 
JAMA 285(16): 2114-2120. 
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asked was, could pharmacy technicians be up skilled to undertake what has traditionally 
been considered a nursing role and thereby release valuable nurse time to care? An acute 
ward in a paediatric hospital was selected for the project. 
In addition, the question was asked, what could the Health service learn from other high risk 
industries, such as the airline industry with regard to the use of Quality Management Systems 
to reduce risks and increase efficiency? We discussed earlier in this thesis the work of Dr 
Atul Gwande, Gwande (2011), author of the “The Checklist Manifesto”, who wrote that failure 
in the modern world, he writes, is really about errors of ineptitude, that is mistakes made 
because we don’t make proper use of what we know. The routine tasks of surgeons, for 
example, have now become so incredibly complicated that mistakes of one kind or another 
are virtually inevitable. As for pilots, a checklist is one approach to managing complexity and 
interruption. Would the introduction of a protocol driven into the medicines administration 
process impact positively? 
Project Overview 	
Pharmacy technicians were allocated to this project for a three-month period in the first 
instance. They were given additional training and supported with a specially designed 
checklist protocol together with a calculation tool. A senior medicines management nurse led 
the team supported by nurse trainers and nurse educators and mentors for the pharmacy 
technicians. 
The pharmacy technicians were assigned to the busiest medicine round particularly to IV 
(intra venous) medicine preparation and administration. They also recorded any interventions 
that they made or concerns that they had. Finally, an unstructured questionnaire was 
conducted to evaluate what the nurses on the ward felt about the project.  
Context 	
In a paediatric hospital, Nurses are tasked with the selection, preparation or more accurately 
reconstitution including if necessary dilution and administration of IV drugs to patients. It is 
mandated by the Trust medicines policy that tasks making up these processes are checked 
by a second competent individual, typically another nurse. 
IV monographs prepared by the pharmacy department give guidelines as to what options are 
available for reconstituting a particular drug, what precautions might need to be taken and 
what routes and in which way a particular drug may be administered. For example which 
diluent to use, whether the final preparation needs to be given slowly over a long period or in 
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fact could be administered over a matter of minutes. Depending upon the route and method 
of administration selected, the dilution calculations will vary and are usually complex. This is 
all the more the case when individual patient factors are taken into account for example, ease 
of access for IV lines, fluid restrictions that may apply to an individual patient and the 
patient’s diagnosis. 
There is therefore no one correct way to approach these tasks and each nurse is likely to 
have determined a strategy based upon their knowledge and experience. In addition, 
calculations may be carried out with the aid of calculators usually without a record being kept 
of the rationale used to derive the final answers, which makes checking the results arguably 
more complex. 
In addition, treatment rooms where these medicines are prepared are seldom quiet. Nurses 
are often interrupted either directly by colleagues asking questions or indirectly by a range of 
activity and noises around them. 
A variety of techniques have been deployed to make medicine related critical processes safer 
with varying degrees of success. Examples of these strategies include reducing the likelihood 
of direct interruptions by staff engaged in medicines administration wearing red tabards, 
these indicate that the operative must not be interrupted. Indirect interruption strategies 
include having designated quiet work areas. Interruptions have been shown to reduce work 
efficiency by 18.75%, Sinclair A.G. (2012)160. 
Project Introduction 	
Joint Nursing Pharmacy medicines administration project. 
The aim of the project was to pair a nurse and a pharmacy technician as a team to carry out 
the medicine rounds on the ward, exclusively with IV drugs and to introduce an administration 
and calculation protocol. 
An acute ward was chosen for the project because of the engagement of the senior nursing 
team on the ward and a willingness to support the project. Experienced pharmacy 
technicians were assigned and the project led by a senior nurse who works in the pharmacy 
department. Initially a training needs assessment was undertaken for the pharmacy 
technicians and additional training delivered by senior nurse trainers was given, particularly in 																																																								
160 Sinclair, AG; The impact of interruptions on individuals carrying out the accuracy-checking step of 
the dispensing process; March 2012 
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IV management including syringe drivers and introduction to basic patient assessment skills. 
In addition an investigation into the legal and professional implications of working in this way 
was carried out and advice sought from relevant professional bodies and discussed with 
senior hospital management. 
The Pharmacy technicians brought with them and implemented approaches that are normal 
ways of working for pharmacy staff for example adherence to protocols in the form of 
worksheets, a proactive stance with regard to errors or incipient errors and recording of near 
misses. It should also be noted that nursing staff are the professional group more than any 
other that actively record errors and incidents.  
In addition, a Checklist was devised, influenced by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
safer surgery checklist together with a calculation aide, designed by the project team. The 
Checklist itself (Appendix 7) consisted of the five rights, the right patient, the right medicine, 
the right dose, the right route and the right time. On the reverse of the checklist was the 
calculation aide that was duplicated so each person involved in the process could complete 
his or her own independently. A complete record of an independent double check having 
taken place was retained. 
Method 	
The study design was a retrospective analysis of reported intervention data over a four-week 
period on an acute Oncology ward at Birmingham Children’s Hospital.  
The Kotter161 (Kotter 2015) model of change management, usually used as a tool for 
achieving meaningful change and accelerating practice change in the pharmacy setting, we 
used it to conduct our change.162 The model consists of eight well defined steps and these 
are; Establish a sense of urgency; Form a powerful coalition; Create a vision; Communicating 
the vision; Empower other to act on the vision; Plan for and create short term wins; 
Consolidate improvement and produce still more change and finally Institutionalize the new 
approaches. 
The Pharmacy technicians were integrated into the nursing team.  At the outset there was a 
sense of urgency due to the fact that there was a shortfall in the number of nursing to staff on 
the ward. A team (coalition) was created to manage the project. A vision and supporting 																																																								
161 Kotter, J. (2015). "The 8-Step process for leading change." 2016, from 
<http://www.kotterinternational.com/our-principles/changesteps/changesteps.> 
162 Guérin A, Hall K, Lebel D, et al. Change management in pharmacy: a simulation exercise and 
identification of change barriers by pharmacy leaders. Int J Pharm Pract 2015. 
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strategies developed together with supporting documentation and the team strengthened 
through various team meetings. The vision was communicated to the rest of the nursing team 
on the unit. Employees were empowered to take action by organising bespoke training 
sessions for the pharmacy technicians, carried out by a senior nurse trainer and in addition 
recruiting nurses on a voluntary basis to take part in the pilot study. Short-term gains were 
identified by means of a pilot study and improvements consolidated into practice with the 
promise of future developments and finally improvements were embedded into current 
practice. 
 
Legal and professional implications 
 
An investigation into the legal and professional implications of working in this way was carried 
out and advice sought from relevant professional bodies, such as the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council (NMC) and national guidance and the results were discussed with senior hospital 
management. This did result in changing elements of the protocol for example the NMC 
guidance clearly states in Standard 14163 of the NMC standards for medicines 
management that registrants must not administer medication drawn into a syringe or 
container by another practitioner when not in their presence. The team therefore had to 
ensure that the nurse member of the team was involved in the preparation of each Intra 
Venous (IV) syringe. Initially the preparation was to be carried out solely by the technician, so 
this part of the protocol was amended.  
The Team 
 
A senior medicines management nurse employed by the pharmacy department led the team 
and also assumed the role of mentor to the pharmacy technicians. in addition, the technicians 
were supported by a senior nurse trainer and nurse educator. Pharmacy technicians selected 
to become members of the nurse team were working on the oncology unit prior to the 
commencement of the project and were known to the nursing team and with ward practice. 
Their pharmacy duties on the ward included medicine stock maintenance, reviewing patients’ 
own medicines for suitability for use during their inpatient stay and surveying medicine 
administration charts for medicine availability.  
 
																																																								
163 https://www.nmc.org.uk/globalassets/sitedocuments/standards/nmc-standards-for-medicines-
management.pdf  <accessed August 10th,2016> 
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New pharmacy technician’s role  
 
The pharmacy technicians were assigned to the busiest medicine round particularly to 
intravenous medicine preparation and administration. A nurse volunteer was paired with a 
pharmacy technician for the preparation and administration of intravenous drugs for that 
medicines round. For this pilot study, the pharmacy technicians acted as the second checker 
to the nurse during preparation and administration of medicines. The second check included 
a strict control of all steps of the process using a checklist especially designed for this 
purpose. 
Assessment 
 
Pharmacy technician’s intervention Three pharmacy technicians recorded prospectively any 
interventions that they made that included the number of intravenous preparations and the 
number of IV administrations performed and concerns that they had. For example, the 
number of near misses that occurred during the double-checking activity, or when a dose 
wasn’t checked prior to administration.  
 
Technician training and management 
 
A training needs assessment was undertaken for the pharmacy technicians and additional 
training (30 hours) delivered by senior nurse trainers was given, particularly in intravenous 
management including syringe drivers and an introduction to nursing basic patient 
assessment skills. The areas of competency and awareness that must be demonstrated by 
pharmacy technicians  
 
A Quality Management System strategy was introduced, and this included a strictly protocol-
driven approach to the process, augmenting the nurses’ clinical and professional skills. This 
included the introduction of a specially designed checklist, influenced by the WHO safer 
surgery checklist and inspired by a visit by one of the investigators to an airline pilots’ 
revalidation session. On the reverse of the checklist was a calculation aide. The checklist 
itself was made up of the five patient rights and these are, the right patient, the right 
medicine, the right dose, the right route and the right time. In addition, the preparation area 
was taken over by the project and became a ‘quiet area’ and was used in preference to the 
noisy bedside area where distractions, both direct and indirect abound. Flow rate calculations 
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and complex calculations were made in this quiet area rather than at the patient’s bedside as 
previously. 
Finally, two staff survey were conducted of nursing staff involved in the project. The first an 
unstructured survey collecting general views of the project from 15 (25.9%; n= 58) ward 
nursing staff who were present on the ward on the day shift over three days in July 2015. The 
second was a structured interview in the form of a questionnaire.  
Results 	
Pharmacy technician’s intervention 	
Three pharmacy technicians were trained and participated in the study. The preparation and 
administration activity consisted of 304 hours of actual cover over 76 days during this period, 
and 509 intravenous injection preparation and administration assisted by the three pharmacy 
technicians that is an average of 35 min per intravenous injection activity out of a possible 
1123 preparations (45%) of all intravenous preparation and administration on the ward during 
the study period. The pharmacy technicians were available to work on the project during the 
busy late morning–lunchtime medicine round. 
Interventions were recorded during 1 week of the project and pharmacy technicians recorded 
15 near misses. Table (1) summarizes the near misses recorded. The addition of a pharmacy 
technician to the medicines administration process appeared to prevent 1–3 medicine related 
incidents (IR1s) a day from occurring. 
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                Table 18 Summary of near misses (15) recorded during June 2015 
 
It should be noted that although many medicine monographs require a bolus to be given over 
significant lengths of time it is practically very difficult to actually give a bolus injection over 3-
5 minutes or longer. Table (2) lists observed bolus rates administration variances and the 
required administration times over a 4 day period in June 2015.. 
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         Table 19 Required Bolus rates and observed bolus rates, observed over 4 days (June
 2015, 22nd-25th). 
 
Survey - Staff Nursing Satisfaction 
 
Fifteen nurses were interviewed, which represented 25.9% (n=58) of the total possible ward 
nursing compliment. Regarding the nurses interviewed, 100% (n=15/15) were satisfied with 
the introduction of a pharmacy technician as part of their team.  																																																								
164 https://www.gov.uk/drug-safety-update/ondansetron-zofran-important-new-intravenous-dose-
restriction accessed July 2015 
Drug and bolus rates Actual bolus rates 
 
Metoclopramide   
Slow bolus to be given over at 
least 5 minutes 
 
1.20, 0.58,1.22,1.04,1.07,0.29,3.36 
Ondansetron 
Slow bolus to be given over 2 to 
5 minutes (MHRA warning164) 
 
0.59,0.59,1.09,0.59,0.13,0.21 
 
Ranitidine 
Slow bolus to be given over 3 to 
5 minutes 
 
1.32,2,59,0.59,1.07,1.04 
 
Meropenum 
20mg/kg/dose or below bolus 
over 3 to 5 minutes 
 
 
 
0.19,0.56,1.04 
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Comments collected through unstructured interviews with ward nursing staff 
 
“The timings of support is not long enough; staff have to adjust administration times to fit in 
with clinical activity and procedures and therefore an increase in the technician time on the 
ward would further support this flexibility”. 
“The team would like support with the oral drug rounds. We have discussed this and had 
hoped to start this but due to resources this has been delayed. We discussed trying to take 
this forward once a member of staff returned from maternity leave.” 
“The team have asked if the pharmacy technician team can “take charge” of the treatment 
room ensuring stock is available; cupboards are well organised etc. They feel this overall 
management of the room would have supported the availability of drugs, which have been 
stored incorrectly or not dispensed in a timely way, and assist in ensuring out of date 
medication is removed rather than having to be sorted out of hours.” 
“Overall they welcomed the pilot and would like to see it extended to impact on more of the 
ward rather than just the main ward; some commented to extend to HDU where there is an 
increase in medication administration per patient would be beneficial.” 
“The team recognise this would also help embed the staff in the ward team.” 
Discussion 
 
Although slips are vastly more common than mistakes, health care has typically responded to 
all errors as if they were mistakes, resorting to remedial education and/or added layers of 
supervision. Such an approach may have an impact on the behaviour of an individual who 
committed an error, but does nothing to prevent other frontline workers from committing the 
same error, leaving patients at risk of continued harm unless broader, more systemic, 
solutions are implemented165. 
An axiom of human factors engineering is that processes should be standardized whenever 
possible166, whether to improve safety or improve efficiency. This approach is at the heart of 
all Quality systems strategies such as Lean Six Sigma, Total Quality management (TQM), 
ISO9000 and other such quality systems.  																																																								
165 http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=21  accessed July 2015 
166 http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=20   accessed July 2015 
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Working to standardised protocols and visual cues are particularly beneficial when working in 
busy time pressured, high-risk situations and where staff is subject to direct or indirect 
distractions. Checklists, evidence-based protocols are particularly helpful in ensuring that 
each necessary step in a process has been completed. In the project the use of a 
standardised protocol in the form of a checklist together with a calculation tool was 
particularly useful in trapping errors and giving assurance to those involved that they hadn’t 
made an error. 
Incorrect awareness of the time over which a bolus injection had actually been given was a 
function of multiple contributory causes not least of which was the impracticality of attempting 
to give a bolus over a prolonged period, two minutes has been suggested as a practical 
threshold beyond which compliance becomes difficult. The lack of a ready available means of 
monitoring the time, however even with such a means available, interruptions and workload 
pressure are likely to have reduced situational awareness as the operative would need to 
manage competing multiple pulls on their attention. This becomes an example of the 
normalization of deviance from accepted practice. The risk of non-adherence to a 
recommended bolus times is a condition known as Speed Shock Speed which occurs when a 
foreign substance usually a medication is rapidly introduced into the circulation; symptoms 
and side effects include, dizziness, facial flushing, headache, tightness in the chest, 
hypotension, irregular pulse, progression of shock. Rapid injection leads to the concentration 
of medication in the blood to reach toxic levels, the heart and brain being particularly 
susceptible167 
Errors in flow rate calculations could be attributed to attempting these complex data 
manipulations at a stage in the process that is subject to most interruptions whether direct, 
being asked a question by a colleague or a patient’s parent or indirect that is locational, 
working within a noisy workspace at the patient bedside. A simple solution would be to 
complete the complex decisions at the start of the process in a controlled environment such 
as a treatment room rather than at the bedside. In addition, observing pilots undergoing 
revalidation168 it was noticed that complex fuel calculations were undertaken in the cockpit at 
the outset of the journey and before other routine business commenced.  
This concept was proposed to the nursing team and emulated in that the task of performing 
complex infusion flow rate calculations, typically carried out at the patient’s bedside where 																																																								
167 Phillips, L et al; Manual of I.V. Therapeutics: Evidence-Based Practice for Infusion Therapy; 2014 
6th ed F.A Davis 
168 Easyjet Pilot revalidation observation; Haywards Heath Sussex; (Oct 2015). 
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the environment can be noisy and distractions abound were transferred to the quiet of the 
treatment room, and performed at the outset of the preparation sequence. In this way the 
nurses were less hurried and less distracted. 
 
IV administration is known to be a high risk procedure, the then National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA) published an alert169 that in the introduction had the following:- 
“The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) received around 800 reports a month to its 
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) relating to injectable medicines between 
January 2005 and June 2006. This represents approximately 24 per cent of the total number of 
medication incidents. The majority of these resulted in no or low harm to patients. However, 
there were 25 incidents of death and 28 of serious harm reported between January 2005 and 
June 2006. Research evidence indicates that the incidence of errors in prescribing, preparing 
and administering injectable medicines is higher than for other forms of medicine. In one 
study, at least one error occurred in 49 per cent of intravenous medicine doses prepared and 
administered on hospital wards; one per cent were judged to be potentially severe errors; and 
29 per cent potentially moderate errors”. 
In Paediatrics, IV administration is known to be a high-risk procedure due to the additional 
complexities associated with administration and dose calculations that children require. An 
analysis of 12 months’ complete data set of medicine related incident reports from across the 
hospital, January to December 2013, was undertaken. Of the 1473 incident summaries, 
medicine related incidents (IR1s) reviewed as part of this analysis 736 (49.97%) were 
categorised as being within the general category of administration related. Further analysis 
revealed that of these 173 (11.74%) were identified as arising during the IV administration 
process and 175 (11.88%) were identified as having been omitted. 
Human factors also referred to as Crew resource management has it that many accidents are 
blamed on the actions or omissions of an individual who was directly involved in operational 
or maintenance work. This typical but shortsighted response ignores the fundamental 
failures, which led to the accident. These are usually rooted deeper in the organisation's 
design, management and decision-making function170.  
																																																								
169 www.npsa.nhs.uk/EasySiteWeb/GatewayLink.aspx?alId=2269 <accessed 10th August 2016> 
170 Reducing Error and Influencing Behavior ; HSE 2nd ed 1999. 
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg48.pdf> accessed July 2015 
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It is accepted that hospital wards are stressful, from the sense of workload pressure, 
environments in which distractions are common place and coping mechanisms may well 
include deviation from protocol as an acceptable approach.  
 
Conclusion 	
This pilot was a brief snapshot in time and more data is required before definitive conclusions 
can be drawn. However, a sufficient indication was derived as to the benefits of drawing from 
the approach, knowledge and competencies of two professional groups to merit a more in 
depth investigation into this strategy. In addition an approach for integrating lessons learnt 
from other high-risk industries, in this case the airline industry, into the culture and 
environment of the health service was developed. 
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Chapter 7.  Thesis Discussion 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis set out to answer three questions, firstly to investigate whether it would be 
feasible to identify latent risks associated with in a specific task set in a National Health 
Service (NHS) paediatric hospital pharmacy department and then to establish the extent to 
which these latent errors could be predicted. Secondly to investigate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the current Incident reporting system (IR1s) in supporting learning from 
incidents and changing practice. Should the error reporting and investigation processes, not 
work sufficiently well, including engaging the staff of the organisation then it will be highly 
unlikely that learning from these errors will take place. If learning from errors that have 
occurred does not take place then practice won’t change and latent errors will remain in the 
system waiting to give rise to an error. To put it another way, an efficient error reporting 
system is an approach to predicting latent system risks.  
An analysis of the outcomes from the first two phases enabled the development of an 
innovative and unique strategy that put in place a system that mitigated against latent errors 
or risks that were found to be predictable. In order to test the robustness of the strategy it 
was implemented with pharmacy staff who were asked to carry out accuracy checking tasks, 
similar to those that took place in phase one of the research, but for this phase, phase 3, the 
tasks were carried out as part of an Intravenous Injection (IV) medicine administration round 
on a busy Oncology Ward. The impact was immediate and observable with predictable error 
types being trapped and in addition perceived stress felt by staff reducing.  
Any investigation into the predictability or otherwise of identifying latent errors must 
demonstrate in the first instance a clarity as to existing error causation theory and then to 
proceed to review what research is known in the discipline of error causation in general and 
then in particular in the context of paediatric hospital pharmacy set in the National Health 
Service in England and Wales. Finally, existing research would have informed current 
practice, also it would have influenced the formulation of national guidance and standards 
and therefore this also needs to be taken into account.  
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Theoretical background 
 
Latent risks or errors have been defined as,” A defect in the design, organization, training or 
maintenance in a system that leads to operator errors and whose effects are typically 
delayed” (Safety 2005)171 . The report goes on to say that “Latent errors pose the greatest 
threat to safety because they often go unrecognised for years, workers simply work around 
defects in the system”. The classic text book examples cited are the cases of the National 
Aeronautics Agency and Space Administration (NASA) space shuttle Challenger incident that 
occurred on January 28th, 1986 when the shuttle broke apart, within 73 seconds into its flight, 
with the deaths of seven crew members. This was attributed to a faulty O-Ring seal in its right 
solid rocket booster. The O-ring was simply not designed to fly under the unusually cold 
conditions generated in a launch scenario, Committee on Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives (1986)172. Also the Three-Mile Island disaster, another much cited accident 
disaster 173(Commission 2013) that occurred on  march 28th, 1979, and was the most serious 
accident in American commercial nuclear power plant history. A combination of equipment 
malfunctions, system errors, design problems and operator failures led to a partial nuclear 
meltdown and a very small off-site release of radioactivity, Report of the President’s 
Commission (1979)174.  
Error Types 
 
Professor J Reason, one of the most influential thinkers in the field of error causation and the 
application of error prevention management strategies in the field of healthcare, in an article 
in the British Medical Journal  Reason(2000)175 describes two approaches that theorists use 
in understanding human fallibility and these he outlines as the human approach and the 
system approach. The human approach takes the view that errors arise due to human 																																																								
171 World Alliance for Patient Safety; . (2005). WHO Draft Guidelines for Adverse Event Reporting and 
Learning Systems. < http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/resources/Reporting_Guidelines.pdf 
accessed August 20th, 2016. 
172 Investigation of the challenger accident report of the committee on science and technology house 
of representatives ninety-ninth congress second session . U.S. government printing office washington : 
1986 < https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf> 
accessed May 2017. 
173 Commission, U. S. N. R. (2013). "Three Mile Isalnd Accident." <accessed 29.10.2016> 
174 The President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island; October 1979 < 
175 Reason, J. (2000). "Human error: models and management." BMJ : British Medical Journal 
320(7237): 768-770. 
	 133	
weakness; individuals are careless, perverse, inattentive or simply incompetent. The System 
approach favours the view that actually before error forcing conditions reach an individual, 
the system that they are working in fails to trap errors from occurring. In reality, both 
approaches are valid and so we find that individuals bring about errors and a variety of error 
types have been defined and these are slips and lapses, mistakes and violations. Reason 
describes these in his book Human Error (Reason 1990)176, Slips and lapses, he writes, “are 
errors which result from some failure in the execution and or storage of an action sequence. 
Whereas mistakes may be defined as deficiencies or failures in the judgmental or inferential 
processes in the selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it”. 
Slips occur at the execution of a task stage; Lapses are related to memory failure and 
mistakes occur when planning an action.  
This later error type has further implications that Broadbent et al (Broadbent, Cooper et al. 
1982)177 describe in their stress-vulnerability hypothesis in which they suggest that those who 
work in high stressful jobs, and make mistakes , are prone to or are more vulnerable to 
showing the bad effects of stress. Stress doesn’t cause them to make errors, rather stressful 
work may give rise to errors and this in turn may give rise to inappropriate behaviours. 
Rasmussen178 (Rasmussen and Jensen 1974) developed a framework for describing error 
types. These were Skill based errors, repeated sequences of actions requiring minimal 
cognitive input. Rule based errors that require an operative to follow a set of instructions and 
knowledge based errors that require active cognitive analysis. In addition to error types there 
are error forms, Reason (1980) which are shortcuts human memory uses to handle 
particularly underspecified cognitive operations, basically heuristics to locate the necessary 
missing information. One is similarity matching that looks at the degree of similarity between 
the current task and what has happened in the past and the other is frequency gambling, how 
often something has occurred previously and seemed to work.  
Basic Risk Factors 
 
Groeneweg 179(Groeneweg 2002) and colleagues outline that behind each error sits one or 
more substandard act but these themselves are brought about by an issue with one or more 																																																								
176 Reason, J. (1990). Human Error, Cambridge University Press. 
177 Broadbent, D. E., et al. (1982). "The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates." Br 
J Clin Psychol 21 (Pt 1): 1-16. 
178 Rasmussen, J. and A. Jensen (1974). "Mental procedures in real-life tasks: a case study of 
electronic trouble shooting." Ergonomics 17(3): 293-307. 
179 Groeneweg, J. (2002). Controlling the Controllable: Preventing Business Upsets, DSWO Press. 
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flawed basic Risk Factor (BRF). The Basic Risk Factors, of which there are eleven can 
combine to generate innumerable substandard acts that in turn lead to errors. The Basic Risk 
Factors have been named, Groeneweg (2002) as being; Design (User unfriendly tools); 
Hardware; Maintenance Management, Housekeeping; Error enforcing conditions, 
Procedures, Training, Communication, Incompatible goals (ethics and world view of the 
organisations versus those of the works in that company); Organization and finally defences 
(Business continuity plans). 
This can be illustrated by referring to the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster. The Herald of 
Free Enterprise was a roll on roll of (Ro-Ro) ferry that capsized minutes after leaving the 
Belgium port of Zeebrugge on the 6th of March 1987180 killing 193 passengers and crew. The 
immediate cause of the accident was attributed to the negligence of a junior crewmember for 
not closing the bow doors before departure. Further investigation showed that actually the 
root cause of the accident was due to a combination of pressure from the parent company to 
speed up transit times, poor equipment or a lack of equipment that the bridge officers didn’t 
know that the bow doors hadn’t been closed and the lack of procedures that would’ve 
prevented the ship from leaving port without closing the bow doors. Probably at least three of 
the Basic Risk Factors, contributed to the errors that led to this accident happening and these 
were, Hardware, Communication and Procedures.   
 
Memory and Multiple stimuli 
 
Error and error causation theory form part of the underlying required knowledge required to 
achieve the aims of this thesis, another body of knowledge required would be to understand 
how memory works, how the brain manages multiple stimuli. Operatives working in 
healthcare environment are more often than not working in stressful situations carrying out 
complex tasks requiring heavy cognitive input and in an environment that is replete with 
distractions, both direct and indirect interruptions. 
The Skill-Rule-Knowledge based framework explains the type of error that has occurred. 
Basic Risk factors will describe the root cause or root causes of an accident and knowing 
what a root cause is or root causes are will enable redesign of the system. The final piece in 
predicting latent risks and so to be able to predict errors in paediatric pharmacy is an 
understanding of how the brain works in processing information particularly multiple stimuli.  
 
																																																								
180 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS_Herald_of_Free_Enterprise <accessed August 20th, 2016> 
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Relevance of the theory in the context of this study  
 
Retrospective analysis of an incident will only give “and” gate analysis trees not “or” gate 
understanding Groeneweg (2002). That is, what did happen not what also could have 
happened. Retrospective analysis won’t recognise any other weaknesses that might exist in 
the system. Furthermore, if the system that allows learning from errors to take place is weak, 
then lessons may be learnt from an error that has occurred but for a short period only. Any 
system that is designed to generate learning from errors, itself needs to be efficient and 
robust. In chapter 6 the efficiency of the reporting system in the hospital was investigated and 
was found to be relatively inexpensive to administer, but inefficient in terms of learning from 
errors.  
Staff who work in a paediatric hospital pharmacy department whether in the dispensary or on 
the wards find themselves working more often than not in busy environments, filled with 
direct and indirect interruptions and often as not under stressful conditions. That is, with a 
high workload together with time expectations and required to undertake complex cognitive 
tasks. Multiple models for how the brain processes multiple tasks simultaneously was 
discussed earlier in this thesis and the three main theories were outlined, these were the 
Capacity sharing, task switching and Cross-talk models. 
The type of interruption or interference was described and could be either Capacity 
interference which is when the number of incoming cues are too numerous for a decision 
maker to process or Structural interference which is when a decision maker must attend to 
two inputs that require the same physiological mechanisms, such as two different visual 
signals. It should be noted that the ability to process multiple sensory inputs simultaneously is 
not the same as being able to process the data efficiently or productively. In addition, 
mitigating interruptions is well documented, however the factors that influence recovery from 
interruptions themselves, less so and the work of Trafton and Monk (2008) and Prakash 
(2014) is of significance in this regard.   
An appreciation of Error causation, Error types and Error forms or heuristics together with an 
appreciation of human fallibility, Reason (1990) including the part that human approach and 
system approach plays and a knowledge of basic risk factors that give an understanding of 
error root causes and finally adding in how the brain processes multiple stimuli and memory 
functioning will give the basis for the work outlined in this thesis.   
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An understanding of the relevant error causation and related theory has been discussed, the 
next step was to review the literature to search for current work and relevant understanding 
on this topic in the selected setting and discuss where the research in this thesis sits. 
Literature Review and National Guidance 
 
The literature search looked for research papers that had conducted research into Safety 
systems, Error management; Risk reduction systems; Interruptions to the dispensing 
process; Economics and efficiency of the NHS Incident reporting system; Quality Systems 
and Checklists and finally Medicines management and administration policies. The context 
looked for was that of a paediatric hospital setting in relation to safety, error reduction, human 
factors, teamwork, flattened hierarchies, visual aids, checklists and protocols. The full search 
strategy has been outlined elsewhere in this document together with the key words used for 
each section. In total 11,896 citations were found but after careful review and refinement this 
number was reduced to thirty-four citations that were deemed to have some relevance and 
these were discussed in detail to ascertain what they might add to the area of research 
covered in this thesis. 
Another approach to determining the extent of research into paediatric related medicine 
errors prevention strategies of any kind, and if medicine is referred to there would be a 
pharmacy connection, is to review national guidance. National Guidance will be generated for 
multiple reasons for example as an outcome of significant research and associated data 
collection or the occurrence of a significant incident. The later itself would then prompt the 
interest of researchers. Therefore, the existence of relevant National Guidance would be an 
indication that a particular topic has been given due consideration and in all likelihood 
research either prompted it or has been prompted by it. 
In 2007 the then National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) published guidance in the form of 
an alert that was issued jointly by the National Reporting and Learning Service and the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence181. It aimed to reduce medication errors, 
which occur most commonly on transfer between care settings and on admission to hospital. 
However, according to Huynh et al 182 (Huynh, Wong et al. 2013) the UK national guidance 
excludes the paediatric population and yet it was widely acknowledged at the time, as it is to 
this day, that Medication reconciliation is an important process in reducing medication errors 
in many countries including Canada, the USA, and UK, all of whom  have incorporated 																																																								
181 http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/?EntryId45=59878  <accessed August 20th ,2016> 
182 Huynh, C., et al. (2013). "Medication Discrepancies at Transitions in Pediatrics: A Review of the 
Literature." Pediatric Drugs 15(3): 203-215. 
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medication reconciliation, for adult patients  as a priority area for national patient safety 
initiatives and goals.  
A second National patient safety campaign called the Patient Safety Thermometer183, first 
introduced in 2012/2013 and that includes a variety of patient safety related metrics and in 
the words of the campaign, was developed for the NHS by the NHS as a point of care survey 
instrument, the NHS Safety Thermometer provides a ‘temperature check’ on harm that can 
be used alongside other measures of harm to measure local and system progress in 
providing a care environment free of harm for our patients. However, it omitted paediatrics 
due to the lack of suitable knowledge from which to derive relevant metrics. 
Very few research papers were found to have relevance to the aim of this thesis and of the 
11,896 citations collected by the literature review only thirty-four had some relevance. We will 
now discuss what these citations add to this area of research. This research is multifaceted 
and as such it was necessary to review existing literature that discussed each area deemed 
to be relevant and having the common connecting context of paediatric healthcare. Safety 
systems in general and error causation and error management together with an appreciation 
of risk management and risk reduction together formed the first area for review. These are 
areas that have received considerable attention from researchers, reflected in the fact that 
the initial search found over 15,000 citations that through the refining process reduced to 746 
articles relevant to healthcare and only 16 articles pertinent to paediatric healthcare. Of these 
sixteen articles, five investigate the benefit of introducing checklists in order to improve 
communication.  
Interruptions, Communication and Visual prompts  
 
Communication has been identified as a risk factor that needs  mitigation, Bagnasco (2013), 
Gordon (2014) and Sharma (2013). Interruptions, also have long been recognized as being 
detrimental to efficiency, for example in open plan offices (Brennan, Chugh et al. 2002)184 
(Davis, Leach et al. 2011)185 and Safety, the Sterile Cockpit rule as set out by the American 
																																																								
183 https://www.safetythermometer.nhs.uk/ <accessed August 20th, 2016> 
184 Brennan, A., et al. (2002). "Traditional versus Open Office Design: A Longitudinal Field Study." 
Environment and Behavior 34(3): 279-299. 
 
185 Davis, M. C., et al. (2011). The Physical Environment of the Office: Contemporary and Emerging 
Issues. International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology 2011, John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd: 193-237. 
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Federal Aviation Authority  (FAR 121.542 and FAR 135.100 - 2009) that prohibits 
unnecessary distraction at critical times in the operation of a civil aviation aircraft.  
Bagnasco (2013) investigates where failures lie in the existing systems found in an 
emergency department in Northern Italy. Gordon et al (2014) investigated the impact of 
introducing a checklist into the work flow of a very specific and specialized area, the catheter 
laboratory in an American Paediatric hospital situated in California, but again this was as a 
communication aid to improve pre-operative communication. The research attempted to 
assess perception of the benefit of introducing a checklist rather than actually measure the 
impact in some way. Sharma (2013) investigated the benefits of introducing a checklist, again 
to improve communication between staff participating in a ward round on a paediatric 
intensive care unit in a large National Health Service hospital in London, England. Poor 
communication is a well-established error causation Basic Risk Factor (BRF), Groeneweg 
(1992) and as such a component of unsafe acts that in turn lead to errors occurring.  
The introduction of Red Tabards (Scott, Williams et al. 2010)186 for nursing staff to wear 
during medicines administration rounds in hospitals convey the message that the wearer is 
not to be disturbed whilst engaged in administering medicines to patients. Scott (2011) 
undertook an audit of medicine rounds and the number of interruptions that occurred together 
with assessing the effectiveness of nursing staff wearing distinctive tabards during the 
medicine round that indicate that the nurse should not be interrupted. The audit took place in 
a Scottish Hospital, the Aberdeen Royal Infirmary. The audit was carried out over a five-week 
period and found that wearing a distinctive tabard the nurse administering medicines was 
interrupted less often than when a distinctive tabard wasn’t worn. The number of interruptions 
per medicine round fell from 6 to 5 on average over the study period and medication 
administration errors fell from 19 to16 over the same five-week period. 
These papers describe how this particular Basic Risk Factor has been mitigated in very 
specific healthcare circumstances, overlaying a minor adaptation, a checklist, onto existing 
processes. In reality, error causation has multiple root causes embedded in complex 
situations and merit a more fundamental review of the work context. Staff may simply forget 
to communicate relevant facts to colleagues in a hand over meeting or the work culture may 
be hierarchical and not encourage input from junior members of the team. It may be that in a 
particular environment the team is dysfunctional.  
In each of these studies an error causing condition was identified and a solution introduced 
without an investigation of the environment in which the errors were occurring. The analysis 																																																								
186 Scott, J., et al. (2010). "The effectiveness of drug round tabards in reducing incidence of medication 
errors." Nurs Times 106(34): 13-15 
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stopped with one Basic Risk Factor or one latent error (substandard act). In reality, errors 
seldom have one causative element and therefore it is inadequate to construct a solution 
based upon one causative factor alone. In addition, the way operatives work in a particular 
environment needs to be taken into account before developing solutions. By contrast and, as 
described in chapter 4, not only was empirical research conducted that identified the 
existence of multiple error enforcing conditions but also the impact these may have had  on 
operatives was considered. The outcome was the development of the strategy described in 
chapter 7 that was multi-layered in order to address multiple readily predictable latent errors 
(Chapter 4), that were shown to impact on operatives (chapter 5) and to allow the inclusion of 
visual cues and prompts to improve further risk mitigation.  This approach is arguably more 
comprehensive than those described to date in the literature.    
Error Reporting and Learning from Errors 
 
Learning from errors is a key plank in the National Health Service Strategy for reducing harm 
caused by errors or incidents, as discussed in detail elsewhere in this document. The 
National Learning and Reporting System (NLRS) collects and collates details of incidents 
from across the National Health Service and themes are identified from these reports that 
form the basis for safety initiatives and alerts. In a report published by the Patient Safety 
Observatory, Safety in Doses: medication safety incidents in the NHS, this organisations 
fourth report (2007) it says that, “developing a culture of reporting and learning from 
medication incidents. Increased reporting will allow practitioners and NHS trusts to identify 
the risks associated with medicines, and track progress in addressing these risks to improve 
patient safety” (NHS 2007)187   The intention is to learn from errors. The National Advisory 
Group for The Safety Of Patients in England published a recommendation written by 
Professor Don Berwick  in which described the number one aim and objective was that The 
NHS should continually and forever reduce patient harm by embracing wholeheartedly an 
ethic of learning 188(Berwick 2013). In other words the National Health Service in England 
should become a learning organisation. This raises the question, what is a learning 
Organisation and how could one be formed? 
 																																																								
187 NHS, N. P. S. A. (2007). Safety in doses: medication safety incidents in the NHS: The fourth report 
from the Patient Safety Observatory. 
188 National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in England (2013). "Improving the Safety of 
Patients in England." < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/226703/Berwick_Report
.pdf> accessed 11/9/2016 
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A learning Organisation 
The seminal work in this area was contributed by Senge, P (1990, 2006) and described in the 
book, The Fifth Discipline.189 In which a learning organisation is defined as one in which, “ 
people continually expand their capacity to create results they truly desire, where new and 
expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured. Where people are continually learning how to 
learn together.”  
Creating a learning organisation is critical to the survival of an organisation and history shows 
that companies that don’t learn these lessons struggle to survive. Senge proposes that five 
component technologies need to be nurtured in order to bring about and sustain a learning 
organisation and these are, systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building 
shared vision and team learning.   
Of these, Systems thinking gives the framework that underpins the four other disciplines. It 
gives the means to integrate the other disciplines once they come into practice. It helps us 
see the bigger picture and appreciate that actions we take locally can impact on the 
organisation as a whole.  
Personal mastery, acknowledges that organisations learn through individuals that learn. 
Senge describes this discipline as one of “continually clarifying and deepening one’s personal 
vision and of seeing reality objectively”.  Team learning on the other hand requires individuals 
to suspend assumptions and engage in dialogue with other members of the team, and enter 
into genuine thinking “together”.  
Mental Models are “deeply ingrained assumptions that influence how we understand the 
world and how we act”. This discipline requires us to be able to review our mental models 
and be prepared to reassess them. Finally, Shared vision is where there is a genuinely 
shared vision then people learn and excel because they want to not because they have to. 
Each of these elements would need to find their place in the final proposed model if a truly 
new approach with aspirations for lasting impact were to be introduced.   
Conspicuous by their absence from the literature were reviews that investigated the efficiency 
of the current National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) from which themes are 
identified, lessons learnt and new practice developed. If the system is inefficient then current 
analyses drawn from the system may be incomplete and any new practice developed may 
not take into account, all relevant factors. According to phase 2 of the project the average 
																																																								
189 Senge, P; The Fifth Discipline ; Random House. (1990, 2006)  
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time spent investigating an incident from beginning to end was 24.69 minutes, barely 
sufficient time enough to discover the substandard act that led to the incident.  
In figure1 taken from Groeneweg (2002) the way in which Basic Risk Factors can combine to 
form substandard acts or latent errors that in turn can lead to errors or accidents occurring. 
The combinations in which the Basic Risk factors can combine are many. It is therefore 
unlikely that they will combine in just the same way in the same environment with the same 
operatives on more than one occasion. Most investigations only go as far as to identify the 
substandard act that led to the error occurring. Due to the relative uniqueness of the 
substandard acts it is not possible to change practice meaningfully and so most learning from 
errors brings useful but superficially changes to practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Shows how Basic Risk Factors combine to create substandard acts (latent errors) 
that in turn can lead to an error (Accident) or incident occurring. 
 
Clearly this strategy will only ever be minimally effective unless and until the reporting of 
medication errors and incidents becomes embedded into the culture of the National Health 
Service and the data collection systems collect useful data, that is data that is clear and 
unambiguous and sufficiently detailed. Armitage (2007) investigated the incident reporting 
system at Bradford teaching hospitals NHS Trust in England. They retrospectively analysed 
incident data collected over a ten-year period between 1993 and 2003, collecting and then 
analyzing 1253 incident reports. They found that 27.8% (n=276) of the reports were 
incomplete and furthermore that the rate of reporting reduced over the period investigated. 
Fung (2012) conducted a literature review looking for papers that investigated the attitudes of 
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nurses to incident reporting. It was concluded that barriers existed to completing incident 
reports and these concluded, fear of the consequences of reporting an error, administrative 
issues and the process itself.  
Ginsburg (2010) investigated the link between Organizational leadership with regard to safety 
and learning from patient safety events. Essentially the attitude of senior management to 
Safety will directly influence the attitude of their employees. If a safety culture is a priority to 
the executive, then the hospital will buy into the importance of generating a safety culture. A 
safety culture has to be led by and shown to be a priority by senior management of an 
organization. Waring (2004) was interested in investigating the variations that exist in 
reporting of incidents between National Health Service Hospital Trusts and the corresponding 
attitudes and buy in of medical professionals. The study showed that if a doctor had 
confidence in the reporting process and the reason for reporting incidents and that the 
outcomes of the error reporting process would result in improved services, then they would 
be inclined to participate. 
These four studies and one report show that whilst there is agreement in the recognition of 
the importance between reporting errors and incidents and the subsequent learning from 
these incidents and errors not all health care staff are inclined to participate with equal 
enthusiasm. Ginsberg (2010) describes the importance of strong organizational leadership as 
a prerequisite for the creation of a safety culture. Fung (2012) the need to remove barriers 
that may dissuade staff from using the reporting system and Waring (2004) the importance of 
conveying the benefits of reporting errors and incidents and how the learning that results can 
improve hospital clinical systems. Armitage (2007) conveys the reality that enthusiasm fades 
over time, although this study didn’t give any reasons as to why this happened. 
Bianchi et al (2009) conducted an investigation in a hospital in Rome, Italy in which nursing 
staff was interviewed in order to ascertain their awareness of errors in healthcare. The 
authors conclude that there needs to be a change in culture from one of blame to no blame in 
order to encourage incident or error reporting. In the environment of a paediatric cardiac 
surgery operating room, Bowermaster (2015) encouraged surgeons to record their errors. 
The impact was an increase in error reporting from 20% of all procedures to 50% of all 
procedures. This increase in error reporting was sufficient to enable an analysis to reveal 
endemic system failures and consequentially to make changes and reduce error rates. 
An initiative introduced at Boston Paediatric Hospital, Massachusetts, USA, looked at the 
impact of introducing an on-line safety event reporting system (SERS) together with a no-
blame culture to encourage reporting and learning from these incidents. Bradley (2011). The 
SERS system was also used to support an initiative through the magnet recognition program, 
	 143	
an initiative introduced by the American Nurses Credentialing Centre (ANCC) to recognise 
excellence in nursing practice. The program centred on educating nurses with regard to the 
benefits of error reporting. It ran for a period and two years’ data analysis showed a 35% 
increase in nurse error reporting, Hession-Laband (2011).  
Kurth et al (2014) demonstrated the benefits or error reporting in order to identify error-
causing patterns in practice and to then bring about quality improvements. The project was 
called Wake Up Safe and developed by the American Society of Anesthesia. Monroe (2011) 
led a joint Anglo-American team investigating patient safety factors of critically y ill children 
on an intensive care unit in a single tertiary regional Paediatric Intensive Care Unit in a 
London Hospital. The study identified a number of deficiencies and called for further studies 
to develop strategies by which safety might be improved. 
The literature proposes many reasons why error reporting in hospitals is not as efficient and 
effective as it might be. The reasons include the need to have a safety culture led by the 
senior management of the trust, Ginsburg  (2010); Lack of confidence in the outcomes of the 
reporting system, Waring (2004); The need to educate operatives as to the benefits of error 
reporting, and to introduce a fair blame culture (Parliament 2009)190.  
Lacking from published research was a composite strategy that included each of these 
components and in addition suggested a solution to the problem of how it would be possible 
to introduce an approach whereby learning from errors could be introduced in a way that 
changes practice for the better and would be flexible enough to be transferable to a related 
but different healthcare setting. In other words, learning from errors is a local matter but 
sharing the resulting good practice, a universal lesson. 
In chapter 7 such a model was described, in which recording incidents and error data and 
then learning from those errors in a way that changed practice was observed. At each step of 
the study when a significant error or latent error was identified practice was changed to 
address the issue. The enablers that made this unusual was that the nurse-pharmacy 
technician team were empowered and knew changes could be made. They could see the 
outcomes to changes made rapidly and the reasons for the changes to be made and on 
occasion personally felt the benefit of the new model, for example in a reduction in perceived 
stress. The team owned the process and felt proprietorial responsibility for it and felt 
supported through the regular meetings with senior management.  
																																																								
190 Parliament, H. o. (2009). "Patient safety policy since 2000." 
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Professionalism 
 
Professionalism, a concept with many and varied definitions and attached concepts, impacts 
both on an operatives’ attitude to work and in addition their competency to carry out a piece 
of work. A professional is expected to work to a defined set of standards and to have the 
required competencies to carry out the task to the required standard. In addition, they will 
demonstrate a commitment to the task that goes beyond simply completing the task to the 
minimum standard. Put simply, a non-professional worker might down tools the minute their 
shift finishes whereas a professional might reasonably expected to continue after their shift 
has ended to complete a task that has been started for some other esoteric principle such as 
discharge of an organization’s values or for the good of a patient.  
During the course of this research it was observed that Pharmacists who belong to a 
profession that is regulated, by the General Pharmaceutical Society (GPhC) and has a code 
of conduct and standards, written by the Royal Pharmaceutical Society (RPS) approached 
their tasks differently to Pharmacy technicians who at the time of this research did not belong 
to a regulated professional body and therefore were not professionals. This can be seen in 
the section of work where nine pharmacists and nine pharmacy technicians were observed 
carrying our one step in the dispensing process, the final accuracy checking step. This is the 
step where an item has passed through the pharmacist clinical screening step that ensures 
that the seven patient rights have been compiled with; that the right medicine has been 
prescribed for the right patient in the right dose by the right route at the right time for the right 
condition with the right documentation. The next step is for a label to be generated and the 
product to be selected and labelled and together with any ancillary items, such as a medicine 
syringe or spoon and a bag, is passed to the final accuracy checker to ensure everything has 
been assembled correctly. 
Jee et al (2016) investigated the process of professional socialization in pharmacy trainees 
during their pre-registration year. The pre-registration year is a year which all pharmacists 
must undertake after graduation from university and before registration a s a pharmacist with 
the General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC). The researchers followed twenty pre-
registration pharmacist students and concluded that the training experienced during this year 
did affect their professional socialisation, although how and in what way wasn’t described.  
It could be argued that professionalism could be distilled into three components, 
responsibility, competent and identity. Responsibility to always endeavour to produce outputs 
to the appropriate standard, usually these is regulated by a professional body such as the 
General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) in the case of Pharmacists. Another component is 
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competence, to ensure one works at the appropriate level and in addition maintains once 
competence though continuing education and a sense of belonging and pride in so doing. At 
the time of this study pharmacy technicians were not professionals in the sense of belong to 
a regulatory body, for example the GPhC. In chapter 4 a variance was observed in the way 
the pharmacist cohort approached their work and the way in which the pharmacy technician 
cohort behaved. No such anomaly was observed in the composite ward team describe in 
chapter 7, that was between the nursing members who belong to a regulated body and the 
pharmacy technicians who at the time didn’t belong to a regulatory body. It could be argued 
that the pharmacy technician ward team members demonstrated professionalism inculcated 
through means of the model itself, which contained the three components of professionalism 
namely, responsibility, competency and identity.  
Workload and Stress 
 
Workload was used as a proxy measure for stress and unexpectedly the two staff groups, the 
Pharmacists and Pharmacy Technicians reacted differently. During the first set of 
observations, the number of steps an individual took to complete a final accuracy check was 
counted. A step was any observable relevant action, such as performing a calculation or 
checking a bag label, in total fifty-seven actions were identified during the observations and 
recorded. As workload increased the number of steps carried out by the pharmacy technician 
group decreased but for the pharmacist group, the number of steps observed increased, this 
was consistent across both groups of operatives. Unsurprisingly, the time spent accuracy 
checking followed this pattern that is the time spent accuracy checking each dispensed 
medicine increased for the pharmacist group but decreased for Pharmacy technician group. 
The final observation observed and recorded only those steps that could be considered to be 
safety orientated steps, for example checking a spoon is present might be considered a 
process step but checking a dose could be considered a safety step. The result is interesting 
in that the number of safety steps that the Pharmacist carried out, as pressure increased, 
decreased as compared with the number of steps that the Pharmacy technicians performed. 
However, the number of safety steps that the Pharmacists carried out started at a higher 
number at the outset, as compared to the Pharmacy Technician group and although the 
number of safety steps decreased in the Pharmacist group and increased in the pharmacy 
Technician group, the Pharmacists carried out a higher number of safety steps even under 
stressful conditions. The reason for this variance between professional and non-professional 
healthcare workers merits further investigation but is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Family (2013) investigated the impact of time pressure on pharmacy students in the context 
of dispensing exercises. The researchers used the National Aeronautics and Space 
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Administration’s (NASA) work –load index, developed by Hart and Staveland (1988) to 
evaluate a participant’s perception of workload. The index assesses a respondent’s response 
in five areas and these are, mental demand, temporal demand, physical demand, 
performance and effort and frustration. The outcome was that time pressure (stress) does 
indeed impact on work accuracy in the given context. 
Lynsksey (2007) investigated fifteen community pharmacies that lay within the Brighton and 
Hove City Primary Care Trust, Sussex. The researchers used self-reporting anonymised 
questionnaires to record errors that had occurred during the study period. The results 
showed that by far the main attributable cause for making an error was being too busy. 
Although this was set in a different context to that of this thesis and the underlying reasons 
for the errors not explicit, nevertheless the perception of the pharmacists who had 
participated was of interest.  
Bond et al (2008) investigated the impact that the introduction of a new community pharmacy 
contract might have on the workforce, paying particular attention to factors such as workload 
and stress. The study was conducted through the instrument of a postal survey sent to all 
community pharmacies (n=1080) located in a stratified random sample of Primary care 
Organisations located across England and Wales. The response rate was high at 71% 
(n=762). A significant number 57%, 237 (n=425 for this question) made clear that they felt 
stressed at work and although the researchers didn’t investigate the impact of this they did 
comment to the effect that this increased stress does call into question a pharmacist’s ability 
to work effectively when clearly stressed and potentially fatigued.  
 
Stress clearly is an error enforcing condition (A Basic Risk Factor) when seen in the context 
of work pressure. In chapter 4 the observable impact that stress had on operatives was 
recorded. As workload increased and here workload was a proxy measure for stress, the 
work pattern of operatives changed, in a way that increased the likelihood of an error 
occurring. The pharmacy technician cohorts’ work rate increased and for both the pharmacy 
technician cohort and the pharmacist cohort, the number of steps that operatives took that 
were considered to be safety steps decreased, which also could be considered to increase 
the likelihood of an error occurring. There are other sources of stress to take into 
consideration that may not be work related but nevertheless are present and arguable could 
impact on an operative’s work performance. The model introduced in chapter 7 controls both 
work rate by virtue of following a standard operating procedure and included visual prompts 
to assist an operative’s focus. 
	 147	
Quality Management  
 
The next element of the literature review was to look for research that investigated the impact 
of introducing Quality Management Systems including related tools and techniques 
developed in other high-risk industries, such as the Checklist. The studies that referred to in 
this section describe studies that look at compliance with existing systems or investigate 
ways of trying to make existing systems safer, none of the studies deemed to be even 
remotely relevant have considered the need to actually change the existing way of working 
and underlying culture in order to bring about improved efficiency and safety.  
Standardising procedures, protocols and medicines interestingly only yielded two papers 
through a literature search, where more could have been reasonably expected due to the 
interest that these attract in healthcare. An example would be the national initiative 
introduced by NHSE (NHSE 2016)191 to force standardization of chemotherapy doses for 
intravenous injection. Standardising procedures could be introduced by introducing an 
electronic prescribing system. This would force users to work in a particular way by limiting 
their options. Johnson et al (2004) conducted a literature review of patient safety enhancing 
technologies and concluded that in paediatrics the five technologies that could improve 
patient safety were Electronic prescribing, electronic Guidelines and protocols, internet based 
disease management resources, tele-consultation and electronic patient healthcare records. 
It is a truism that before you introduce electronic systems one needs to have reviewed how 
efficient the manual system is and has introduced lean working at the pre-electronic stage, or 
one could replicate inefficiencies in process electronically, and hence the development of 
systems analysis in the late 1970’s. Systems analysts are qualified to investigate paper-
based systems or people based systems, and then to analyse and interpret information flows.  
 
Bullock (2006) determined the impact of introducing standardised intravenous infusions onto 
a Paediatric Intensive Care Unit in Mattel Children’s Hospital, California, USA. The outputs 
were significant with error rates for incorrect doses falling from 52% to 21% as a result. 
Standardization of processes clearly reduced errors for so many reasons but in order to 
introduce standardised procedures there is a bargain to be struck as standardization 
arguably erodes professional independence. 
 
																																																								
191 NHSE (2016). "CA2 Nationally Standardised Dose Banding Adult Intravenous SACT." 
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Van der Velde (2010) compared error rates arising from during the prescribing process when 
two different approaches to generating prescriptions (orders for medication) were used. The 
two approaches were to use an electronic prescribing system to generate prescriptions or a 
system of pre-printed forms. The team-reviewed prescriptions generated by means of 
electronic prescribing (n=373) and pre-printed forms (n=538) and analysed the errors found 
using the NCCMERP (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention) in the USA, NCCMERP (2016)192 that categorizes medication errors according to 
the degree of harm that they caused. Of relevance to this thesis was the fact that the 
researchers identified six errors that had the causative factor attributed to high workload 
distraction. 
Another strategy, described by Lepee (2012) would be introducing a checklist. Here 
described having been introduced onto a medical round in a busy London hospital paediatric 
ward in order to help a prescriber focus on the job in hand. The researchers found that 
although the quality of prescription writing improved slightly after the intervention of a 
prescribing checklist was introduced and figures were cited of a reduction in technical errors 
from 10.8% to 7.3%, there was no impact was perceived in the clinical error rate. A technical 
error might be the omission of the prescriber’s contact details for example. Significantly the 
investigators comment that a change in culture may be needed to realise any significant 
improvements.  
Manias (2005) investigated how nurses actually use protocols in relation to medicines 
management tasks, in other words do they actually follow the protocol? They observed 12 
graduate nurses working on a busy surgical ward in a metropolitan hospital in Australia. More 
specifically they observed the nurses during two-hour medicine administration rounds where 
patients are given their medication. What the discovered was that nurses followed the 
protocols provided they didn’t impede other nursing duties. They were also more likely to 
follow the protocols if they could also make decisions in their own right and if it decreased the 
likelihood of disciplinary action. This does raise the issue of healthcare professionalism, that 
is healthcare workers see themselves as independent practitioners and have a tendency to 
prefer not to follow protocols. This was discovered to be a reason for non-participation or 
partial participation in one of the studies that comprise this thesis where nurses were invited 
to participate in a quality systems approach to medicines preparation and administration on a 
busy paediatric oncology ward in my hospital.   
																																																								192	NCCMERP (2016). "MERP index."; < http://www.nccmerp.org/sites/default/files/algorColor2001-06-
12.pdf> [accessed 12/09/2016].	
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Pape (2012) investigating the impact of introducing the MedSafe protocol in a 600-bed 
hospital situated in Middle America. The MedSafe protocol consists of a number of steps to 
prevent nurses engaged in medicines preparation and administration from being interrupted. 
Through a series of measures that reduce interruptions, for example using visible signs such 
as notices on walls, yellow duct tape on the floor to indicate quiet zones and wearing a sash 
all to indicate that the wearer is not to be interrupted, error rates reduced significantly during 
the study period. In England, in some hospitals, nurses engaged in a medicines 
administration round, wear a red tabard the significance of which is that they are not to be 
interrupted. In both cases the system doesn’t change but by introducing minor superficial 
amendments, impressive improvements can be realised. It is less clear whether tinkering 
around the edge in this way delivers long term sustainable improvements and it has been 
said that if you want to find a nurse on a busy ward, the one wearing a bright red tabard or 
sash is certainly easy to identify!  
Other researchers concluded that standardization of procedures and protocols and indeed 
medicines will yield improved safety outcomes, Johnson (2004), Bullock (2006). Several 
papers already mention in passing the requirement to introduce a safety culture, Verschoor 
(2007) describes an initiative introduced into a group of Women and Children’s’ healthcare 
facility in British Columbia, Canada describing the introduction of initiatives that help to do 
just this, that is introduce a safety culture from the top down rather than through the means of 
a specific project, by virtue of the introduction of safety walkabouts and safety briefings and 
the fact that senior management are willing to introduce improvements to improve safety. No 
data is introduced in the paper that quantifies the benefits or otherwise of this approach. 
Sullivan (2004) describes the beneficial impact of introducing lean methodology into an 
aseptic compounding unit in New Haven Hospital, Connecticut, USA and as a result reduced 
the turnaround times for compounding chemotherapy intra venous injections from 91 minutes 
to 20 minutes. Improved efficiency could be argued due to a thorough review of practice may 
also impact on safety. 
Raja (2009) investigated compliance to medicines administration protocols on a neonatal 
intensive care unit in a hospital in Malaysia. The study revealed less than complete 
adherence to the medicines administration protocols by nurses and as a consequence the 
nurses were given remedial re-education, which does sound vaguely, disciplinary in nature. 
After this remedial re-education took place some improvement was realised but the 
implication was that this approach enjoyed limited success. For completeness, a report by 
Samman (2011) has been included that describes a safety improvement strategy being 
introduced at St Vincent Indianapolis community hospital in America to address safety 
concerns over the management of a very high strength insulin injection. The hospital 
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introduced a series of guides, prescribing forms and picking sheets to mitigate the risk but no 
data were presented in the report.   
The most impressive and thorough piece of work carried out by McLeod and Barber (2015) 
that utilized a variety of study approaches to comprehensively map and understand what took 
place during medicines administration rounds in three National Health Service Trusts in 
England. The study conducted over 85 hours, observing 43 nurses during 56 drug rounds 
across three hospital wards. The investigators concluded that to reduce medication 
administration errors the medicines administration processes need improving, that 
interruptions both direct and indirect need to be reduced and they also go on to add that 
patients ought be more involved with their medication where appropriate. 
Cottney (2014) investigated the benefit or otherwise of introducing automated drug cabinets 
onto an inpatient ward in an English Hospital in regard to reducing medication administration 
related errors. These cabinets consist of locked doors and drawers that require an operator 
to access via a computer control system. The software requires an operator to identify 
themselves; the patient that they intend administering a medicine to, the medicine itself and 
the quantity. The resulting data actually showed that implementing automated drug cabinets 
impacted little on error rates but did save a small amount of nursing time. Presumably 
reducing time that it took to locate a particular patient’s medication in a previously cluttered 
medicine trolley or cupboard in the treatment room.  
McLeod (2015) empirically investigated a healthcare environment to discover what issues 
might be present but don’t go on to suggest a strategy to address the issues that were 
revealed. By contrast, the other authors describe a solution to a single problem that had been 
identified.  
Implications 	
Notwithstanding the fact that error causation theory is well understood, a literature search 
failed to find work that conducted empirical research into the impact on operatives of Basic 
Risk Factors, such as error enforcing conditions, in the context of a healthcare environment. 
Latent errors were identified, which included interruptions, stress, communication, and 
training. In addition, the issue of professionalism was considered as was reporting and 
learning from errors in a way that changed practice. The significance and importance of 
creating a genuine learning culture was considered, Senge (2006). All of these elements 
were combined into a quality management approach. 
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The Model     
 
The proposal or strategy that resulted from this work contains the following elements; 
 
1. Staff groups were selected by virtue of their work cultural style approach to tasks. 
Pharmacy technicians particularly pay attention to detail, are protocol driven and risk 
adverse were paired with nursing staff who have a clinical and patient work culture 
focus.  
2. Pharmacy technicians were inculcated with a professionalism, a responsibility to the 
task. This was brought about in a number of ways. They received additional training 
at a high level for the new task that they were required to undertake. This included 
training from a senior nurse trainer, to the same level that nurses received. They were 
given ownership of the project and responsibility for delivering on it. 
3. The environment, in which the teams worked, the ward treatment room, was tightly 
controlled and kept both quiet and uncluttered. 
4. The standard operating procedure (SoP) to which the operatives worked included a 
checklist, which acted as a visual prompt, steps within the task were listed and ticked 
off when completed, so operatives always knew where in the SoP they were at any 
given time that is what task they had completed and what tasks remained to be 
carried out. A visual aid was also included that led operatives through the necessary 
complex calculations required of them. All operatives carried out calculations 
therefore in the same way. 
5. The nurse member of the team was encouraged to undertake complex flow rate 
calculations in the quiet of the treatment room at the outset of the process rather than 
at the end of the process at the patients’ bedside where they were prone to distraction 
and interruption.   
6. Errors or near misses were recorded and discussed with the senior ward and 
pharmacy staff at a later stage with changes being made to practice as necessary.  
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The Future 
   
The aim and objectives of this research have been achieved and has produced measurable 
and positive results. In phase 1 the objective was to identify latent errors in one step of the 
dispensing process in a paediatric hospital pharmacy. In phase two the objective was to 
investigate the error reporting and learning process and determine the efficiency of the 
process and finally in phase 3 the objective was to analyse the outcomes from the first two 
phases together with error causation theory and relevant published research, if any, and 
develop and test a new risk mitigation model.  
There would be merit in extending the project to another ward area and collecting data over 
an extended period of time, before proceeding to replicate the approach in another National 
Health Service Hospital followed by a hospital set in a different but related culture for 
example on mainland Europe. 
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Chapter 8.  Conclusion 
 
Error causation theory was discussed at length and the two approaches that theorists use, 
the human approach that is errors arise due to human weakness to the fact that individuals 
can be careless, inattentive, perverse or simply incompetent. The second approach being 
that of flawed systems, flawed in the sense that error enforcing conditions, emanating from 
basic risk factors, lie dormant in systems but the systems are poorly designed and fail to trap 
these flaws from making themselves known as errors.   
 
An appreciation of how memory works and how the brain responds to multiple stimuli formed 
another arm of the foundational theory required for this research.  
A comprehensive literature review revealed that to date little consideration had been given to 
either an appreciation of how individual operatives react in a stressful healthcare environment 
containing multiple stimuli impacting continually on these individuals or the implication of 
professionalism for how operatives approach their work.  
This first study, showed that there was a measurable connection between workload, used as 
a proxy measure for stress and performance. It was noted that the pharmacist cohort and the 
pharmacy technician cohort behaved in explicitly different ways to each other, raising the 
question of professional versus non-professional behaviour. Interruptions appeared to cause 
both sets of operatives to become distracted and lose awareness of what they had completed 
and what task remained to be completed and this led to unnecessary task repetition. 
It was widely accepted, a priori; in the literature that interruptions lead to errors rather than 
post priori that is from observation. It was therefore determined to establish whether 
interruptions in reality actually impacted adversely on operatives leading to errors occurring 
or whether this was merely an assumption but in reality something else was happening.  
If the sole cause of errors in healthcare task related scenarios were due to external 
interruptions, then introducing a do not interrupt zone would work effectively. On the other 
hand, if the causes were multiple then the solution would arguably be more complex. 
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This reasoning led to the next project in this research and that was to establish the impact 
that interruptions whether direct or indirect actually had on an operative performing a 
designated controlled task. This post priori approach was unique in the literature in a 
healthcare setting. It was found that interruptions did in fact impact adversely on efficiency 
and output performance.  
To test the reliability of incident evidence, consideration was given to the process of 
recording incidents and errors collected by National Health Service organisations, through 
the National Learning and Reporting System (NLRS). Data submitted through the NLRS is 
collected electronically by means of free text data entry. The project analysed 12 months IR1 
incident forms to determine cost and attitude towards the process. It was found that the 
process was relatively inexpensive to manage but inefficient when it comes to learning from 
the incidents themselves.   
The question remained as to whether interruptions were the critical failure in the system or 
were there other factors that needed to be taken into consideration. In order to predict latent 
errors in paediatric hospital pharmacy it was thought necessary to explore the impact that 
other relevant elements of the system might have. To this end it was determined to observe a 
similar but unrelated high-risk industry environment and observe how risks had been 
predicted, controlled and mitigated against. This led to a visit to a revalidation exercise for 
airline pilots. This comprised a 4.5-hour flight simulator exercise in which various incidents 
were given to the pilots and observations made followed by debrief and analysis of their 
performance. The similarities are many both healthcare operatives work as teams in high 
risk, high stress often-unpredictable situations and are required to make high impact 
decisions at short notice and subject to interruptions.    
Finally a project, described fully above, was devised in which the emergent hypothesis was 
tested. Pharmacy technicians partnered ward-nursing staff on specific medicine 
administration ward rounds. The medicine administration process was completely redesigned 
completely taking into account data collected during the course of this research and lessons 
learnt from error causation theory and error reports from other high-risk industries.  
Time was allowed in which current approaches could be reviewed and reassessed and a 
new-shared vision developed. In which, the team itself took ownership of the project and had 
space to challenge their existing mental models and develop new ones.  
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A protocol driven approach was introduced to ensure standardised working with clear 
operating procedures, together with a checklist based upon the five patient rights. Visual aids 
help operatives pick up where they’ve left off after an unplanned distraction, for example an 
interruption. In addition, a dose, volume and flow rate calculator guide that not only 
documents calculations but ensures they are carried out in the same way was also included. 
The treatment room, where the intravenous injections were prepared, was designated a quiet 
area.  
Double-checking of doses, medicines and patient identity, a practice deemed necessary in 
paediatric healthcare because of the complexity of the medicines and vulnerability of the 
patients, was ensured by the process and documented. This in itself is quite unique and 
probably the first time this has been achieved and evidenced.  
Complex flow rate calculations, necessary for setting up the infusion pump that controls 
administration of the drug into the patient that previously were undertaken at the patient’s 
bedside and the operative subject to interruptions and distractions was moved to the quiet of 
the treatment room.  
Finally, errors or latent errors were recorded and reported in real time and team meetings 
held to consider how to respond and whether or not to make process changes. 
In other words, a combination of designed process, the use of visual aids and prompts and a 
controlled environment together with appropriate training was introduced.  This package of 
approaches was utilised in a different but related paediatric healthcare environment to 
undertake medicine related accuracy related tasks. 
The outcome was that during the study period the incident reporting system for the hospital 
reported an unaccountable fall in incidents and errors on the oncology ward. The number of 
these increased at the end of the project. Whilst the link between the fall in incidents for the 
duration of the project must be regarded as anecdotal due to the fact that a direct causal link 
hasn’t been established and indeed falls outside of the remit of this project, however the 
coincidence was overwhelming. 	
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The Objectives of this project were threefold 
1. To identify latent risks associated with in a specific task set in an NHS paediatric 
hospital pharmacy department. Then to establish the extent to which these latent risks 
may be predicted. One specific area of paediatric pharmacy practice, the  final 
accuracy checking process, will be the medium for this study 
 
2. To investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of the current Incident reporting system 
(IR1s) in supporting learning from incidents and changing practice.   
3. To determine the impact of introducing a Quality Management Approach to process 
design into one process on a busy Oncology ward in the same paediatric hospital and 
determine the benefits of this approach including in terms of risk reduction. 
The latent risks have been identified, the impact of introducing a quality management 
approach systematic approach taking into account error causation theory, published research 
and data collected during the course of this project has been successful it would appear in 
impacting upon error and incident rates. The IR1 incident and error reporting system is 
efficient but less so in generating learning from those errors. 					 	 _______________________________________________________	
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Appendix 1 - Questionnaire  (Chapter 4) 			The following questionnaire, described in chapter 4, was available in the dispensary to be 
completed on a voluntary ad hoc basis that is a participant operative was invited to complete 
a form as often as they went into the dispensary to undertake a dispensary duty. These 
dispensary “duties” would typically last between 60-120 minutes on each occasion. 		
		
The following extract from a worksheet summarises the domain of interest and the scale of 
feeling experienced towards it.  	
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Appendix 2 – Extract of results from the questionnaire (Chapter 4) 	
		
The table recorded the time and date of the dispensary duty to which the completed form 
referred to and the initials of who completed the form. The next eight columns record the 
domains of interest from Environmental noise (EN) across to Knowledge Base (K). The 
numbers express the degree of feeling as shown in the second table in appendix 1. 
Participants were also asked to note if they had made an error. Workload was also noted. 
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Appendix 3 – Individual interviews relating to the study in Chapter 4 
 
Each participant was interviewed individually using a semi structured interview technique and 
then the transcripts were analysed using Action Research methodology identifying key 
themes from reoccurring words (bold typeface) . The content of the interviews were made by 
means of the interviewer taking notes. 
It was decided not to use the resulting data, as although of interest it didn’t add to the 
outcomes data sufficiently to be of use. 	
Key Themes and Comments 
 
MS  20/02/08 
 
 What does experienced checker technician mean?  
o Confident? 
 Reasons for Checkers being interrupted include 
o To clarify something on a prescription often by technicians not used to being in 
the dispensary     TRAINING 
o To clarify something that a Clinical Checker has passed i.e. incomplete 
documentation of clinical decisions   CLARIFICATION 
o Loud noise can be intrusive. NOISE 
o Would prefer to sit but its quicker to stand and also doesn’t obstruct gangway.  
WORKPLACE DESIGN 
 
 ERROR    missed an expiry dateàmissed step in checking process CLUTTERED 
PRESCRIPTIONà PAPERWORK DESIGN 
 Labels are difficult to check on ASCribe 
o Reasoning as to why a particular quantity was selected 
o Also to identify just who produced the label 
 PMRs There is no uniform approach and drug amendments are not being moved into 
History and so can easily select incorrect dose. TRAINING & PROCEDURES 
 
MMcM 18/03/08 
 
 Content to check 
 Prefer to stand 
 DISTRACTIONS 
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o Pressure from wards    PRESSURE TO WORK FASTER 
o Pressure if know patient is waiting at Hatch PRESSURE TO WORK FASTER 
o Door opening and closing     NOISE 
o Phone ringing, especially if left to ring 
 Position in Dispensary not an issue 
 Checking system 
o Check prescription 
o Check item 
o Check dose and volume (Calculate) 
o Check  
§ Name 
§ Strength 
§ Date 
§ Name on label 
§ Drug and dose 
 ERROR 
o Returned from ward and found no staff  …felt angry EMOTION 
o Needed a drug releasing from bond for a patient who had already been down 
three times   PRESSURE 
o Staff absent at a safety group meeting  OWNERSHIP 
 When there’s pressure to check more rapidly or to check items out of sequence     
PRESSURE 
 
SO 27/3/08 
 
 Mood acceptable 
o Mood affects session if away from normal work i.e. ward and know that work 
on ward is backing up  DISTRACTED 
o Also if in dispensary for several back to back sessions i.e. dispensing and then 
checking 
 Prefers to Stand 
 Positioning of workstation       WORKPLACE DESIGN 
o Long walks helps to clear mind 
o a/c too cold 
o Hatch is distracting 
 Interruptions include 
o Bleep 
o Asked questions about Ward 15 work   PRESSURE àEXPECTATIONS to 
know everything 
o Noise 
o Phone 
§ When distracted start again 
 Length of session is OK 75 minutes 
 ERROR 
o Dispensing Omeprazole MUPS 
§ Checked Box 
§ Checked label 
§ Took strips out and checked them 
§ Bagged items 
§ Had second thoughts and rechecked contents and found that one 
tablet strip was an incorrect strength 
§ Was busy and felt distracted  PRESSURE 
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 Distractions 
o Name called out allowed in dispensary particularly if its sounds like my name 
o When checking try to zone out NOISE 
o People walking down gangway directly behind me  WORKPLACE DESIGN 
o People working close by me WORKPLACE DESIGN 
 
 Retain some outers and discard others? 
o Retain box to protect bottle 
o Discard box to prevent wards confusing item with ward stock 
 If harassed by ward feel PRESSURE 
 
LW 28/3/08 
 
 Content to check 
 Prefer to stand 
 Don’t like to walk to pigeon holes as can get called to the Hatch, as feel worried that 
I’m not checking, but can’t ignore people at hatch  WORKPLACE DESIGN     
PRESSURE 
  Interruptions 
o  At lunchtime am often the only available technician so get asked questions, 
including from Pharmacists who just pop in and out àannoying      EMOTION  
o My Own ward phones to speak with me      
o Have to block out noises     NOISE 
o As am skilled with computer often get asked how to do things, if busy have to 
say NO!   EMOTION      PRESSURE 
o Also if tired tell people not to ask questions!   EMOTION 
o Multiple interruptions 
o A/C distracting as too cold    ENVIRONMENT 
o Being near to Hatch   
o Colleagues walking close behind in gangway WORKPLACE DESIGN 
o Colleagues working close behind in gangway WORKPLACE DESIGN 
 Sessions are right length  (75 minutes) 
 ERROR   
o  late night, very busy and feeling tired at end of long extended day     
EMOTION 
o worrying about drug being dispensed (Thalidomide) 
o also about quantity being issued 
o was most senior technician on duty….felt responsibilities PRESSURE 
o Phones ringing  NOISE 
o Colleague (the Porter) harassing to be able to leave   PRESSURE     
DISTRACTION 
o Labelling error with respect to the strength 
  Procedures 
o We don’t use tracker properly TRAINING 
o Clinical pharmacists do not make their decisions clear so that anyone could 
simply dispense what they are recommending. TRAINING  
o Insufficient workspace WORKPLACE DESIGN 
o People have a Lack of confidence in using ASCribe   TRAINING 
o PMRS colleagues do not put the same thing in the record and hence on the 
label as on the prescription.  TRAINING 
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o Labels are attached to containers obscuring information TRAINING 
 
 
DR   28/3/08 
 
 
 Content to Check 
 Prefer to sit 
 Workplace positioning 
o It’s a problem if too near to the Hatch 
o Walking to various destinations is ok 
o Not distracted by people walking in gangway or working behind me 
o Noise not an issue 
o A/C not an issue 
o Talking if too loud does distract  NOISE 
o Too crowded WORKPLACE DESIGN 
 
 Distractions 
o Students asking questions    DISTRACTED 
o Phone Calls 
o Being called to the hatch to deal with an issue 
o Often am asked questions because of my role as dispensary senior technician 
o If distracted then start checking again    
o Takes 10 minutes to get into checking zone. If asked a question especially if 
one knows the answer then drop out of checking zone EMOTION  
DISTRACTION  
 Checking session is right length (75 minutes) 
 ERROR 
o Incorrect paracetamol dose on label that had dispensed. 
o Calculated dose in Head and volume required was incorrect and as was dose. 
§ It was a busy Monday p.m.   PRESSURE 
§ Worried about late night coming up   EMOTION 
§ Varied from own usual checking procedure   DISTRACTED 
§ Brain saturated   frazzled     EMOTION  
§ Cut corners 
 
SM  31/3/08 
 
 
 
 Neutral to checking 
o Usually stand unless dealing with a complex prescription i.e. cystic then prefer 
to sit    and to be somewhere quieter    NOISE WORKPLACE DESIGN 
 Walking to destinations is OK otherwise become uncomfortable 
 Interruptions 
o Labellers ask what my labelling preferences are!  TRAINING 
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o Sounds can distract as can complete silence   NOISE   SILENCE 
o Might ask for person to be quiet 
o If interrupted will start checking item again   
 Length of session is ok (75 minutes) 
 ERROR 
o Complex Outpatient prescription 
o 11-12 items on prescription FORM DESIGN  CLUTTERED 
o missed a dose i.e. was 2.5mLs  but gave 5mLs 
o spotted by parent at home 
o Felt Gutted as a result 
o Was removed from checking rota as was third error in six months (!!!) 
 Processes 
o Dispensary bench becoming cluttered 
o If other colleagues are working too close to me WORKPLACE DESIGN 
o Hatch is an issue i.e. 
§ If people are looking at me , burning eyes or 
§ Get caught at the hatch to deal with something 
o Talks out load to self  through checking steps 
 
RA 14/4/08 
 Neutral to checking 
 Prefers to Sit 
 Sitting of accuracy checking station not good as often get interrupted but getting up to 
walk to places is ok. WORKPLACE DESIGN 
 Interruptions tend to be due to 
o Hatch 
o Phone Calls 
o Dispensing and labelling queries  TRAINING 
o NOISE i.e. Children outside hatch 
o Blocks out dispensary hubbub……not too much of a distraction…get used to 
it. 
 If interrupted half way through checking an item then will start again from where 
interruption occurred 
 Prefer shorter time slots i.e.   1.25 hours is Ok even up to 2 hours but if longer then 
will split the time with someone else. 
 ERROR   prescription was for Codeine tablets tds 
o Directions were correct but the warning was left unchanged which said that no 
more than four doses to be taken in 24 hours. 
o Comment: was dealing with a problem on a prescription with a pharmacist but 
was called back to check this prescription urgently as someone was waiting. 
PRESSURE 
 Dispensary System 
o Previously labelled and dispensed but now these two functions have been 
separated. 
o Harder to track the person who had labelled an item . 
o Now the dispenser is asked to be responsible for their work 
o PMRs are completed by the clinical pharmacist but the same information isn’t 
put onto the prescription and so intention is not communicated with rest of 
team.  INFORMATION/TRAINING? 
o Don’\t go by PMR 
§ Incorrect item is often selected by the Pharmacist 
§ Or wrong form 
§ Or wrong treatment length 
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§ Or wrong directions 
§ Or information has been added by a tech and not a pharmacist    
TRAINING 
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Appendix 4 – Focus groups (Chapter 4) 	
The final stage of the study described in chapter 4 was to hold two focus groups, one for the 
pharmacist cohort and one for the technician cohort. These lasted 60 minutes and each 
cohort was asked the same question, “How many steps do you think it takes to accuracy 
check a simple medicine request, for example  a request for Paracetamol liquid”? Each group 
answered as a group having taken a consensus and then this response was compared with 
the observations made and described in chapter 4. 
Then each group was asked to describe the individual steps that comprise the accuracy 
checking process and these were mapped using SSADM (Structured system and design 
methodology) flow diagrams. The steps asked for, were what they actually did not what they 
thought needed to be done. These flow diagrams were constructed one for each group, using 
a flip chart with A1 paper. 
The Pharmacists’ group response 	
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The technician group’s response required two A1 sheets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 					
  
. 	
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Appendix 5- Publications related to the studies in this thesis 
Publication 1 (Chapter 4) Published in the British Journal of Clinical Pharmacy; Vol 2. 2010 
Page 1 
 Pages 168-169 removed for copyright restrictions. 
170	
Publication 2 (Chapter 5) To investigate how disruptive interruptions are on paediatric 
dispensary accuracy checkers 
Eur J Hosp Pharm 2012;19:90 doi:10.1136/ejhpharm-2012-000074.15 
171	
Publication 3 (Chapter 6) Investigating the cost and efficiency of incident reporting in 
a specialist paediatric NHS Hospital and impact on patient safety. 
http://ejhp.bmj.com/content/24/2/91
 Pages 172-175 removed for copyright restrictions. 
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Publication 4 (Chapter 7) The Introduction of pharmacy technicians onto a busy oncology 
ward. 
Sinclair A, et al. Eur J Hosp Pharm 2016;0:1–4. doi:10.1136/ejhpharm-2016-000951 
http://ejhp.bmj.com/content/early/2016/06/07/ejhpharm-2016-000951
 Pages 177-179 removed for copyright restrictions. 
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Appendix 6   Other Publications 
Terry,D; Petridis,K; Aiello,M; Sinclair, A; et al. The potential for pharmacists to manage 
children attending emergency departments. Archives of Disease in Childhood 101(9):e2.1-
e2 · September 2016 DOI: 10.1136/archdischild-2016-311535.1  
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medication discrepancies and clinical significance of medicines reconciliation in children 
admitted to hospital; Archives of Disease in Childhood 101(1) · November 2015 DOI: 
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Bird, C; Hartshorn, S; Sinclair, A. Safety of "single checker" patient group directives for 
selected medications during initial nurse assessment in the emergency department (ed) 
Archives of Disease in Childhood 100(Suppl 3):A34-A34 · April 2015 DOI: 
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Huynh, C; Tomlin, S; Yogi, Yani; Sinclair, A ; Wilson, K; et al. Medication Discrepancies at 
Transitions in Pediatrics: A Review of the Literature. Paediatric Drugs 15(3) · May 2013 DOI: 
10.1007/s40272-013-0030-8 · Source: PubMed 
Terry,D; Sinclair, A; Prescribing for children at the interfaces of care; Archives of Disease in 
Childhood - Education and Practice 97(4):152-6 · August 2012 DOI: 10.1136/archdischild-
2011-301254 · Source: PubMed 
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Appendix 7 The Checklist and calculation guide (Chapter 7) 
 
 
      The Checklist used in the oncology ward pharmacy technician project 
 
 
             
            The Calculation guide also used in the same project 
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Appendix 8     National Research Ethics Service (NRES) - Ethics approval email 
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